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Preface
You are currently reading the book version of my doctoral dissertation which
I successfully defended at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel on 10th November 2000,
slightlymore than 15 years ago at the time of writing this preface. I feel privileged
to have been the very first to implement Luc Steels’ language game paradigm on
a robotic platform. As you will read, the robots I used at that moment were very
limited in their sensing, computational ressources and motor control. Moreover,
I spent much time repairing the robots, as they were built from lego parts (not
lego Mindstorms, which was not yet available at the start of my research) and
a homemade sensorimotor board. As a result, the experimental setup and the
evolved lexicons were also very limited. Nevertheless, the process of implement-
ing the model, carrying out the experiments and analysing these, has provided a
wealth of insights and knowledge on lexicon grounding in an evolutionary con-
text, which, I believe, are still relevant today.
Much progress has been made since the writing of this dissertation. First, the
language game paradigm has been implemented in more advanced robots, start-
ingwith the Talking Heads (Steels et al. 2002) and the Sony Aibo (Steels & Kaplan
2000), which emerged while I was struggling with the lego robots, then soon fol-
lowed by various humanoid platforms, such as Sony’s Qrio (see, e.g. Steels 2012
and this book series). Second, the cognitive architecture has become much more
advanced through the development of fcg (Steels & De Beule 2006), which al-
lowed for more complex languages to emerge, resembling more closely natural
languages. Third, the underlying processes of language games, in particular of
the naming game, and the resulting dynamics in an evolutionary context have
been widely studied using methods stemming from statistical mechanics (e.g.,
Baronchelli et al. 2006).
During the first years after the completion of my dissertation, I have published
various studies from this book as journal articles (Vogt 2000a; 2002; 2003a). A
broader review of using robots in studies of language evolution has appeared
in Vogt 2006. Building further on the work presented in this book, I formu-
lated the physical symbol grounding hypothesis (Vogt 2002). This hypoth-
esis essentially states that Harnad’s (1990) symbol grounding problem is not a
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philosophical problem, but a technical problem that needs to be addressed by
(virtual) robotic agents situated in a (virtual) environment, provided we adopt
Peirce’s semiotics, because according to this view, symbols have per definition
meaning. As physical symbol grounding can in principle be achieved by indi-
vidual agents, the ability to develop a shared symbolic communication system
is a (much) harder challenge. This challenge, which I have called social symbol
grounding (Vogt & Divina 2007), has remained my primary research focus.
The fact that I worked in a lab without robotic platforms forced me to con-
tinue my research in simulations. Although simulations move away from the
advantages of studying physically situated language development, it allowed me
to scale up and, not unimportantly, speed up the research. Together with Hans
Coumans, I reimplemented the three types of language games studied in this
book (the observational game, the guessing game and what I then called the self-
ish game) in a simulation to demonstrate that the selfish game can work properly
(Vogt &Coumans 2003), despite the results presented in this book. Inmy disserta-
tion, the term “selfish game” was used to indicate that the hearer had to interpret
an utterance solely based on the utterance and the context without receiving ad-
ditional cues through joint attention or feedback. I later discovered that the statis-
tical learning method I implemented is known as cross-situational learning
(Pinker 1984; Siskind 1996). As I have worked a lot on cross-situational learn-
ing (xsl) over the past decade, I have decided to change the term “selfish game”
into xsl game. Apart from a few small typos, this is the only change made with
respect to the original dissertation.
Over the years, I have become convinced that xsl is the basic learning mech-
anism that humans use to learn word-meaning mappings. xsl learning allows
the learner to infer the meaning of a word by using the covariation of meanings
that occur in the contexts of different situations. In Smith et al. (2006), we have
shown that xsl can be highly robust under large amounts of referential uncer-
tainty (i.e. a lexicon can be learned well even when an agent hears a word in
contexts containing many possible meanings). However, this was shown using
a mathematical model containing many unrealistic assumptions. When relaxing
such assumptions, such as using a robot (cf. this book), having many agents in
the population (Vogt & Coumans 2003) or assuming that words and meanings
occur following a Zipfian distribution (Vogt 2012), xsl is no longer that powerful.
To resolve this, a learner requires additional cues to learn a human-size lexicon,
such as joint attention or corrective feedback.
These ideas were further elaborated in the eu funded New Ties project (Gilbert
et al. 2006), in whichwe aimed to set up a large scale ALife simulation, containing
viii
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thousands of agents who “lived” in a complex environment containing all sorts
of objects, who could move around, and who would face all sorts of challenges in
order to survive. The agents would learn to survive through evolutionary adap-
tation based on genetic transmission, individual learning and social learning of
skills and language. Although we only succeeded partially, an interesting modi-
fication of the language game was implemented. In this implementation, agents
could engage in a more dialogue-like interaction requesting additional cues or
testing learnt vocabulary. They could also pass on learnt skills to other agents
using the evolved language. The interactions could involve both joint attention
and corrective feedback to reduce referential uncertainty, while learning was
achieved through xsl (Vogt & Divina 2007; Vogt & Haasdijk 2010).
Another line of research that I have carried out after writing this book, com-
bined the language game paradigm with Kirby and Hurford’s 2002 iterated
learning model, studying the emergence of compositional structures in lan-
guage (Vogt 2005b,a). This hybrid model, implemented in the simulation toolkit
thsim (Vogt 2003b), simulates the Talking Heads experiment.1 These studies
have provided fundamental insights on how compositionality might have evolv-
ed through cultural evolution bymeans of social interactions, social learning and
self-organisation. Population dynamics, transmission over generations, and the
active acquisition of language and meaning were considered crucial ingredients
of this model (for an overview of the results, see Vogt 2007).
While I was making good progress with all this modelling work, providing
interesting and testable predictions on language evolution and language acquisi-
tion, I increasingly realised the importance of validating these predictions with
empirical data from studies with humans (or other animals). Together with Bart
de Boer, we organised a week-long meeting in which language evolution mod-
ellers working on various topics were coupled to researchers working on empiri-
cal data from various fields, such as child language acquisition, animal communi-
cation, cognitive linguistics, etc. In this workshop, novel approaches to compare
our models as closely as possible to empirical findings were developed (Vogt &
de Boer 2010).
As there is virtually no empirical data on the evolution of word-meaning map-
pings, the most straightforward comparison that could be made with my mod-
elling researchwas to compare to child language acquisition (Vogt& Lieven 2010).
Although there is a wealth of data on child language acquisition, none was found
that captured the data needed to make a reliable comparison. Therefore, I decided
to collect the data myself. This resulted in a project on which I have worked
1 Downloadable from http://ilk.uvt.nl/~pvogt/thsim.html.
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for over the past five years. Its aim is to develop longitudinal corpora of chil-
dren’s interactions with their (social) environment from different cultures (the
Netherlands andMozambique), together with parental estimates of the children’s
vocabulary size at different ages during children’s second year of life. In these
corpora, recordings of naturalistic observations are annotated based on the type
of interactions (e.g. dyadic vs. triadic interactions), the use of gestures such as
pointing, the use of feedback, the child-directed speech and the children’s social
network of interactions. The resulting corpora contain statistical descriptions of
the types of interactions and stimuli which the children from the different cul-
tures encounter. The idea is that these corpora can be used to set the parameters
of language game simulations similar to the one described in Vogt & Haasdijk
(2010). The aim is to simulate observed naturalistic interactions and to compare
the lexicon development of the artificial agents with that of the simulated chil-
dren. If the predictions from the simulations match the observed development of
the children, then we may be confident that the model is an accurate (or at least
highly plausible) theory of children’s language acquisition. Development of the
ultimate model, however, may take another 15 years. (For more details on this
approach, consult Vogt & Mastin 2013.)
Now, let us move on to where it all started for me. Before going there, however,
I would like to apologise for any mistake that you may encounter, or visions I
may no longer adhere to, and which could easily have been repaired if I would





In 1989 I started to study physics at the University of Groningen, because at
that time it seemed to me that the working of the brain could best be explained
with a physics background. Human intelligence has always fascinated me, and I
wanted to understand how our brains could establish such a wonderful feature
of our species. After a few years I got disappointed in the narrow specialisation
of a physicist. In addition, it did not provide me the answers to the question I
had. Fortunately, the student advisor of physics, Professor Hein Rood introduced
to me a new study, which would start in 1993 at the University of Groningen
(RuG).This study was called “cognitive science and engineering”, which included
all I was interested in. Cognitive science and engineering combined physics (in
particular biophysics), artificial intelligence, psychology, linguistics, philosophy
and neuroscience in an technical study in intelligence. I would like to thank
Professor Rood very much for that.
This changedmy life. After a few years of study, I became interested in robotics,
especially the field of robotics that Luc Steels was working on at the ai lab of the
Free University of Brussels. In my last year I had to do a research project of six
months resulting in a Master’s thesis. I was pleased to be able to do this at Luc
Steels’ ai lab. Together weworked on our first steps towards grounding language
on mobile robots, which formed the basis of the current PhD thesis. After receiv-
ing my MSc degree (doctoraal in Dutch) in cognitive science and engineering,
Luc Steels gave me the opportunity to start my PhD research in 1997.
I would like to thank Luc Steels very much for giving me the opportunity to
work in his laboratory. He gave me the chance to work in an extremely motivat-
ing research environment on the top floor of a university building with a wide
view over the city of Brussels and with great research facilities. In addition, his
ideas and our fruitful discussions showed me the way to go and inspired me to
express my creativity.
Many thanks for their co-operation, useful discussions and many laughs to
my friends and (ex-)colleagues at the ai lab Tony Belpaeme, Karina Bergen, An-
dreas Birk, Bart de Boer, Sabine Geldof, Edwin de Jong, Holger Kenn, Dominique
Osier, Peter Stuer, Joris Van Looveren, Dany Vereertbrugghen, Thomas Walle
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and all those who have worked here for some time during my stay. I cannot
forget to thank my colleagues at the Sony CSL in Paris for providing me with a
lot of interesting ideas and the time spent during the inspiring off-site meetings:
Frédéric Kaplan, Angus McIntyre, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Gert Westermann and
Jelle Zuidema.
Students Björn Van Dooren andMichael Uyttersprot are thanked for their very
helpful assistance during some of the experiments. Haoguang Zhu is thanked for
translating the title of this thesis into Chinese.
The teaching staff of cognitive science and engineering have been very helpful
for giving me feedback during my study and my PhD research, especially thanks
to Tjeerd Andringa, Petra Hendriks, Henk Mastebroek, Ben Mulder, Niels Taat-
gen and Floris Takens. Furthermore, some of my former fellow students from
Groningen had a great influence on my work through our many lively discus-
sions about cognition: Erwin Drenth, Hans Jongbloed, Mick Kappenburg, Rens
Kortmann and Lennart Quispel. Also many thanks to my colleagues from other
universities that have provided me with many new insights along the way: Ruth
Aylett, Dave Barnes, Aude Billard, Axel Cleeremans, Jim Hurford, Simon Kirby,
Daniel Livingstone, Will Lowe, Tim Oates, Michael Rosenstein, Jun Tani and
those many others who gave me a lot of useful feedback.
Thankfully I also have some friends who reminded me that there was more in
life than work alone. For that I would like to thank Wiard, Chris and Marcella,
Hilde and Gerard, Herman and Xandra and all the others who somehow brought
lots of fun in my social life.
I would like to thank my parents very much for their support and attention
throughout my research. Many thanks to my brother and sisters and inlaws for
being there for me always. And thanks to my nieces and nephews for being a joy
in my life
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Miranda Brouwer for
bringing so much more in my life than I could imagine. I thank her for the pa-
tience and trust during some hard times while I was working at a distance. I




L’intelligence est une adaptation.
(Piaget 1996)
One of the hardest problems in artificial intelligence and robotics is what has
been called the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990). The question how
“seemingly meaningless symbols become meaningful” (Harnad 1990) is a ques-
tion that also holds grip of many philosophers for already more than a century,
e.g. Brentano (1874), Searle (1980) and Dennett (1991).1 With the rise of artificial
intelligence (ai), the question has become very actual, especially within the sym-
bolic paradigm (Newell 1990).2 The symbol grounding problem is still a very hard
problem in ai and especially in robotics (Pfeifer & Scheier 1999).
The problem is that an agent, be it a robot or a human, perceives the world in
analogue signals. Yet humans have the ability to categorise the world in symbols
that they, for instance may use for language. The perception of something, like
e.g. the colour red, may vary a lot when observed under different circumstances.
Nevertheless, humans are very good at recognising and naming this colour un-
der these different conditions. For robots, however, this is extremely difficult.
In many applications the robots try to recognise such perceptions based on the
rules that are pre-programmed. But there are no singular rules that guide the
conceptualisation of red. The same argument holds for many, if not all percep-
tions. A lot of solutions to the symbol grounding problem have been proposed,
but there are still many limitations on these solutions.
Intelligent systems or, as Newell (1980) called them, “physical symbol systems”
should amongst others be able to use symbols, abstractions and language. These
symbols, abstractions and language are always about something. But how do
they become that way? There is something going on in the brains of language
users that give meaning to these symbols. What is going on is not clear. It is clear
from neuroscience that active neuronal pathways in the brain activate mental
1 In philosophy the problem is usually addressed with the term “intentionality”, introduced by
Brentano (1874).
2 In the classical and symbolic ai the problem has also been addressed in what is known as the
“frame problem” (Pylyshyn 1987).
1 Introduction
states. But how does this relate to objects and other things in the real world?
According to Maturana & Varela (1992) there is a structural coupling between
the things in the world and an organism’s active pathways. Wittgenstein (1958)
stresses the importance of how language is used tomake a relationwith language
and its meaning. The context of what he called a language game and the purpose
of the language game establishes the meaning of it. According to these views, the
meaning of symbols is established for a great deal by the interaction of an agent
with its environment and is context dependent. A view that has been adopted in
the field of pragmatics and situated cognition (Clancey 1997).
In traditional ai and robotics the meaning of symbols was predefined by the
programmer of the system. Besides that these systems have no knowledge about
the meaning of these symbols, the symbols’ meanings were very static and could
not deal with different contexts or varying environments. Early computer pro-
grams that modelled natural language, notably shrdlu (Winograd 1972) were
completely pre-programmed, and hence could not handle the complete scope of
a natural language. It could only handle that part of the language that was pre-
programmed. shrdlu has been programmed as if it were a robot with an eye and
arm that was operating in a blocks world. Within certain constrictions, shrdlu
could manipulate English input such that it could plan particular goals. However,
the symbols that shrdlu was manipulating had no meaning for the virtual robot.
Shakey, a real robot operating in a blocks world, did solve the grounding problem.
But Shakey was limited to the knowledge that had been pre-programmed.
Later approaches to solve the grounding problem on real world multi-agent
systems involving language have been investigated by Yanco & Stein (1993) and
Billard & Hayes (1997). In the work of Yanco and Stein the robots learned to
communicate about actions. These actions, however, were pre-programmed and
limited, and are therefore limited to the meanings that the robots had. In Bil-
lard & Hayes (1997) one robot had pre-programmed meanings of actions, which
were represented in a neural network architecture. A student robot had to learn
couplings between communicated words and actions it did to follow the first
robot. In this work the student robot learned to ground the meaning of its ac-
tions symbolically by associating behavioural activation with words. However,
the language of the teacher robot was pre-programmed and hence the student
could only learn what the teacher knows.
In the work of Billard and Hayes, the meaning is grounded in a situated ex-
periment. So, a part of the meaning is situated in the context in which it is used.
However, the learned representation of the meaning is developed through bodily
experiences. This is conform with the principle of embodiment (Lakoff 1987), in
2
1.1 Symbol grounding problem
which the meaning of something is represented according to bodily experiences.
The meaning represented in someone’s (or something’s) brain depends on previ-
ous experiences of interactions with such meanings. The language that emerges
is therefore dependent on the body of the system that experiences. This princi-
ple is made clear very elegantly by Thomas Nagel in his famous article What is it
like to be a bat? (Nagel 1974). In this article Nagel argues that it is impossible to
understand what a bat is experiencing because it has a different body with differ-
ent sensing capabilities (a bat uses echolocation to navigate). A bat approaching
a wall must experience different meanings (if it has any) than humans would
have when approaching a wall. Thus a robot that has a different body than hu-
mans will have different meanings. Moreover, different humans have different
meaning representations because they encountered different experiences.
This book presents a series of experiments in which two robots try to solve
the symbol grounding problem. The experiments are based on a recent approach
in ai and the study of language origins, proposed by Luc Steels (1996c). In this
new approach, behaviour-based ai (Steels & Brooks 1995) is combined with new
computational approaches to the language origins and multi-agent technology.
The ideas of Steels have been implemented on real mobile robots so that they can
develop a grounded lexicon about objects they can detect in their real world, as
reported first in Steels & Vogt 1997. This work differs from the work of Yanco
& Stein (1993) and Billard & Hayes (1997) in that no part of the lexicon and its
meaning has been programmed. Hence their representation is not limited due to
pre-programmed relations.
The next section introduces the symbol grounding problem inmore detail. This
section first discusses some theoretical background on the meaning of symbols
after which some practical issues on symbol grounding are discussed. The ex-
periments are carried out within a broader research on the origins of language,
which is presented in Section 1.2. A little background on human language ac-
quisition is given in Section 1.3. The research goals of this book are defined in
Section 1.4. The final section of this chapter presents the outline of this book.
1.1 Symbol grounding problem
1.1.1 Language of thought
Already for more than a century philosophers ask themselves how is it possi-
ble that we seem to think in terms of symbols which are about something that
is in the real world. So, if one manipulates symbols as a mental process, one
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could ask what is the symbol (manipulation) about? Most explanations in the
literature are however in terms of symbols that again are about something, as in
folk-psychology intentionality is often explained in terms of beliefs, desires etc.
For instance, according to Jerry Fodor (1975), every concept is a propositional
attitude. Fodor hypothesises a “Language of Thought” to explain why humans
tend to think in a mental language rather than in natural language alone.
Fodor argues that concepts can be described by symbols that represent propo-
sitions towards which attitudes (like beliefs or desires) can be attributed. Fodor
calls these symbols “propositional attitudes”. If P is a proposition, then the phrase
“I belief that P” is a propositional attitude. According to Fodor, all mental states
can be described as propositional attitudes, so a mental state is a belief or desire
about something. This something, however, is a proposition, which according to
Fodor is in the head. But mental states should be about something that is in the
real world. That is the essence of the symbol grounding problem. The proposi-
tions are symbol structures that are represented in the brain, sometimes called
“mental representations”. In addition, the brain consists of rules that describe
how these representations can be manipulated. The language of thought, accord-
ing to Fodor, is constituted by symbols which can be manipulated by applying
existing rules. Fodor further argues that the language of thought is innate, and
thus resembles Chomsky’s universal grammar very well.
Concepts are in this Computational Theory of Mind (as Fodor’s theory some-
times is called) constructed from a set of propositions. The language of thought
(and with that concepts) can, however, not be learned according to Fodor, who
denies:
[r]oughly, that one can learn a language whose expressive power is greater
than that of a language that one already knows. Less roughly, that one can
learn a language whose predicates express extensions not expressible by
those of a previously available representational system. Still less roughly,
that one can learn a language whose predicates express extensions not ex-
pressible by predicates of the representational system whose employment
mediates the learning. (Fodor 1975: 86, Fodor’s italics)
According to this, the process of concept learning is the testing of hypotheses
that are already available at birth. Likewise, Fodor argues that perception is again
the formulating and testing of hypotheses, which are already available to the
agent. So, Fodor argues that, since one cannot learn a concept if one does not have
the conceptual building blocks of this concept, and since perception needs such
building blocks as well, concept learning does not exist and therefore concepts
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must be innate. This is a remarkable finding, since it roughly implies that all that
we know is actual innate knowledge. Fodor called this innate inner language
“Mentalese”. It must be clear that it is impossible to have such a language. As
Patricia S. Churchland puts it:
[The Mentalese hypothesis] entails the ostensibly new concepts evolving
in the course of scientific innovation – concepts such as atom, force field,
quark, electrical charge, and gene – are lying ready-made in the language
of thought, even of a prehistoric hunter-gatherer… The concepts of modern
science are defined in terms of the theories that embed them, not in terms of
a set of “primitive conceptual atoms,” whatever those may be. (Churchland
1986: 389)
Although the Computational Theory of Mind is controversial, there are still
many scientist who adheres to this theory and not the least many ai researchers.
This is not surprising, since the theory tries to model cognition computationally,
which of course is a nice property since computers are computational devices.
It will be shown however that Fodor’s Computational Theory of Mind is not
necessary for concept and language learning. In particular it will be shown that
robots can be developed that can acquire, use and manipulate symbols which
are about something that exists in the real world, and which are initially not
available to the robots.
1.1.2 Understanding Chinese
This so-called symbol grounding problem was made clear excellently by John R.
Searle with a gedankenexperiment called the “Chinese Room” (Searle 1980). In
this experiment, Searle considers himself standing in a room in which there is a
large data bank of Chinese symbols and a set of rules how to manipulate these
symbols. Searle, while in the room receives symbols that represent a Chinese
expression. Searle, who does not know any Chinese, manipulates these symbols
according to the rules such that he can output (other) Chinese symbols as if it
was responding correctly in a human like way, but only in Chinese. Moreover,
this room passes the Turing test for speaking and understanding Chinese.
Searle claims that this room cannot understand Chinese because he himself
does not. Therefore it is impossible to build a computer program that can have
mental states and thus being what Searle calls a “strong ai”.3 It is because Searle
3 It is not the purpose of this book to show that computer programs can have mental states, but
to show that symbols in a robot can be about something.
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inside the room does not know what the Chinese symbols are about that Searle
concludes that the room does not understand Chinese. Searle argues with a log-
ical structure by using some of the following premises (Searle 1984: 39):
(1) Brains cause minds.
(2) Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
(3) Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or syntactical,
structure.
(4) Minds have mental contents; specifically, they have semantic contents.
Searle draws his conclusions from these premises in a correct logical deduc-
tion, but, for instance, premise (1) seems incomplete. This premise is drawn from
Searle’s observation that:
[A]ll mental phenomena […] are caused by processes going on in the brain.
(Searle 1984: 18)
One could argue in favour of this, but Searle does not mention what causes
these brain processes. Besides metabolic and other biological processes that are
ongoing in the brain, brain processes are caused by sensory stimulation and
maybe even by sensorimotor activity as a whole. So, at least some mental phe-
nomena are to some extent caused by an agent’s4 interaction with its environ-
ment.
Premise (3) states that computer programs are entirely defined by their formal
structure, which is correct. Only Searle equates formal with syntactical, which is
correct when syntactic means something like “manipulating symbols according
to the rules of the structure”. The appearance of symbols in this definition is
crucial, since they are by definition about something. If the symbols in computer
programs are about something, the programs are also defined by their semantic
structure.
Although Searle does not discuss this, it may be well possible that he makes
another big mistake in assuming that he (the central processing unit) is the part
where all mental phenomena should come together. An assumption which is
debatable (see, e.g. Dennett 1991; Edelman 1992). It is more likely that conscious-
ness is more distributed. But it is not the purpose here to explain consciousness,
4 I refer to an agent when I am talking about an autonomous agent in general, be it a human,
animal, robot or something else.
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instead the question is how are symbols about the world. The Chinese Room is
presented to make clear what the problem is and how philosophers deal with it.
Obviously Searle’s Chinese Room argument found a lot of opposition in the
cognitive science community. The critique presented here is in line withwhat has
been called the “system’s reply” and to a certain extend the “robot’s reply”.5 The
system’s reply holds that it is not the system who does not understand Chinese,
but it is Searle who does not. The system as a whole does, since it passed the
Turing test.
The robot’s reply goes as follows: The Chinese Room as a system does not have
any other input than the Chinese symbols. So the system is a very unlikely cog-
nitive agent. Humans have perceptual systems that receive much more informa-
tion than only linguistic information. Humans perceive visual, tactile, auditory,
olfactory and many other information; the Chinese Room does, as it seems, not.
So, what if we build a device that has such sensors and like humans has motor
capacities? Could such a system with Searle inside understand Chinese?
According to Searle in his answer to both the system’s as robot’s reply (Searle
1984), his argument still holds. He argues that both the system’s reply and the
robot’s reply do not solve the syntax vs. semantics argument (premise 2). But the
mistake that Searle makes is that premise (3) does not hold, thus making premise
(2) redundant. Furthermore, in relation to the robot’s reply, Searle fails to notice
the fact that brain processes are (partly) caused by sensory input and thus mental
phenomena are indirectly caused by sensory stimulation.
And even if Searle’s arguments are right, in his answer to the robot’s reply he
fails to understand that a robot is actually a machine. It is not just a computer
that runs a computer program. And as Searle keeps on stressing:
“Could a machine think?” Well, in one sense, of course, we are all machines.
[…] [In the] sense in which a machine is just a physical system which is
capable of performing certain kinds of operations in that sense we are all
machines, and we can think. So, trivially there are machines that can think.
(Searle 1984: 35, my italics)
The reason why the phrase “a physical system which is capable of performing
certain kinds of operations” is emphasised is because it is exactly that what a
robot is. A robot is more than a computer that runs a computer program.
A last point that is made in this section is that Searle does not speak about
development. Could Searle learn to understand Chinese if it was in the room
5 See for instance the critiques that appeared in the open peer commentary of Searle’s 1980
article in the Behavioural and Brain Sciences.
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from its birth and that he learned to interpret and manipulate the symbols that
were presented to him? It is strange that a distinguished philosopher like Searle
does not understand that it is possible to develop computer programs which can
learn.
The Chinese Room introduced the symbol grounding problem as a thought
experiment that inspired Stevan Harnad to define his version of the problem
(Harnad 1990). Although controversial, the Chinese Room experiment showed
that there are nontrivial problems arising when one builds a cognitive robot that
should be able to acquire a meaningful language system. The arguments pre-
sented against the Chinese Room are the core of the argument why robots can
ground language. As shall become clear, there’s more to language than just sym-
bol manipulation according to some rules.
1.1.3 Symbol grounding: philosophical or technical?
Although it might seem very philosophical up to now, this book in noway tries to
solve the philosophical problem of what is meaning. In fact there is no attempt
being made in solving any philosophical problem. The only thing that is done
here is to translate a philosophical problem into a technical problem, which will
be tackled in this work. The solution to the technical problem could then be the
meat for the philosophers to solve their problem.
Before discussing the symbol grounding problem in more technical detail, it
is useful to come up with a working definition of what is meant with a symbol.
Harnad’s definition of a symbol is very much in line with the standard definition
used in artificial intelligence. This definition is primarily based on physical sym-
bol systems introduced by Newell and Simon Newell (1980; 1990). According to
Harnad symbols are basically a set of arbitrary tokens that can bemanipulated by
rules made of tokens; the tokens (either atomic or composite) are “semantically
interpretable” (Harnad 1990).
In this book a definition taken from semiotics will be adopted. Following
Charles Sanders Peirce and Umberto Eco (1976; 1986) a symbol will be equalled
with a sign. Using a different, but more familiar terminology than Peirce Nöth
(1990), a sign consists of three elements (Chandler 1994):6
Representamen The form which the sign takes (not necessarily material).
Interpretant The sense made of the sign.
6 An instructive introduction into the theory of semiotics can be found on the world-wide web
(Chandler 1994). The work of Peirce is collected in Peirce 1931–1958.
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Object To which the sign refers.
Rather than using Peirce’s terms, the terms adopted in this book are form for
representamen, meaning for interpretant and referent for object. The adopted
terminology is in line with Steels’ terminology (Steels 1999). It is also interest-
ing to note that the Peircean sign is not the same as the Saussurean sign (de
Saussure 1974). De Saussure does not discuss the notion of the referent. In de






Figure 1.1: A semiotic triangle shows how a referent, meaning and form are re-
lated as a sign.
How the three units of the sign are combined is often illustrated with the semi-
otic triangle (Figure 1.1). According to Peirce, a sign becomes a “symbol” when
its form, in relation to its meaning “is arbitrary or purely conventional – so that
the relationship must be learnt” (Chandler 1994). The relation can be convention-
alised in language. According to the semiotic triangle and the above, a symbol is
per definition grounded.
In the experiments reported in this book, the robots try to develop a shared
and grounded lexicon about the real world objects they can detect. They do so
by communicating a name of the categorisation of a real world object. In line
with the theory of semiotics, the following definitions are made:
Referent The referent is the real world object that is subject of the communica-
tion.
Meaning The meaning is the categorisation that is made of the real world object
and that is used in the communication.
Form The form is the name that is communicated. In principle its shape is ar-




Symbol A symbol is the relation between the referent, the meaning and the form
as illustrated in the semiotic triangle.
This brings us to the technically hard part of the symbol grounding problem
that remains to be solved: How can an agent construct the relations between a
form, meaning and referent? In his article Harnad (1990) recognises three main
tasks of grounding symbols:
Iconisation Analogue signals need to be transformed to iconic representation
(or icons).7
Discrimination “[The ability] to judge whether two inputs are the same or differ-
ent, and, if different, how different they are.” Note that in Harnad’s article,
discrimination is already pursued at the perceptual level. In this book, dis-
crimination is done at the categorical level.
Identification “[The ability] to be able to assign a unique (usually arbitrary) re-
sponse – a “name” – to a class of inputs, treating them all as equivalent or
invariant in some respect.” (Harnad 1990, my italics)
So, what is the problem? Analogue signals can be iconised (or recorded) rather
simple with meaningless sub-symbolic structures. The ability to discriminate is
easy to implement just by comparing two different sensory inputs. The ability to
identify requires to find invariant properties of objects, events and state of affairs.
Since finding distinctions is rather easy, the big problem in grounding actually
reduces to identifying
invariant features of the sensory projection that will reliably distinguish
a member of a category from any non-members with which it could be
confused. (Harnad 1990)
Although people might disagree, for the roboticists this is not more than a
technical problem. The question is whether or not there exist real invariant fea-
tures of a category in the world. This probably could be doubted quite seriously
(see e.g.Harnad 1993). For the time being it is assumed that there are invariant
properties in the world and it will be shown that these invariants can be found if
an embodied agent is equipped with the right physical body and control. The lat-
ter inference is in line with the physical grounding hypothesis (Brooks 1990),
which will be discussed below.
7 The terms “icon” and “iconisation”, as they are used byHarnad andwill be adopted here, should
not be confused with Peirce’s notion of these terms.
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Stevan Harnad proposes that the sgp for a robot could possibly be solved by
invoking (hybrid) connectionist models with a serious interface to the outside
world in the form of transducers (or sensors) (Harnad 1993). Harnad, however
admits that the symbol grounding problem also might be solved with other than
connectionist architectures.
1.1.4 Grounding symbols in language
In line with the work of Luc Steels the symbols are grounded in language (see
e.g. Steels 1997b; 1999). Why grounding symbols in language directly and not
ground the symbols first and develop a shared lexicon afterwards? Associating
the grounded symbols with a lexicon is then a simple task, (see e.g. Oliphant
1997; Steels 1996c). However, as Wittgenstein (1958) pointed out, the meaning
of something depends on how it is used in language. It is situated in the envi-
ronment of an agent and depends on the bodily experience of it. Language use
gives feedback on the appropriateness of the sense that is made of a referent.
So, language gives rise to the construction of meanings and the construction of
meaning gives rise to language development. Hence, meaning co-evolves with
language.
That this approach seems natural can be illustrated with Roussau’s paradox.
Although for communication, categorisation of reality needs to be similar to dif-
ferent language users, different languages do not always employ the same cat-
egorisations. For instance, there are different referential frames to categorise
spatial relations in different language communities. In English there are spatial
relations like left, right, front and back relative to some axis. However in Tzetal,
a Mayan language, this frame of reference is not used. The Tzetal speakers live
in an area with mountains and their frame of reference is absolute in relation to
the mountain they are on. The spatial relations in this language can be translated
with ‘uphill’, ‘downhill’ and ‘across’. If something is higher up the mountain in
relation to the speaker, they can say “this something is uphill of me”.
So, if a novel language user enters a language society, how would it know how
to categorise such a spatial relation? To know this, the new language user has
to learn how to categorise the reality in relation to the language that is used by
the particular language society. Therefore it is thought to be necessary to ground
meaning in language. How lexicon development interacts with the development
of meaning will become clearer in the remainder of this book.
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1.1.5 Physical grounding hypothesis
Another approach to grounding is physical grounding. In his article Elephants
Don’t Play Chess, Rodney Brooks (1990) proposed the physical grounding hypoth-
esis as an additional constraint to the physical symbol system hypothesis.
The physical grounding hypothesis states that to build a system that is in-
telligent it is necessary to have its representations grounded in the physical
world. (Brooks 1990)
The advantage of the physical grounding hypothesis over physical symbol sys-
tem hypothesis is that the system (or agent) is directly coupled to the real world
through its set of sensors and actuators.
Typed input and output are no longer of interest. They are not physically
grounded. (Brooks 1990)
In Brooks’ approach symbols are not a necessary condition for intelligent be-
haviour anymore (Brooks 1990; 1991). Intelligent behaviour can emerge from a
set of simple couplings of an agent’s sensors with its actuators,8 as is also shown
in e.g. Steels & Brooks 1995, Steels 1994a, and Steels 1996b. An example is “wall
following”. Suppose a robot has two simple behaviours: (1) the tendency to move
towards the wall and (2) the tendency to move away from the wall. If the robot
incorporates both behaviours at once, then the resulting emergent behaviour is
wall following. Note that agents designed from this perspective have no cogni-
tive abilities. They are reactive agents, like e.g. ants are, rather than cognitive
agents that can manipulate symbolic meanings.
The argument that Brooks uses to propose the physical grounding hypothesis
is that
[evolution] suggests that problem solving behaviour, language, expert know-
ledge and application, and reason, are all rather simple once the essence of
being and reacting are available. That essence is the ability to move around
in a dynamic environment, sensing the surroundings to a degree sufficient
to achieve the necessary maintenance of life and reproduction. (Brooks
1990)
This rapid evolution is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Brooks also uses this argument
of the rapid evolution of human intelligence as opposed to the slow evolution of
life on earth in relation to symbols.
8 Note that Brooks’ approach does not necessarily invoke connectionist models.
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Figure 1.2: (a) The evolutionary time-scale of life and cognitive abilities on earth.
After the entrance of the great apes, evolution of man went so fast
that it cannot be shown on the same plot, unless it is shown in loga-
rithmic scale (see b). It appears from the plot that cultural evolution




[O]nce evolution had symbols and representations things started moving
rather quickly. Thus symbols are the key invention … Without a carefully
built physical grounding any symbolic representation will be mismatched
to its sensors and actuators. (Brooks 1990)
To explore the physical grounding hypothesis, Brooks and his co-workers at
the mit ai Lab developed a software architecture called the subsumption archi-
tecture (Brooks 1986). This architecture is designed to connect a robot’s sensors
to its actuators so that it “embeds the robot correctly in the world” (Brooks 1990).
The point made by Brooks is that intelligence can emerge from an agent’s phys-
ical interactions with the world. So, the robot that needs to be built should be
both embodied and situated. The approach proposed by Brooks is also known as
“behaviour-based ai”.
1.1.6 Physical symbol grounding
The physical grounding hypothesis (Brooks 1990) states that intelligent agents
should be grounded in the real world. However, it also states that the intelligence
need not to be represented with symbols. According to the physical symbol sys-
tem hypothesis the thus physically grounded agents are no cognitive agents. The
physical symbol system hypothesis (Newell 1980) states that cognitive agents are
physical symbol systems with the following features (Newell 1990: 77):
Memory
• Contains structures that contain symbol tokens
• Independently modifiable at some grain size
Symbols
• Patterns that provide access to distal structures
• A symbol token is the occurrence of a pattern in a structure
Operations Processes that take symbol structures as input and produce sym-
bol structures as output
Interpretation Processes that take symbol structures as input and execute
operations
Capacities
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Clearly, an agent that uses language is a physical symbol system. It should
have a memory to store an ontology and lexicon. It has symbols. The agent
makes operations on the symbols and interprets them. Furthermore, it should
have the capacity to do so. In this sense, the robots of this book are physical
symbol systems.
A physical symbol system somehow has to represent the symbols. Hence the
physical grounding hypothesis is not the best candidate. But since the defini-
tion of a symbol adopted in this book has an explicit relation to the referent, the
complete symbol cannot be represented inside a robot. The only parts of the sym-
bols that can be represented are the meaning and the form. Like in the physical
grounding hypothesis, a part of the agent’s knowledge is in the world. The prob-
lem is: how can the robot ground the relation between internal representations
and the referent? Although Newell (1990) recognises the problem, he does not
investigate a solution to it.
This problem is what Harnad (1990) called the symbol grounding problem. Be-
cause there is a strong relation between the physical grounding hypothesis (that
the robot has its knowledge grounded in the real world) and the physical symbol
system hypothesis (that cognitive agents are physical symbol systems) it is useful
to rename the symbol grounding problem in the physical symbol grounding
problem.
The physical symbol grounding problem is very much related to the frame
problem (Pylyshyn 1987). The frame problem deals with the question how a
robot can represent things of the dynamically changing real world and operate
in it. In order to do so, the robot needs to solve the symbol grounding problem.
As mentioned, this is a very hard problem. Why is the physical symbol ground-
ing problem so hard? When sensing something in the real world under different
circumstances, the physical sensing of this something is different as well. Hu-
mans are nevertheless very good at identifying this something under these dif-
ferent circumstances. For robots this is different. The one-to-many mappings
of this something unto the different perceptions needs to be interpreted so that
there is a more or less one-to-one mapping between this something and a sym-
bol, i.e. the identification needs to be invariant. Studies have shown that this is
an extremely difficult task for robots.
Already numerous systems have been physically grounded (see e.g. Brooks
1990; Steels 1994a; Barnes et al. 1997; Kröse et al. 1999; Tani & Nolfi 1998; Bert-
houze & Kuniyoshi 1998; Pfeifer & Scheier 1999; Billard &Hayes 1997; Rosenstein
& Cohen 1998a; Yanco & Stein 1993 and many more). However, a lot of these
systems do not ground symbolic structures because they have no form (or arbi-
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trary label) attached. These applications ground “simple” physical behaviours in
the Brooksean sense. Only a few physically grounded systems mentioned above
grounded symbolic structures, for instance in the case of Yanco & Stein (1993),
Billard & Hayes (1997), and Rosenstein & Cohen (1998a).
Yanco & Stein developed a troupe of two robots that could learn to associate
certain actions with a pre-defined set of words. One robot would decide what
action is to be taken and communicates a relating signal to the other robot. The
learning strategy they used was reinforcement learning where the feedback in
their task completion was provided by a human instructor. If both robots per-
formed the same task, a positive reinforcement was given, and when both robots
did not, the feedback consisted of a negative reinforcement.
The research was primarily focussed on the learning of associations between
word and meaning on physical robots. No real solution was attempted to solve
the grounding problem and only a limited set of word-meaning associations were
pre-defined. In addition, the robots learned bymeans of supervised learning with
a human instructor. Yanco & Stein showed, however, that a group of robots could
converge in learning such a communication system.
In Billard & Hayes (1997) two robots grounded a language by means of im-
itation. The experiments consisted of a teacher robot, which had a pre-defined
communication system, and a student robot, which had to learn the teacher’s lan-
guage by following it. The learning mechanism was provided by an associative
neural network architecture called drama. This neural network learned associ-
ations between communication signals and sensorimotor couplings. Feedback
was provided by the student’s evaluation if it was still following the teacher.
So, the language was grounded by the student using this neural network archi-
tecture, which is derived from Wilshaw networks. Associations for the teacher
robot were pre-defined in their couplings and weights. The student could learn
a limited amount of associations of actions and perceptions very rapidly (Billard
1998).
Rosenstein & Cohen (1998a) developed a robot that could ground time series
by using the so-called method of delays, which is drawn from the theory of non-
linear dynamics. The time series that the robots produce by interacting in their
environment are categorised by comparing their delay vectors, which is a low-
dimensional reconstruction of the original time series, with a set of prototypes.
The concepts the robots thus ground could be used for groundingword-meanings
(Rosenstein & Cohen 1998b).
The method proposed by Rosenstein & Cohen has been incorporated in a lan-
guage experiment where two robots play follow me games to construct an on-
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tology and lexicon to communicate their actions (Vogt 1999; 2000b). This was a
preliminary experiment, but the results appear to be promising.
A similar experiment on language acquisition on mobile robots has been done
by the same group of Rosenstein & Cohen at the University of Massachusetts
(Oates, Eyler-Walker & Cohen 1999). The time series of a robot’s actions are cat-
egorised using a clustering method for distinctions (Oates 1999). Similarities be-
tween observed time series and prototypes are calculated using dynamical time
warping. The thus conceptualised time series are then analysed in terms of hu-
man linguistic interactions, who describe what they see when watching a movie
of the robot operating (Oates, Eyler-Walker & Cohen 1999).
Other research propose simulated solutions to the symbol grounding problem,
notably Cangelosi & Parisi (1998) and Greco, Cangelosi & Harnad (1998). In his
work Angelo Cangelosi created an ecology of edible and non-edible mushrooms.
Agents that are provided with neural networks learn to categorise the mush-
rooms from “visible” features into the categories of edible and non-edible mush-
rooms.
A problem with simulations of grounding is that the problem cannot be solved
in principle, because the agents that “ground” symbols do not do so in the real
world. However, these simulations are useful in that they can learn us more about
how categories and words could be grounded. One of the important findings of
Cangelosi’s research is that communication helps the agents to improve their
categorisation abilities (Cangelosi, Greco & Harnad 2000).
Additional work can be found in The grounding of word meaning: Data and
models (Gasser 1998), the proceedings of a joint workshop on the grounding of
word meaning of the aaai and Cognitive Science Society. In these proceedings,
grounding of word meaning is discussed among computer scientists, linguistics
and psychologists.
So, the problem that is tried to be solved in this book is what might be called
the physical symbol grounding problem. This problem shall not be treated philo-
sophically but technically. It will be shown that the quality of the physically
grounded interaction is essential to the quality of the symbol grounding. This is
in line with Brooks’ observation that a.o. language is
rather easy once the essence of being and reacting are available.
(Brooks 1990)
Now that it is clear that the physical symbol grounding problem in this work is
considered to be a technical problem, the question rises how it is solved. In 1996,
Luc Steels published a series of papers in which some simple mechanisms were
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introduced by which autonomous agents could develop a “grounded” lexicon
(Steels 1996c,d,a,e, for an overview see Steels 1997c). Before this work is discussed,
a brief introduction in the origins of language is given.
1.2 Language origins
Why is it that humans have language and other animals cannot? Until not very
long ago, language has been ascribed as a creation of God. Modern science, how-
ever, assumes that life as it currently exists has evolved gradually. Most influ-
encing in this view has been the book of Charles Darwin The origins of species
(1968). In the beginning of the existence of life on earth, humans were not yet
present. Modern humans evolved only about 100,000 to 200,000 years ago. With
the arrival of homo sapiens, language is thought to have emerged. So, although
life on earth is present for about 3.5 billion years, humans are on earth only a
fraction of this time.
Language is exclusive to humans. Although other animals have communica-
tion systems, they do not use a complex communication system like humans do.
At some point in evolution, humans must have developed language capabilities.
These capabilities did not evolve in other animals. It is likely that these capabili-
ties evolved biologically and are present in the human brain. But, what are these
capabilities? They are likely to be the initial conditions from which language
emerged. Some of them might have co-evolved with language, but most of them
were likely to be present before language originated. This is likely because bio-
logical evolution is very slow, whereas language on the evolutionary time scale
evolved very fast.
The capabilities include at least the following things: (1) The ability to asso-
ciate meanings of things that exist in the world with arbitrary word-forms. (2)
The ability to communicate these meaningful symbols to other language users.
(3) The ability to vocalise such symbols. (4)The ability to map auditory stimuli of
such vocalisations to the symbols. And (5) the ability to use grammatical struc-
tures. These abilities must have evolved somehow, because they are principle
features of human language. There are probably more capabilities, but they serve
to accomplish the five capabilities mentioned. In line with the symbol grounding
problem this book concentrates on the first two principle capabilities.
Until the 1950s there was very little research going on about the evolution and
origins of language. Since Noam Chomsky wrote his influential paper on syntac-
tic structures (Chomsky 1956), linguistic research and research on the evolution
of language boomed. It took until 1976 for the first conference on the origins
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and evolution of language to be held (Harnad, Steklis & Lancaster 1976). Most
papers of this conference involved empirical research on ape studies, studies on
gestural communication and theoretical and philosophical studies. Until very re-
cently, many studies had a high level of speculation and some strange theories
were proposed. For an overview of theories that were proposed on the origins
and evolution of language until 1996, see Aitchison (1996).
1.2.1 Computational approaches to language evolution
With the rise of advanced computer techniques in artificial intelligence (ai) and
Artificial Life (ALife), it became possible to study the origins and evolution of
language computationally. In the 1990s many such studies were done. It is prob-
ably impossible to say with this approach exactly how language originated, but
the same is probably true for all other investigations. The only contribution com-
puter techniques can bring is a possible scenario of language evolution. Possible
initial conditions and hypotheses can be validated using computer techniques,
which may shed light on how language may have emerged. Furthermore, one
can rule out some theories, because they do not work on a computer.
Many early (and still very popular) scenarioswere investigated based onChom-
sky’s theory about a universal grammar, which are supposed to be innate.9
According to Chomsky, the innate universal grammar codes “principles” and
“parameters” that enable infants to learn any language. The principles encode
universals of languages as they are found in the world. Depending on the lan-
guage environment of a language learner, the parameters are set, which allows
the principles of a particular language to become learnable. So, the quest for
computer scientist is to use evolutionary computation techniques to come up
with a genetic code of the universal grammar. That this is difficult can already
be inferred from the fact that up to now not one non-trivial universal tendency
of language is found which is valid for every language.
In the early nineties a different approach gained popularity. This approach is
based on the paradigm that language is a complex dynamical adaptive system.
Here it is believed that universal tendencies of language are learned and evolve
culturally.
Agent based simulations were constructed in which the agents tried to develop
(usually an aspect of) language. The agents are made adaptive using techniques
taken from ai and adaptive behaviour (or ALife). The main approach taken is
9 One of the reasons why Chomsky’s theory is still very popular amongst computational lin-
guistics is that the theory has a computational approach.
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a bottom-up approach. In contrast to the top-down approach, where the intelli-
gence is modelled and implemented in rules, the bottom-up approach starts with
implementing simple sensorimotor interfaces and learning rules, and tries to in-
crease the complexity of the intelligent agent step by step.
Various models have been built by a variety of computer scientists and com-
putational linguists to investigate the evolution of language and communication
(e.g. Cangelosi & Parisi 1998; Kirby & Hurford 1997; MacLennan 1991; Oliphant
1997; Werner & Dyer 1991). It goes beyond the scope of this book to discuss all
this research, but there is one research that is of particular interest for this book,
namely the work of Mike Oliphant (1997; 1998; 1999).
Oliphant simulates the learning of a symbolic communication system in which
a fixed number of signals are matched with a fixed number of meanings. The
number of signals that can be learned is equal to the number of meanings. Such
a coherent mapping is called a Saussurean sign (de Saussure 1974) and is the
idealisation of language. The learning paradigm of Oliphant is an observational
one and he uses an associative network incorporating Hebbian learning. With
observational is meant that the agents during a language game have access to
both the linguistic signal and its meaning.
As long as the communicating agents are aware of the meaning they are sig-
nalling, the Saussurean sign can be learned (Oliphant 1997; 1999). The awareness
of the meaning meant by the signal should be acquired by observation in the en-
vironment. Oliphant further argues that reinforcement types of learning as used
by Yanco & Stein (1993) and Steels (1996c) are not necessary and unlikely (see
also the discussion about the no negative feedback evidence in Section 1.3). But
he does not say they are not a possible source of language learning (Oliphant
1999).
The claim Oliphant makes has implications on why only humans can learn
language. According to Oliphant (1998), animals have difficulty in matching a
signal to a meaning when it is not an innate feature of the animal. Although this
is arguable (Oliphant refers here to e.g. Gardner & Gardner 1969 and Premack
1971), he observes the fact that in these animal learning the communication is
explicitly taught by the researchers.
1.2.2 Steels’ approach
This adaptive behaviour based approach has also been adopted by Luc Steels
(e.g. Steels 1996c,d; 1997c). The work of Steels is based on the notion of lan-
guage games (Wittgenstein 1958). In language games agents construct a lexicon
through cultural interaction, individual adaptation and self-organisation. The
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view of Wittgenstein is adopted that language gets its meaning through its use
and should be investigated accordingly. The research presented in this book is
in line with the work done by Luc Steels. This research is part of the ongoing
research done at the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Paris and at the Ar-
tificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Free University of Brussels (vub), both di-
rected by Luc Steels.
The investigation in Paris and Brussels is done on both simulations and ground-
ed robots. It focuses on the origins of sound systems, in particular in the field
of phonetics (de Boer 1997; 1999; Oudeyer 1999), the origins of meaning (Steels
1996d; Steels & Vogt 1997; de Jong & Vogt 1998; Vogt 1998a; de Jong & Steels
1999), the emergence of lexicons (Steels 1996c; Steels & Kaplan 1998; Kaplan 2000;
Vogt 1998b; Van Looveren 1999), the origins of communication (de Jong 1999a;
2000) and the emergence of syntax (Steels 2000). Within these subjects various
aspects of language like stochasticity (Steels & Kaplan 1998; Kaplan 2000), dy-
namic language change (Steels 1997a; Steels & McIntyre 1999; de Boer & Vogt
1999), multi-word utterances (Van Looveren 1999), situation concepts (de Jong
1999b) and grounding (Belpaeme, Steels & van Looveren 1998; Steels & Vogt 1997;
Steels 1999; Kaplan 2000) are investigated.
Bart de Boer of the vub ai Lab has shown how agents can develop a human-like
vowel system through self-organisation (de Boer 1997; 1999). These agents were
modelled with a human like vocal tract and auditory system. Through cultural
interactions and imitations the agents learned vowel systems as they are found
prominently among human languages.
First in simulations (Steels 1996c,d) and later in grounded experiments on mo-
bile robots (Steels & Vogt 1997; Vogt 1998a,b; de Jong & Vogt 1998) and on the
Talking Heads (Belpaeme, Steels & van Looveren 1998; Kaplan 2000; Steels 1999)
the emergence of meaning and lexicons have been investigated. Since the mobile
robots experiment is the issue of the current book, only the other work will be
discussed briefly here.
The simulations began fairly simple by assuming a relative perfect world
(Steels 1996c,d). Software agents played naming and discrimination games to cre-
ate lexicons and meaning. The lexicons were formed to name predefined mean-
ings and themeanings were created to discriminate predefined visual features. In
later experiments more complexity was added to the experiments. From findings
of the mobile robots experiments (Vogt 1998a) it was found that the ideal assump-
tions of the naming game, for instance, considering the topic to be known by the
hearer, were not satisfied. Therefore a more sophisticated naming game was de-
veloped that could handle noise of the environment (Steels & Kaplan 1998).
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Figure 1.3: The Talking Heads as it is installed at Sony csl Paris.
For coupling the discrimination game to the naming game, which first has
been done in Steels & Vogt (1997), a new software environment was created: the
geom world (Steels 1999). The geom world consisted of an environment in which
geometric figures could be conceptualised through the discrimination game. The
resulting representations could then be lexicalized using the naming game. The
Talking Heads are also situated in a world of geometrical shapes that are pasted
on a white board the cameras of the heads look at (Figure 1.3).
The Talking Heads consist of a couple of installations that are distributed
around the world. Installations currently exist in Paris at the Sony csl, in Brus-
sels at the vub ai Lab, in Amsterdam at the Intelligent Autonomous Systems
laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. Temporal installations have been
operational in Antwerp, Tokyo, Laussane, Cambridge, London and at another
site in Paris. Agents can travel the world through the internet and embody them-
selves into a Talking Head. A Talking Head is a pan-tilt camera connected to
a computer. The Talking Heads play language games with the cognitive capaci-
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ties and memories that each agent has or has acquired. The language games are
similar to the ones that are presented in the subsequent chapters. The main dif-
ference is that the Talking Heads do not move from their place, which the mobile
robots do. The Talking Heads have cameras as their primary sensory apparatus
and there are some slight differences in the cognitive capabilities as will become
clear in the rest of this book.
All these experiments show similar results. Label-representation (or form-
meaning) pairs can be grounded in sensorimotor control, for which (cultural) in-
teractions, individual adaptation and self-organisation are the key mechanisms.
A similar conclusion will be drawn at the end of this book. The results of the
experiments on mobile robots will be compared with the Talking Heads as re-
ported mainly in Steels 1999. Other findings based on the different variations of
the model, which inspects the different influences of the model will be compared
with the PhD thesis of Frédéric Kaplan of Sony csl in Paris (Kaplan 2000).10
A last set of experiments that will be brought to the reader’s attention is the
work done by Edwin de Jong of the vub ai Lab. De Jong has done an interesting
experiment in which he showed that the communication systems that emerged
under the conditions by which language research is done in Paris and Brussels
are indeed complex dynamical systems (de Jong 2000). The communication sys-
tems of his own experiments all evolved towards an attractor and he showed
empirically that the system was a complex dynamical system.
Using simulations, de Jong studied the evolution of communication in exper-
iments in which agents construct a communication system about situation con-
cepts (de Jong 1999b). In his simulation, a population of agents were in some
situation that required a response in the form of an action. I.e. if one of the
agents observed something (e.g. a predator), all the agents needed to go in some
save state. De Jong investigated if the agents could benefit from communication,
by allowing the agents to develop a shared lexicon that is grounded in this sim-
ulated world. The agents were given a mechanism to evaluate, based on their
previous experiences, whether to trust on their observations or on some com-
municated signal. The signal is communicated by one of the agents that had
observed something.
While doing so, the agents developed an ontology of situation concepts and a
lexicon in basically the same way as in the work of Luc Steels. This means that
the robots play discrimination games to build up the ontology and naming games
10 Currently Frédéric Kaplan is working on human-machine interaction on the aibo robot that
looks like a dog and which has been developed by Sony csl in Tokyo. Naturally, the aibo
learns language according to the same principles advocated by our labs.
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to develop a language. A major difference is that the experiments are situated in
a task oriented approach. The agents have to respond correctly to some situation.
To do so, the agents can evaluate their success based on the appropriateness of
their actions. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, de Jong used a different method
for categorisation, called the adaptive subspace method (de Jong & Vogt 1998).
One interesting finding of de Jong was that it is not necessary that agents use
feedback on the outcome of their linguistic interactions to construct a coherent
lexicon, provided that the robots have access to the meaning of such an interac-
tion and lateral inhibition was assured. Hence this confirms the findings of Mike
Oliphant (1998). Questions about the feedback on language games are also issued
in the field of human language acquisition.
1.3 Language acquisition
Although children learn an existing language, lessons from the language acqui-
sition field may help to understand how humans acquire symbols. This knowl-
edge may in turn help to build a physically grounded symbol system. In the
experiments presented in the forthcoming, the robots develop only a lexicon by
producing and understanding one word utterances. In the literature of language
acquisition, this period is called early lexicon development. Infants need to
learn how words are associated with meanings. How do they do that?
In early lexicon development it is important to identify what cues an infant
receives of the language it is learning. These cues not only focus on the lin-
guistic information, but also on the extra-linguistic information. It is not hard
to imagine that when no linguistic knowledge is available about a language, it
seems impossible to learn such a language without extra-linguistic cues such as
pointing or feedback about whether one understands a word correctly. (Psycho-)
linguists have not agreed upon what information is available to a child and to
what extend.
The poverty of the stimulus argument led Chomsky to propose his linguistic
theory. Although an adult language user can express an unlimited number of
sentences, a language learner receives a limited amount of linguistic information
to master the language. With this argument Chomsky concluded that linguistic
structures must be innate. But perhaps there are other mechanisms that allow
humans to learn language. Some might be learned and some might be innate.
A problem that occupies the nativist linguists is the so-called no negative
feedback evidence (e.g. Bowerman 1988). The problem is that in the innate ap-
proach language can only be learned when both positive and negative feedback
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on language is available to a language learner. However, psychological research
has shown that no negative feedback is provided by adult language users (Braine
1971). Demetras and colleagues, however showed that there ismore negative feed-
back provided than assumed (Demetras, Nolan Post & Snow 1986). In addition,
it is perhaps underestimated how much feedback a child can evaluate itself from
its environment. Furthermore, feedback is thought to be an important principle
in cognitive development (see e.g. Clancey 1997).
One alternative for the feedback, which is assumed to be provided after the
linguistic act, is the establishment of joint attention prior to the linguistic com-
munication. Do children really receive such input? Early studies of Tomasello
showed that children can learn better when joint attention is established, as long
as this is done spontaneously by the child (Tomasello, Mannle & Kruger 1986,
cited in Barrett 1995). Explicit drawing of attention seemed to have a negative
side effect. Although it has been assumed that pointing was a frequently used
method to draw a child’s attention, later studies have argued against such this
assumption. Tomasello reported in a later studies that pointing is not necessary
for learning language, provided there is explicit feedback (Tomasello & Barton
1994).
In this article, Tomasello and Barton report on experiments where children
learn novel words under two different conditions. In one condition, children do
not receive extra-linguistic cues when the word-form is presented. There is a
so-called “nonostensive” context. When at a later moment the corresponding
referent is shown, a positive feedback is given if the child correctly relates the
referent with given word-form. If the child relates the word-form to an incorrect
referent, negative feedback is given. In the second condition, joint attention is
established simultaneous with the presentation of the word-form. In this condi-
tion the child receives a so-called “ostensive” context. Tomasello & Barton (1994)
showed in their experiments that children could equally well learn novel word-
meaning relations in both condition.
Yet another strategy is proposed by Eve Clark (1993). She argues that children
can fill in knowledge gaps when receiving novel language, provided the context
was known.
So, a lot of strategies appear to be available to a language learner, and there
may be more. It is not unlikely that a combination of the available strategies is
used; perhaps some more frequent than others. A natural question rises: Which
strategies work and which do not? In this book experiments are presented that
investigate both the role of feedback and joint attention.
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1.4 Setting up the goals
This book presents the development and results of a series of experiments where
twomobile robots develop a grounded lexicon. The experiments are based on lan-
guage games that have first been implemented on mobile robots in Steels & Vogt
(1997) and Vogt (1997). The goal of the language games is to construct an ontology
and lexicon about the objects the robots can detect in their environment.
The sensory equipment with which the robots detect their world is kept sim-
ple, namely sensors that can only detect light intensities. One of the goals was
to develop the experiments without changing the simplicity of the robots very
much and to keep the control architecture within the behaviour-based design.
Luc Steels (1996c) hypothesises three basic mechanisms for language evolution,
which have been introduced above: individual adaptation, cultural evolution and
self-organisation.
In a language game, robots produce a sensorimotor behaviour to perceive their
environment. The environment consists of a set of light sources, which are dis-
tinguishable in height. The raw sensory data that results from this sensing is
segmented, yielding a set of segments of which each segment relates to the de-
tection of a light source. These segments can be described by features, which
are categorised by the individual robots. The categorisation is processed by so-
called discrimination games (Steels 1996d). In this process the robots try to
develop categories that discriminates one segment from another. The lexicon is
formed based on an interaction and adaptation strategy modelled in what has
been called naming games (Steels 1996c). In a naming game one robot has the
role of a speaker and the other robot has the role of the hearer. The speaker
tries to name the categorisation (or meaning) of a segment it has chosen to be
the topic. The hearer tries to identify the topic using both linguistic and extra-
linguistic information when available.
The language game is adaptive in that the robots can adapt either their ontol-
ogy or lexicon when they fail to categorise of name the topic. This way they
may be successful in future games. In addition, the robots can adapt association
strengths that they use to select elements of their ontology or lexicon. The se-
lection principle is very much based on natural selection as proposed by Charles
Darwin (1968), but the evolution is not spread over generations of organisms, but
over “generations” of language games. The principle is that the most effective ele-
ments are selected more and ineffective ones are selected less frequently, or even
not at all. This way the most effective elements of the language are spread in the
language community, thus leading to a cultural evolution.
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The idea of cultural evolution has best been described by Richard Dawkins
in his book The Selfish Gene (1976). In this book Dawkins proposes the notion of
memes. Memes are elements that carry the notion of ideas, like the idea of awheel.
Like genes, memes are generated as varieties of previous ideas and possibly as
complete new ideas. The memes are spread in the society by cultural interac-
tions. The evolution of memes is similar to that of genetic evolution and good
memes survive, whereas bad memes do not. However, the cultural evolution is
much faster than biological evolution and several generations of memes can oc-
cur in a society within the lifetime of an organism. When changing the notion
of memes into language elements, a cultural evolution of language arrives. The
emergence of language through cultural evolution is based on the same principle
as biological evolution, namely self-organisation.
Three main research questions are raised in this book:
1. Can the symbol grounding problem be solved with these robots by con-
structing a lexicon through individual adaptation, (cultural) interaction
and self-organisation? And if so, how is this accomplished?
2. What are the important types of extra-linguistic information that agents
should share when developing a coherent communication system?
3. What is the influence of the physical conditions and interaction of the
robots on developing a grounded lexicon?
The first question is an obvious one and can be answered with yes, but to
a certain extend. As argued in Section 1.1.3, the symbol grounding problem is
solved when the robots are able to construct a semiotic sign of which the form
is either arbitrary or conventionalised. Since the robots try to ground a shared
lexicon, the form has to be conventionalised. Therefore the robots solve the sym-
bol grounding problem when they successfully play a language game. I.e. when
both robots are able to identify a symbol with the same form that stands for the
same referent.
Throughout the book the model that accomplishes the task is presented and
revised to come up with two language game models that work best. Although
the basics of the models, namely the discrimination- and naming game are very
simple, the implementation on these simple robots has proven to be extremely
difficult. Not all the designer’s frustrations are made explicit in this book, but
working with lego robots and “home-made” sensorimotor boards made life not
easier. In order to concentrate on the grounding problem, some practical assump-
tions have been made leaving some unsolved technical problems.
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The two models that are proposed at the end of the experimental results show
different interaction strategies that answer the second question. Both feedback
and joint-attention are important types of extra-linguistic information necessary
for agents to develop a lexicon, although not necessarily used simultaneously.
How feedback and joint attention can be established is left as an open question.
Technical limitations drove to leave this question open as one of the remaining
frustrations. Some of these limitations are the same that introduced the assump-
tions that have been made.
Although more difficult to show, the quality of physical interactions have an
important influence on the robots’ ability to ground a lexicon. When the robots
are not well adapted to their environment (or vice versa) no meaningful lexicon
can emerge. In addition, when the robots can co-ordinate their actions well to
accomplish a certain (sub)task, they will be better in grounding a lexicon than
when the co-ordination is weak.
1.5 Contributions
How does this book contribute to the field of artificial intelligence and cognitive
science? The main contributions made in this book that there is an autonomous
system that is grounded in the real world of which no parts of the ontology or lex-
icon is pre-defined. The categorisation is organised hierarchically by prototypical
categories. In addition, the book investigates different types of extra-linguistic
information that the robots can use to develop a shared lexicon. No single aspect
is more or less unique. However, the combination of some aspects is.
Table 1.1 shows the contributions of research that is most relevant to this work.
The table lists some aspects that the various researchers have contributed in their
work. The aspects that are listed are thought to be most relevant to this work.
Note that with Steels’ work the Talking Heads experiments are meant. In the
discussion at the end of this book, a more detailed comparison with the Talking
Heads is made.
Of the related work, the work of Cangelosi & Parisi (1998), de Jong (2000),
and Oliphant (1997) is not grounded in the real world. The work of Cangelosi
et al. and de Jong is grounded only in simulations. This makes the grounding
process relatively easy, because it avoids the problems that come about when
categorising the real world. Oliphant does not ground meaning at all. The work
of this book is grounded in the real world.
Some researchers, notably Billard & Hayes (1997), Cangelosi & Parisi (1998),
and Yanco & Stein (1993), pre-define the language. I.e. they define how a word-
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Table 1.1: Various aspects investigated by different researchers. Each column of
the table is reserved for a particular research. The related work in this
table is from (the group of): Billard (B), Cangelosi (C), de Jong (D), Oli-
phant (O), Rosenstein (R), Steels (S), Vogt (V), and Yanco & Stein (Y).
The other symbols in the table stand for “yes” (+), “no” (–) and “not
applicable” (·).
Aspect B C D O R S V Y
Grounded in real world + – – – + + + +
Language pre–defined + + – – · – – +
Meaning pre–defined +/– – – + – – – +
Prototypical categories – – – · + – + –
Hierarchical layering of
categories
– – + · – + + –
Nr. of meanings given +/– – – + – – – +
Nr. of forms given + + – + · – – +
Nr. of agents 2 ≥ 2 ≥ 2 ≥ 2 1 ≥ 2 2 ≥ 2
Calibrated world – – – · – + – –
Mobile agents + + + · + – + +
Camera vision – · · · – + – –
Autonomous + + + + + + + –
Task oriented + + + – – – – +
Extra–linguistic – – + + · – + –
form relates to a behaviour or real world phenomenon. The pre-defined language
in Billard and Hayes’ experiments is only given to the teacher robot, the student
robot has to learn the language. Although in the work of Yanco & Stein the
robots learn the language, the researchers have pre-defined the language and
they provide feedback whether the language is used successfully. Rosenstein
& Cohen (1998a) do not model language yet. Hence the question if they pre-
define the language is not applicable. In the work done at the vub ai Lab no such
relationships are given to the agents. This is also not given in the work of Mike
Oliphant (1997). This means that the agents construct the language themselves.
Meaning is pre-defined if the agents have some representation of the meaning
pre-programmed. This is done in the work of Billard & Hayes (1997), Oliphant
(1997) and Yanco & Stein (1993). In the work of Billard & Hayes, the meaning
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is only given to the teacher robot. The student robot learns the representation
of the meaning. Oliphant’s agents only have abstract meanings that have no
relation to the real world. In the work that is done in most of Steels’ group the
agents construct their own ontology of meanings.
Of the researchers that are compared with this work, only Rosenstein & Cohen
(1998a) make use of prototypes as a way of defining categories. All other work
makes use of some other definition. This does notmean that the use of prototypes
is uncommon in artificial intelligence, but it is uncommon in the grounding of
language community.
A hierarchical structuring of the categorisations is only done by the research-
ers of Steels’ group, this book included. The advantage of hierarchical structuring
of categories is that a distinction can be either more general or more specific.
Quite some researchers pre-define the number of meanings and/or forms that
is, or should arise in the language (Billard & Hayes 1997; Cangelosi & Parisi 1998;
Oliphant 1997; Yanco & Stein 1993). Naturally, language is not bound by the
number of meanings and forms. Therefore, the number of meanings and forms
is unbound in this book.
It may be useful if the position of the robot in relation to other robots and ob-
jects in their environment is known exactly. Especially for technical purposes,
like pointing to an object. However, such information is not always known to
the language users. In the Talking Heads experiment, the robots have calibrated
knowledge about their own position (which is fixed) and the position of the other
robot, and they can calculate the position of objects in their world. Such informa-
tion is not available to the robots in this book. This is one of the main differences
between the Talking Heads and the current experiments. Another difference
with the Talking Heads is the use of camera vision, rather than low-level sensing.
Still other differences are at the implementation of the model. These differences
have been discussed above and will be discussed more in Chapter 7.
Not all experiments deal with robots that are mobile in their environment. In
particular the Talking Heads are not mobile, at least not in the sense that they can
move freely in their environment. The Talking Heads can only go from physical
head to physical head. The locations of these heads are fixed.
Except the work of Yanco & Stein (1993), all experiments are autonomous, i.e.
without the intervention of a human. Yanco & Stein give their robots feedback
about the effect of their communication. This feedback is used to reinforce the
connections between form and meaning. The system designed in this book is
completely autonomous. The only intervention taken is to place the robots at a
close distance rather than letting them find each other. This is done in order to
30
1.6 The book’s outline
speed up the experiments. In previous implementations, the robots did find each
other themselves (Steels & Vogt 1997). There is no intervention at the grounding
and learning level involved.
In most of the experiments mentioned, the agents have only one task: devel-
oping language. Some scientist argue that language should be developed in a
task-oriented way, e.g. Billard & Hayes (1997), Cangelosi & Parisi (1998), de Jong
(2000) and Yanco & Stein (1993). In particular, the task should have an ecolog-
ical function. This seems natural and is probably true. However, in order to
understand the mechanisms involved in lexicon development, it is useful to con-
centrate only on lexicon development. Besides, developing langauge is in some
sense task-oriented.
As explained, one of the research goals is to investigate the importance of
extra-linguistic information that guides the lexicon development. This has also
been investigated by Oliphant (1997) and de Jong (2000).
So, in many respects the research that is presented in this book is unique. It
takes on many aspects of a grounded language experiment that is not shared by
other experiments. The experiment that comes closest is the TalkingHeads exper-
iment. The results of the experiments from this book will therefore be compared
in more detail at the end of this book.
1.6 The book’s outline
The book is basically divided in three parts. In the first part, the model by which
the experiments are developed is introduced. Part two presents experimental
results. And the final part is reserved for discussions and conclusions.
Chapter 2 introduces the experimental set-up. This includes the environment
in which the robots behave and the technical set-up of the robots. This chap-
ter explains the Process Description Language (pdl) in which the robots are pro-
grammed. pdl is for the purpose of these experiments extended from a behaviour-
based architecture in a behaviour-based cognitive architecture. This is to enable
better controllable planned behaviour. People not interested in the technical de-
tails of the robots may omit this chapter. For these people it is advisable to read
Section 2.1 in which the environment is presented. In addition, the part on the
white light sensors in Section 2.2.1 is important to follow some of the discussions.
The language game model is introduced in Chapter 3. It explains how the
robots interact with each other and their environment. The interaction with their
environment includes sensing the surroundings. The result of the sensing is pre-
processed further to allow efficient categorisation. The discrimination game with
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which categorisation and ontological development is modelled is explained. Af-
ter that, the naming game is presented, which models the naming part of the
language game and the lexicon formation. The chapter ends with a presentation
of how the discrimination game and the naming game are coupled to each other.
The experimental results are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 first
introduces themeasures bywhich the results aremonitored. The first experiment
that is presented is called the basic experiment. A detailed analysis is made of
what is going on during the experiment. As will become clear it still has a lot of
discrepancies. These discrepancies are mostly identified in following chapters.
The experiments presented in Chapter 5 are all variants of the basic experiment.
In each only one parameter or strategy has been changed. The experiments inves-
tigate the impact from various strategies for categorisation, physical interaction,
joint attention and feedback. In addition, the influence of a few parameters that
control adaptation are investigated. Each set of experiments is followed by a brief
discussion.
The final series experiments are presented in Chapter 6. Two variants of the
language games that have proven to be successful in previous chapters are in-
vestigated in more detail. Each of these experiments have a varying strategy of
using extra-linguistic information and are additionally provided with parameter
settings that appeared to yield the best results. The first experiment is the guess-
ing game in which the hearer has to guess what light source the speaker tries
to name, without previous knowledge about the topic. In the second experiment
prior topic knowledge is provided by joint attention. No feedback on the outcome
is provided in the second game, called the observational game.
Chapter 7 discusses the experimental results and presents the conclusions. The
discussion is centred on the research questions posed in the previous section. Ad-
ditional discussions centre on the similarities and differences with related work,
in particular with the work done by other members of the vub ai Lab and Sony
csl Paris. Finally some possible future directions are given.
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In this chapter the design and architecture of the robots is discussed. The ex-
periments use two small lego vehicles, which are controlled by a small sensori-
motor board. The robots, including their electronics, were designed at the vub
ai Lab. They were constructed such that the configuration of the robots can be
changed easily. Sensors may be added or changed and the physical robustness
of the robots has improved through time. In some experiments they are changed
substantially, but in most experiments the robots remain the same.
The robots are controlled by a specialised sensorimotor board, the smbii1 (Ver-
eertbrugghen 1996). The sensorimotor board connects the sensory equipment
with the actuators in such a way that the actuators and sensor readings are up-
dated 40 times per second. The actuators respond to sensory stimuli, where the
response is calculated by a set of “parallel” processes. These processes are pro-
grammed in the Process Description Language (pdl), which has been developed
at the vub ai Lab as a software architecture to implement behaviour-oriented
control (Steels 1994c).
The outline of the experiments is discussed in Chapter 3; this chapter is concen-
trated on the physical set-up of the robots and their environment in the different
experiments. The robots’ environment is presented in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 dis-
cusses the physical architecture of the robots. Section 2.3 discusses the Process
Description Language.
2.1 The environment
The environment that has been used for the experiments in the past varied across
some of the experiments. The environment in early experiments (Steels & Vogt
1997; Vogt 1998b,a) had different light sources than the current environment. Fur-
thermore, the size of the environment shrinked from 5 · 5m2 to 2.5 · 2.5m2. In the
current environment there are four different white light sources, each placed at
a different height (Figure 2.1).
1 Read as smb-2.
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These white light (wl) sources (or light sources for short) all emit their light
from black cylindrical boxes with small slits. The light sources are halogen lights
and each box now has a height of 22 cm, a diameter of 16 cm and 3 horizontal
slits. Each slit has its centre at a height of 13 cm (measured from the bottom of
the box) and is 0.8 cm wide. Although the different slits are intersected by a bar,
they can be approximated to be one slit.
The boxes are placed such that the height of the slit varied per light source.
The four different heights are distributed with a vertical distance of 3.9 cm. In
one experiment the difference in height was changed to 2.9 cm. The robots were
adjusted to this environment (or vice versa) so that the light sensors were placed
at the same height as the centre of the slits.
Figure 2.1: The robots in the environment as is used in the experiments.
2.2 The robots
In the experiments two lego robots as in Figure 2.2 are used. Each robot has a set
of sensors to observe theworld. These sensors are low-level. They can only detect
the intensity of light in a particular frequency domain. Other low-level sensors
are used to control the robots in their movement. The sensors are connected
to a dedicated sensorimotor board, the so-called smbii. On the smbii all sensors
are read at a rate of 40 hz. The sensor readings are processed according to the
software, written in pdl (see next section). After the sensors have been processed
the smbii outputs the actuator commands and sends its appropriate signals to the
actuators. The robots are powered by a re-chargeable nickel–cadmium battery
pack as used in portable computers.
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In this section the set-up of the sensors and actuators of the robots are dis-
cussed first. Secondly the architecture of the smbii is discussed briefly.
Figure 2.2: One of the lego robots used in the experiments.
2.2.1 The sensors and actuators
The robots in all experiments have a set-up like shown schematically in Figure 2.3.
The sensory equipment consists of four binary bumpers, three infrared (ir) sen-
sors and a radio link receiver. The radio link is a module that also has a radio link
transmitter, which is classified as an actuator. The infrared sensors are part of
the infrared module, which also consists of an actuator: the infrared transmitter.
Two independent motors complete the actuator set-up. All sensors and actuators
are connected to the smbii, which is powered by a battery-pack. The battery-pack
also powers the motor-controller. The motor-controller, controlled by the smbii
controls the motors. The motors are connected to the wheels via a set of gears.
Finally there are four white light sensors that are responsible for the perception.
Below amore detailed description of the most important sensors and actuators
are given.
The bumpers The robots have four bumpers that are used for touch based obsta-
cle avoidance; two on the front and two on the back of the robot, both left
and right. Each bumper is a binary switch: when it is pressed it returns 1,
else it returns 0. The bumpers have a spanning construction of lego (see
Figure 2.4(a) and 2.4(b)). If a robot bumps with this construction into an
obstacle. The program can then react on the sensed collision.
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Figure 2.3: A schematic overview of the basic set-up of the robots that are used
in the experiments.
The infrared module Whereas the bumpers are simple binary sensors, the infra-
red module Figure 2.4(a) is more complex. The infrared module consists
of infrared emitters and sensors. The emitters are light emitting diodes
emitting infrared. The infrared sensors themselves are sensors that can
be found in e.g. television sets. They detect light at infrared wavelengths
and send a signal to the smbii that is proportional to the intensity of the
infrared. The sensors are mounted such that they can discriminate infra-
red coming from the left, centre and right sides in front of the robot. The
sensors are not calibrated in the sense that one can calculate the exact an-
gle from where the infrared is coming or from what distance. Also the
positions of the sensors are not exactly symmetric, due to some physical
limitations of the sensors and the lego construction. Vogt (1997) discusses
some practical problems concerning the modulation and characteristics of
the infrared module in detail.
The radio link The radio link module is a transmitter/receiver device designed to
connect with the smbii (see Figure 2.4(b)). The module is a Radiometrix
bm-433f module with rx (receive) and tx (transmission) connections. The
module can send up to 40 Kbit/s, but is used at 9.6 Kbit/s.
Every clock cycle of the smbii a packet of messages can be sent. A packet
can consist of a maximum of 31 messages each up to 127 bytes long. A
message has a transmission id and an destination address, which define
the sender and receiver(s) of the message. It also has a bit defining the
reliability of the transmission; this bit has to be set to unreliable, i.e. to 0,
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because the reliability protocol has not been implemented in the radio link
kernel. This has the consequence that if a message is sent, it is not sure
if the message arrives at its destination. But when it arrives, the message
arrives error-less. About 5 % of the messages sent do not arrive at their
destination.
This unreliability has some technical impacts on the experiments. Since
data logging, recording and communication passes through the radio link,
not all information is received. Filters had to written to find out whether
all data was logged and if not, part of the data would be unreliable and
should therefore be discarded. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation
to go into the details of such filters here. For the purpose of the book it is
assumed that the radio transmission is reliable.
The motor controller and the motors The motor controller is a device that trans-
forms and controls motor commands coming from the smbii into signals
that are sent to the standard lego dc motors. Each robot has two indepen-
dent motors. So, in order to steer the robot, one has to send a (possibly
different) signal to each motor.
Gearing Themotors are not directly connected to thewheels. They are connected
to the wheels with a set of gears (see Figure 2.4(c)). The wheels are placed
such that they form an axis approximately through the centre of the robot
so that it can rotate around this point. A third small caster-wheel is used
to stabilise the robot.
The light sensors The white light sensors are the most crucial sensors in the ex-
periments. This is because they are used for the perception of the analogue
signals that the robots are supposed to ground. Each robot has four white
light sensors stacked on top of each other. The sensors have a vertical dis-
tance of 3.9 cm between each other. Each sensor is at the same height as a
light source (Figure 2.4(a)).
The light sensors were calibrated such that the characteristics of all sensors
are roughly the same. Figure 2.5 shows the characteristics of the calibrated
light sensors as empirically measured for the experimental set-up. On the
x-axis of each plot the distance of the robot to the light source is given in
centimetres; the y-axis shows the intensity of the light in pdl values. pdl
scales the light sensors between 0 and 255, where 0 means no detection
of light and 255 means maximum intensity. The calibration of each sensor
is done while it was exposed to a corresponding light source. A sensor is
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said to correspond with a light source when it has the same height. The
complete figure shows the characteristics of the two robots r0 and r1, each
with four sensors (s0 . . . s3).
It is notable that for light source L0 the characteristics of sensor s3 is high
at the beginning (Figure 2.5 (a) and (e)). This is because for the lowest light
source L0, sensor s3 is higher than the top of the box, which is open. At a
larger distance the light coming from the top of this box cannot be seen.
It is clear that all characteristics are similar. The sensor that corresponds to
a light source detects high intensities at short distances and low values at
larger distances. From 0.6 m other sensors start detecting the light source
as well. This is because the light coming from the slit does not propagate in
a perpendicular beam, but is diverging slightly. It is important to note that
corresponding light sensors are calibrated to read the highest intensities
between 0 and 1.2 m. The shape of the plots are like they would have been
expected from the physics rule that the intensity I ∼ 1r2 , where r is the
distance to the light source.
It is noteworthy that each sensor detects noise that comes mainly from
ambient light.
The robots are also equipped with sensors and actuators that are used for in-
terfacing the robot with the experimenter. It has for instance a serial port for
connecting the robot to a pc, a display with 64 leds, a pause button, an on/off
switch, etc. Since these sensors are not vital for the behaviour of the robots, they
are not discussed in more detail here.
This subsection introduced the sensorimotor equipment that the robot carries
in the experiments as discussed throughout this book. The next subsection dis-
cusses the sensorimotor board in some more detail.
2.2.2 Sensor-motor board II
The computing hardware of the robots is a sensorimotor board, called the smbii,
which is developed at the vub ai Lab by Dany Vereertbrugghen (1996). It consists
of an add-on smb-2 board and a Vesta Technologies sbc332 micro controller
board.
The Vesta board (see Figure 2.6(a)) contains a Motorola mc68332 microcon-
troller, 128 kb rom and 1 mb ram.2 The board’s micro-controller runs at 16.78 mhz






















Figure 2.4: Several close ups of one of the robots. Figure (a) shows the front side
of the robot. The bumper construction can be seen. The perceptual
sensor array consisting of 4 light sensors, the infrared sensors and the
infrared emitter are also visible. The radio link module can be seen in
(b) as well as a part of the bumper construction on the back. Figure
(c) shows the bottom of the robot. We see the wheels, gearing and the
battery pack. Also a good view is seen of the bumper constructions.
at 5 Volt and everything is powered by a pack of rechargeable nickel–cadmium
batteries.
The add-on smb-2 board (Figure 2.6(b)) contains several i/o chips, bus con-
trollers and connectors. The smbii low-level program is run on the kernel and it
can interface a user program written in any language as long a the kernel calls
are written in c (Vereertbrugghen 1996). The program that is run on the smbii
for these experiments is written in the Process Description Language pdl.
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2.3 The Process Description Language
The robots are programmed in the so-called Process Description Language (Steels
1992; 1994b,c). pdl is designed as a framework for designing software for au-
tonomous agents according to the behaviour-oriented control.
In pdl one can decompose a behaviour system in a set of dynamical processes.
For instance, one can decompose the behaviour of phototaxis (i.e. moving to-
wards a light source) into two dynamical processes: (1) moving forward and (2)
orienting towards the light. pdl is designed to implement parallel processes that
are virtually evaluated simultaneously to output a summated response. So, sup-
pose there are the two parallel processes (1) and (2) that are evaluated simultane-
ously. And suppose further that the output of the two processes are summated
to give a motor response. Then the emergent behaviour is phototaxis.
pdl cycles the process of reading sensors, evaluate processes and control
actuators (Figure 2.7). During a pdl cycle a robot reads the sensors to detect
the current state of a robot in the world. These sensor readings are evaluated
by processes that are defined in the software as explained below. The processes
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Figure 2.5: The characteristics of the calibrated light sensors as empirically mea-
sured for the experimental set-up when exposed to light sources
L0 − L3. Plots (a) – (d) show the of robot r0 and plots (e) – (h) show
them for r1. The distances are measured from the front of the robots
to the boxes. Actual distances from source to sensor are 12 cm further.
output commands to activate the actuators. These actuators in turn change the
state of the world. Such a cycle is processed at 40 hz, so 40 pdl cycles take 1
second. Throughout the book the basic time unit is a pdl cycle ( 140 s).
The initial implementation of pdl was written in lisp, the currently used ver-
sion is implemented in ansi-c. It can compile both the specialised pdl syntax
and ansi-c commands within its architecture. The pdl architecture has as its ba-
sic symbolic units so-called quantities. A quantity is a struct type that has a
name, a value, an upper bound, a lower bound and an initial value. Each
quantity can be connected to a serial port, interfacing the programwith the phys-
ical sensors and actuators. Each type of sensor and actuator is defined within the
operating system of the smbii. The radio module has its own interface, but can be
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2x 64k EPROM
2X 512 kB RAM
MC68332 Micro-controller
(a) Vesta board (b) smb-2 add-on
Figure 2.6: The two components of the smbii board: (a) the Vesta Technologies









Figure 2.7: The way that pdl interacts with the world via a robot. Every 140 s pdl
is going through a cycle as shown in the figure.
called with a pdl command. The most important parts of a pdl program are the
processes. Each time a pdl program is compiled, a network of processes is build
up. The following example of phototaxis shows how this is done.
The example implements two behaviours: (1) infrared orientation and (2)
infrared phototaxis. In infrared orientation, the goal of the robot is to orient
itself in the direction of an infrared source without approaching the source.3 It
is implemented using only one dynamic process called taxis. With infrared pho-
totaxis the goal of a robot is to approach the infrared source. It is implemented
with an additional process that causes a robot to try to move at a default speed.
After declaration, the quantities have to added to the system as follows:
3 In the experiments the robots themselves are infrared sources.
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Figure 2.8: The construction of a pdl network. The program has serial ports
sid_an1 and sid_an2 for analogue sensory input. Ports aid_motor1
and aid_motor2 are serial ports for the motors. The network consists
of the quantities LeftFrontIR, RightFrontIR, LeftMotor and Right-
Motor.
The function add_q adds the quantity LeftFrontIR to the network, an upper
bound of 255.0f (where f stands for “float”), a lower bound of 0.0f and an ini-
tial value of 0.0f. Likewise the quantities RightFrontIR, LeftMotor and Right-
Motor were added, see Figure 2.8. The upper and lower bound of the motors
are 100.0 and −100.0, respectively. If, mathematically, an upper or lower bound
would be exceeded, pdl sets the quantity-value to its upper or lower bound. The
next step is to connect the quantities to the serial ports of the smbii, which are





Now the network looks like in Figure 2.9. The above is part of the initialisation.























Figure 2.10: This is the pdl network after the processes Taxis and TowardsDe-
fault are added.
This leads to the network as shown in Figure 2.10. To couple the sensors with
the actuators, the processes have to be defined. The process Taxis causes the







Here, value(Q) is a function that returns the value of quantity Q, add_va-
lue(Q,V) adds value V to the value of Q. The actual update of Q is done at the end
of each pdl cycle. When more values are added to Q, these values are summed
before they are added. C is a constant and F(D) is a scaling factor of difference
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F(x) · x dampens x strongly if x is large, it is less dampened if x is not large. If
F(x) is not applied, the robot would exaggerate its wiggling too much.
Taxis increases the LeftMotor and decreases the RightMotor by a value pro-
portionate to D. If the infrared source is to the right of the robot, the difference
D is positive. Hence the value of the LeftMotor increases and the value of the
RightMotor decreases. This in effect causes the robot to turn to the right. When
the infrared source is to the left of the robot, the opposite happens. So, the robot
will rotate in the direction in which the intensity of infrared is detected the high-
est. If the robot passes the infrared source, the direction in which the infrared
is detected (i.e. the sign of direction changes) and so the robot changes its direc-
tion of rotation. This will continue until D approaches zero or when the values
become so small, that it there is no power left to move the robot.
Although the robot is rotating around its axis in varying directions, it does not






This process causes the robot to change its speed towards a default speed with
certain step size. The step size is introduced to let the robot accelerate smoothly.
Note that this way the motor values do not reach the default speed; the values
approach it asymptotically. When the processes are defined, the network looks
like in Figure 2.12.
Taking the two processes together results in the emergent behaviour that the
robot will move wiggling towards the infrared source (see Figure 2.11). Such
phototaxis behaviour, although with a slightly different implementation, was in-
troduced for a robot application by Valentino Braitenberg (1984) and has already
been discussed extensively in the literature, see e.g. Steels 1994a.
Appendix B presents the structure of the implemented pdl program in more
detail. In the next section the behaviour based architecture is expanded to incor-
porate planned behaviours as well.
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Figure 2.11: This figure shows the evolution of the infrared sensors andmotor val-
ues in time during phototaxis, i.e. the emergent dynamics of combin-
ing the processes Taxis and TowardsDefault. On the x-axis the time
is shown in the basic time unit of the robots, a pdl cycle (= 140 s). The
y-axis shows the intensity of the infrared sensors and motor signals.
The data is taken from a robot that was driving using both processes
Taxis and TowardsDefault. It drove straight forward until at time
140 the robot detected an infrared source after which it adjusted its
motor signals to home in on the source.
2.4 Cognitive architecture in PDL
To accomplish a complex task like communication, a sequence of actions have to
be planned. Reactive behaviours like phototaxis alone do not suffice. To allow the
robots to execute planned behaviour a new architecture has been developed. This
resulted in what could be called a behaviour-based cognitive architecture
that is primarily based on the behaviour-based control architecture proposed
by Luc Steels (1994c). This cognitive architecture could be applied as a general
purpose architecture for complex and dynamic tasks like navigation. The archi-
tecture executes a script (or plan) through excitation and inhibition of processes
that altogether result in some emergent behaviour. The scripts are implemented
as finite state automata in which transitions are controlled by state-specific pre-
and post-conditions. In each state of the finite state automaton (fsa) a particular
set of processes are activated or inhibited. Figure 2.13 shows the basic principle.
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Figure 2.12: Finally the network of quantities and processes for the phototaxis
example is complete. The LeftFrontIR and RightFrontIR are con-
nected to input Taxis, which outputs to the motor quantities. The
motor quantities are also used to calculate the output, hence this con-
nection is bi-directional. The process TowardsDefault does not use
any sensors; as in Taxis it only uses values of the quantities Left-
Motor and RightMotor thus giving the bi-directional connection be-
















Figure 2.13: A schematic overview of the developed architecture. See the text for
details.
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In the architecture the sensors Se and actuators A are coupled through a com-
plex of connections. The agent consists of a set of scripts, which are implemented
as finite state automata. The finite state automata are parallel processes where
transitions are regulated by pre- and post-conditions. Usually the pre- and post-
conditions are satisfied by some sensory stimuli. A state may also be fed with
information coming from some internal process (not shown). Every state S has a
post-condition that allows the system to enter the default state S0 where nothing
happens. Each state of the automaton has excitatory and inhibitory connections
with dynamic sensorimotor processes P. The excitatory connections are drawn
as dotted lines, the inhibitory have been left out for clarity of the picture. The pro-
cesses are divided between reactive (R) and cognitive (C) processes. The reactive
processes have more direct processing and can take usually only sensorimotor
data as input. The cognitive processes are more complex, and may take also stim-
uli coming from other internal processes. Note that the finite state automaton
could be considered as a cognitive process as well. The configuration of exci-
tatory processes and the dynamics of the robot with its environment cause the
robot to perform some emergent behaviour. Hence the system is consistent with
the behaviour-based paradigm.
Activation of processes is modelled by invoking motivational factors (cf. Steels
1996a; Jaeger & Christaller 1998). For example if is a state that in which the
motivation for doing infrared taxis is present, this state may be a motivational







A multi-agent system is a parallel process in which two robots cooperate au-
tonomously. In order to synchronise these two parallel processes, the robots
use pre-programmed radio communication. The robots playing a language game
process dependent, but parallel operating finite state automata. A signal is broad-
casted when both robots should transfer to another state simultaneously as the
result of the transition of one of the robots.
Because the architecture uses finite state automata, readers may wrongly sug-
gest it is the subsumption architecture proposed by Rodney Brooks (1990). In the
subsumption architecture each process is viewed as a finite state automaton on
its ownwith only one state that models a behaviour (Figure 2.14 (a)). The architec-
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Figure 2.14: The finite state automata as used in the subsumption architecture (a)
and in the cognitive architecture (b). In the subsumption architecture
the finite state automata usually only has one state that models a par-
ticular behaviour. This behaviour can inhibit (or subsume) another
behaviour. The cognitive architecture has some finite state automata
each modelling a script-like behaviour. Each state excites or inhibits
a number of dynamical processes. The finite state automata function
independently as a parallel process.
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ture proposed here uses possibly more finite state automata eachwith a sequence
of states that can be entered (Figure 2.14 (b)). These finite state automata are used
to control planning. A process in the cognitive architecture can be activated by
several states, and a particular state can activate several processes. In addition
the processes couple the sensors with the motors, like the behaviour-based ar-
chitecture proposed by Luc Steels (1994c).
The behaviour-based cognitive architecture has strong similarities with the
dual dynamics architecture (Jaeger & Christaller 1998). However, the in the dual
dynamics the activation of processes is regulated internally of these processes.
There is no explicit finite state automaton that regulates the activation.
The architecture proposed here is also similar to the architecture proposed by
Barnes (1996) and Barnes et al. (1997), called the behaviour synthesis architec-
ture (bsa), which synthesises a set of behaviour patterns with a certain utility (or
strength) for accomplishing a task. A behaviour script controls a sequence of be-
haviour packets. Each behaviour packet consists of a set of behaviour patterns, a
pre-condition and a post-condition. Comparing the behaviour patterns with the
dynamical processes of pdl, the behaviour scripts with the finite state automata
and the packets with a single state, then the bsa is very close to the architecture
that has been incorporated here. Main differences with the work of Barnes (1996)
is the use of utility functions as its synthesis mechanism. Although the architec-
ture here is developed by a human programmer, Barnes et al. (1997) show that
planning can be automated using the bsa.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter the basic set-up of the robots, their software and environment
were introduced. The experiments use two small lego vehicles that are equipped
with a set of sensors, actuators, a battery pack and a specialised sensorimotor
board smbii. The robots are programmed in a specialised programming language
pdl, which is dedicated to process the dynamics of sensorimotor behaviours in
the behaviour-oriented paradigm.
The principles of pdl have been extended to a behaviour-based cognitive ar-
chitecture. In this new architecture robots can execute planned behaviour as
cognitive processes.
The robots as introduced here are the physical bodies withwhich the agents try
to develop their ontologies and lexicons. How they do that is explained in Chap-
ter 3. As shall become clear some processing is done off-board. This is mainly
done to experiment more efficiently and to be able to test different approaches
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on recorded data. In some specific experiments the architecture of the robots
has been changed with respect to the description given in this chapter. Relevant
changes will be reported when these experiments are discussed.




In order to solve the symbol grounding problem the robots engage in a series of
language games. Every language game can be thought of as a communication
act in which the robots communicate about an object (in this case a light source).
The goal of a language game is for the two robots to identify the same referent
through the exchange of linguistic and possibly non-linguistic information. If
this does not succeed they can adjust their set of meanings and/or lexicons so
they may be successful in future games.
The notion of a language game was first introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1958). Wittgenstein called every language use a language game. The meaning
of the language game depends, according to Wittgenstein, on the how the game
is used. Wittgenstein gave some examples of different types of language games
Wittgenstein (1958: 11, §22):
• Giving orders, and obeying them
• Describing the appearances of an object, or giving its measurements
• Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)
• Reporting an event
• Speculating about an event
• …
In the experiments done at the ai Lab different types of games are investi-
gated. Besides the basic term of language game, the following games have been
introduced naming games (Steels 1996c), discrimination games (Steels 1996d),
imitation games (de Boer 1997), guessing games (Steels & Kaplan 1999), iden-
tification games and follow me games (Vogt 1999; 2000b). All games model
a communication act, except the discrimination and identification games which
model categorisation. The types of games that will be used in this book are nam-
ing games, discrimination games, guessing games and two additional games that
3 Language games
will be explained further on in this chapter. The discrimination and naming game
form a sub-part of what is called a language game here. The other games are a
special type of language game.
In the context of this work, a language game is the complete process of per-
forming a communication act. As mentioned in Chapter 1, grounding language
is strongly influenced by an agent’s interaction with its environment. Since it is
assumed that language and meaning formation are complex dynamical adaptive
systems, these systems can be defined by their mechanical processes and the sys-
tems boundary conditions (Prigogine & Strengers 1984). So, to develop a robot
capable of constructing conceptual structures and language, one has to define
such mechanisms and boundary conditions of the system. The mechanism has
already been chosen, namely the selectionist approach taken (Steels 1996c,d).
The boundary conditions will be defined (for a great deal) by the physical bodies
and interaction of the robots with their ecological niche.
This chapter presents the physical interactions of the robots with their envi-
ronment. It defines the language game scenario in detail, defining the physical in-
teraction in which a context setting is acquired. This happens in the next section.
Then Section 4.1.3 discusses the advantages of on-board vs. off-board process-
ing as a methodology of experimenting with robots. Section 3.4.1 discusses the
perception and segmentation during a language game. Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3
explain the higher cognitive functions of categorisation and naming. A final sec-
tion of this chapter couples the different parts of the language game.
3.2 The language game scenario
Thegoal of a language game is to communicate a name for one of the light sources
that the robots can detect in their environment. To do so, both robots first have
to sense their surroundings. One of the robots takes the role of the speaker, the
other takes the role of hearer. The speaker selects one sensation of a light source.
This light source is the subject of the communication. The speaker looks for a
category that relates to the sensation of this light source. When it did this, it
searches a word-form that it has associated with this category in the past. This
word-form is then communicated to the hearer.
The hearer, who has also sensed several light sources, tries to interpret the
communicated word-form. It looks in its memory if it had stored an association
of this word-form with one or more meanings that relate to the sensation of the
light sources. If the hearer can find a link between the word-form and some light
source, the language game is successful when both robots communicated about
the same light source.
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In the beginning of the experiments, the robots have no categories or word-
forms yet. These are the things that they need to develop. So, when the robots
are not able to find a suitable category or a word-form, they may expand their
memory in order to do so in the future. And if they were able to do so, they will
increase the strength of the used association, which increases the chance that
they will be successful in the future. How they do this will be explained in detail
in this chapter. In this section, the sub-tasks of a language game will be identified
and organised.
So, how is a language game organised? Table 3.1 shows the structure of the lan-
guage game scenario. In a language game two robots – a speaker and a hearer
– get together at close distance. In earlier experiments (Steels & Vogt 1997) the
robots came together autonomously. When sensing each other’s vicinity, the
speaker approached the hearer by using infrared phototaxis. When both robots
were close to each other, they aligned such that they faced each other prior to the
sensing. This behaviour, however, took approximately 1.5 minutes for each lan-
guage game. To speed up the current experiments the robots have been brought
together manually. The pdl source code for finding each other is included in
Appendix B. For more details on this part of the language games, consult Vogt
1997.
Table 3.1: The language game scenario. The “Get together and align” phase is
done by the experimenter for practical reasons. “Pointing” and “Topic
selection” may be omitted for methodological reasons. See the text for
more details.
speaker hearer
Get together and align










When the robots are standing together at close distance, they acquire a spatial
view of their surroundings by means of a specialised sensing task. This sens-
ing task results in a spatial view of the robot’s surroundings, which is then seg-
mented resulting in a set of segments (or context for short). Each segment is
supposed to refer to a light source as detected by the robot and is represented
by a set of connected data points. These data points are sensory data that from
which the noise is reduced. From these segments feature vectors are extracted
that designate some properties of these segments.
The speaker chooses one segment from the context to be the topic of the lan-
guage game and tries to categorise its relating feature vector by playing a dis-
crimination game. The discrimination game results in one or more distinctive
categories. The hearer identifies one or more segments from the context as a
possible topic an tries to categorise its (their) related feature vector(s).
After the speaker has chosen a topic and categorised this segment, it produces
an utterance. An utterance is the communication of a form. The hearer tries to
understand this utterance by looking for matching associations of this form with
a meaning in its lexicon. If one of these meanings is coherent with one of the
distinctive categories of the topic, then the language game may be a success. The
language game is successful when the speaker and the hearer communicated
about the same referent. The evaluation of the success is called the feedback.
If the language game was not a success, the lexicon has to be adapted either by
creating a new form (if the speaker could not produce an utterance), by adopt-
ing the form (if the hearer could not understand the utterance) or by decreasing
association scores. Association scores are increased when the language game is
successful. The process that models naming and lexicon adaptation is called
a naming game. Figure 3.1 illustrates the language game scenario schematically.
3.3 PDL implementation
To play a language game, a robot has to perform a sequence of actions. These
actions need to be planned. The planning is pre-programmed as a script using
finite state automata. There is a finite state automaton (fsa) for each role the
robots can play: the speaker or hearer. Each finite state automaton is active all
the time and when no language game is played, both robots are in state 0. A
process called DefaultBehavior decides when an agent goes into state 1 of the
speaker-fsa or hearer-fsa. In each state a set of dynamic processes is activated
or inhibited.1








Figure 3.1: A temporal overview of the language game scenario. (a)The robots get
together aligned and align. (b)The robots rotate in order to sense their
surroundings. (c) The speaker produces an utterance and the hearer
tries to understand the speaker. (d) When the hearer “thinks” it under-




How the physical behaviours of the robots are implemented in pdl is presented
in Appendix B. Section 3.4 sketches the architecture as a general architecture for
developing cognitive robots. After the introduction of the architecture sensing,
segmentation and pointing is discussed in detail.
Table 3.2: A list of abbreviations as used in Figure 3.2.
sensors
lfb Left Front Bumper
rfb Right Front Bumper
lbb Left Back Bumper
rbb Right Back Bumper
lir Left Infrared Sensor
fir Front Infrared Sensor
rir Right Infrared Sensor




Sx Speaker’s State x
Hx Hearer’s State x
processes






Figure 3.2 shows how the language games are implemented in the behaviour-
based cognitive architecture. The architecture is built of a large set of parallel
processes, which are continuously being processed. These processes, however,
do model different types of behaviour and should not be viewed at one level of
complexity. Rather, the processes are organised hierarchically.
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Figure 3.2: The behaviour-based cognitive architecture of the robotic system for
processing language games. Note that the pdl-like network structure
as introduced in Section 2.3. The flow of information follows each line
in the direction of the arrow. If a cross-connection is found, the infor-
mation follows the line straight. Only when a T-connection is encoun-
tered, the direction of the arrow is taken. Some lines are bi-directional,
in such cases information flows in both directions. Basically, the in-
formation flows from the sensors on the left-hand side of the figure
to the actuators on the right-hand side. In between, the information
first flows in the finite state automata that controls the planning of
the robots. Table 3.2 gives the translation of the abbreviations. Note
that the term “perception” is used to designate the sensing.
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There is a finite state automaton for the speaker role and one for the hearer.
Each state of the finite state automaton activates a set of processes that are shown
to the right of the finite state automaton. Those processes that are active respond
to information that flows from connected sensors, actuators or other processes.
All processes have been implemented in pdl on the real robots in previous ver-
sions (Steels & Vogt 1997). In the current experiments, the cognitive processes
are implemented as software agents that are processed on a pc.
There are reactive processes like taxis, rotate and obstacle-avoidance. All these
processes guide the physical behaviour of the robots.
The cognitive processes can be distinguished from the reactive processes in
that they model more complex behaviour and need not directly influence actua-
tors, but they can also influence the internal state of an agent.2 Coincidentally
all cognitive processes are implemented off-board, besides the sensing which is
implemented on-board. The cognitive processes tend to work at different time
scales then reactive ones. I.e. the time necessary to, e.g., categorise something
takes computationally longer than reactive responses do. This has not only been
observed in neuroscience,3 but also during the implementation of so-called fol-
low me games (Vogt 1999; 2000b). In the follow me games the hearer is follow-
ing the speaker using phototaxis. When a change in direction is encountered
the robot categorises a part of its movement. If both phototaxis and categori-
sation and naming are processed simultaneously on the smbii, the robot fails
to follow the speaker because the categorisation process takes more time than
0.025s, which is the time of one pdl cycle. Although pdl normally cycles the
read-process-execute cycle 40 times per second, it only does so when it finished
all its processes.
The categorisation and naming are single processes that carry out a complex
process of search, selection and adaptation, but these processes could in principle
be modelled by a set of parallel processes as well. This has not been done for the
sake of both simplicity and architectural requirements (the computers used are
still serial machines).
Both the reactive and cognitive processes are activated or inhibited by the
motivational factors which are set inside the states of the finite state automaton.
2 Although the term “cognitive processes” is sometimes used to refer to reactive processes as
well, the term is used here to indicate the distinction between reactive behaviours and be-
haviours that require more sophisticated cognitive processing. The cognitive processes refer
to those processes that are fundamentally involved in categorisation and/or naming.
3 There is a lot of evidence for fast and slow pathways in the central nervous system, where
the fast pathways are reactive and the slow are considered to model higher cognition (see e.g.
LeDoux 1996).
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So, depending on the role an agent has, it will enter either the speaker-fsa or the
hearer-fsa. Each finite state automaton models a script-like scheme that takes
care of the plan. Note that of course, depending on the task, numerous finite
state automata could be developed. Each state takes either direct sensory stimuli
or indirect stimuli as read messages or a timer as their arguments. These stimuli
are used to determine when the final condition of the state is reached. The final
conditions of a state are immediately the initial conditions of the next state. If a
robot is too long in one state, measured by the timer, a transition is made to the
default state and consequently the language game fails. All other final conditions
cause the robot to enter the subsequent state unless it is the final state of the
automaton, then it also enters the default state. If no final condition is met, the
robot remains in (or re-enters) the same state.
This section sketched how language games are implemented in the behaviour-
based cognitive architecture. Of course, muchmore could be said about the archi-
tectural implementation, but this is beyond the scope of the dissertation, which
is more concerned with grounding symbols.
3.4 Grounded language games
How are the different sub-parts of the language game scenario modelled? Up
to now the physical set-up and implementation of the robots and their interac-
tions have been explained. The only part of the implementation that still needs
to be presented are the cognitive models that implement the sensing, segmenta-
tion, feature extraction, categorisation and lexicon formation. These models are
the core of the present solution to the physical symbol grounding problem. The
remainder of this chapter presents these processes.
Sensing, segmentation and feature extraction are important ingredients of the
solution of the symbol grounding problem: they form the first step towards in-
variance. Invariance returns in the cognitive processes during the selection of
elements. The three recognised problems in the symbol grounding problem icon-
isation, discrimination and identification (Harnad 1990) are cognitively modelled.
Recall from Chapter 1 that iconisation is the construction of iconic representa-
tions that relate to the detection of some real world object. In these experiments,
iconisation is more or less modelled by the sensing and segmentation. Harnad
(1990) calls “discrimination” the process where it is determined how iconic rep-
resentations differ. He uses discrimination at the sensing level. Here discrimi-
nation is used at the categorisation level. It is modelled by the discrimination
games. Identification is the process where categories are identified that relate to
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the iconic representations invariantly. This is modelled in this book by the nam-
ing game model. As will be explained soon, this classification is not so clear-cut.
As argued in Chapter 1, a symbol can be illustrated with a semiotic triangle.
The semiotic triangle, a symbol or sign has three relations: (1) meaning – refer-
ent, (2) form – meaning, and (3) form – referent. So, how do robots that have
no knowledge construct a meaningful ontology and lexicon for these three rela-
tions? Two models have been proposed to solve this problem. For relation (1),
there are discrimination games (Steels 1996d). Relation (2) is modelled by the
naming game (Steels 1996c). Coupling the two models in a grounded experiment
provides relation (3). As argued in Chapter 1, this is because language and mean-
ing co-evolve (Steels 1997b). Closing the semiotic triangle with success is then
what Harnad (1990) called “identification” and the symbol grounding problem is
solved for that particular symbol. This is so, because only if it is closed success-
fully, there is enough reason to assume that the symbol stands for the referent.
In the semiotic triangle there is a direct relation between meaning and the ref-
erent. However, in cognitive systems there is no such direct relation; the world
has to be sensed first. So, to achieve a semiotic coupling, Steels (1999) proposes
a semiotic square rather than a triangle (see Figure 3.3). Note that the square
couples the semiotic relations in one robot with another. As argued, language
dynamics is thought to give rise to the development of both the lexicon as the on-
tology. How the ontology and lexicon are developed is explained in Sections 3.4.2
and 3.4.3. Section 3.4.1 explains how the robots do their sensing, segmentation
and feature extraction.
3.4.1 Sensing, segmentation and feature extraction
In the phase of sensing, the goal is that each robot observes its surroundings
from its current physical position. To obtain a more or less identical view, the
robots start close to each other. Sensing its surroundings means that the robots
construct a spatial view of their environment. This spatial view is represented
by the recorded sensory data. However the robots cannot obtain a spatial view
directly with the sensors they have, because the sensors can only detect light
intensity without spatial information. In order to get a spatial view of their envi-
ronment, either the robots need to have a spatially distributed array of sensors
or the robots need to move. Because of the robots’ physical limitations (and the
sensory-motor board in particular) it is opted to let the robots move. As a side-
effect a higher resolution is obtained. To obtain a spatial view of their complete
surroundings the robots rotate a full circle around their axis.
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Figure 3.3: The semiotic landscape of a language game can be viewed as a struc-
tural coupling. In this landscape, there are two squares, representing
the speaker (left) and the hearer (right). The speaker senses a topic, re-
sulting in a perception. In the terminology of this book, this is called
sensing. The perception is conceptualised (or categorised) yielding a
meaning. This meaning is then verbalised by the speaker and when
the hearer receives the utterance (or form), it tries to interpret this.
The interpretation results in a meaning which can be applied to a per-
ception. According to this perception, the hearer acts to identify the
referent, which should be the same as the topic and thus completing
the coupling. When at some point something goes wrong, the agent
can adapt their memory. The errors are signalled by means of back
propagation.
The robot’s observation of its surroundings results in a set of raw sensory data
that represents the scene. However, in order to identify the different light sources,
the robots have to find connected regions of the sensory data that relate to the
sensing of these light sources. This is done by the segmentation process. The
segmentation can result in segments of varying length. To be able to identify a
good category it is more efficient to have a description in a consistent manner
that designates invariant and useful properties or features of the sensation of
the light source. Extracting these features is done by means of what is called
feature extraction.
The detection of the raw sensory data is done completely on-board. This data
is sent to a pc where it is processed further. So, the segmentation and feature





During the sensing, the robots construct a spatial view of their surroundings. But
because the sensors cannot detect spatial information, sensing is done by letting
the robots rotate (ideally) 360o and record their sensory information while doing
so. While they rotate (one by one) they record the sensor data 40 times per
second. Each sensor writes its data on a sensory channel. The data that enter

















Figure 3.4: The sensing of a robot’s surroundings as in the experiments. See the
text for explanation.
Figure 3.4 shows a spatial view of a robot’s sensing. The sensing took 60 pdl
cycles (= 1.5s). Each peak corresponds to one of the four light sources in the envi-
ronment. Remember that corresponding means that the sensor with the highest
intensity at a peak detects the light source that is placed at the same height as
the sensor itself. Recall that the environment consists of 4 light sources that are
placed at different heights (Section 2.2).
Figure 3.4 shows that at time step 7 sensory channel s0 sensed a large peak,
whereas the other sensory channels show low peak values. At time step 18 there
is a main peak for sensory channel s1 with lower peaks for the other sensory
channels. Sensory channel s2 shows a maximum at time 28 and sensory channel
s3 sensed a maximum during time steps 40 to 43. Table 3.3 gives these peaks with
their sensory channel values.
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Table 3.3: Peaks P observed in Figure 3.4. The table lists the highest intensity
reached at time t with sensory channels s0, s1, s2 and s3.
P t s0 s1 s2 s3
1 7 201 9 7 3
2 18 56 59 11 3
3 28 5 41 48 6
4 42 3 3 10 248
These peaks can all be explained with the characteristics of the sensory chan-
nels seen in Figure 2.5, page 42. The intensity of each peak is dependent on the
distance of the robot to the light source. The robot clearly detects light sources L0
and L3 from nearby; the corresponding sensory channels detect high values and
almost all other sensory channels show low noise values. Light sources L1 and L2
are further away. The corresponding light sensors show relative low values and
some adjacent sensory channels show values that are close to the corresponding
sensory channels. Values lower than 10 between the peaks are noise values.
After the speaker finished its sensing, the hearer starts its sensing. That the





















ure 3.5, which shows the spatial view of the hearer during the same language
game. If one looks carefully, one can see similarities, but there is no straightfor-
ward mapping. In this plot five interesting peaks can be identified (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: Peaks of Figure 3.5.
P t s0 s1 s2 s3
1 1 4 25 30 7
2 8 7 3 7 150
3 40 247 5 4 6
4 47 38 24 4 3
5 54 12 4 21 8
Peaks 1 and 5 (Table 3.4) both appear to correspond to L2. Although the times
at which the peaks are observed lie far apart, these peaks are detected under
almost the same orientation of the robot, namely in the front. This fits well with
the sensing of L2 of the speaker as shown in Figure 3.4, where it is behind the
speaker. Peaks 2 and 3 (corresponding to L3 and L0 resp.) can also be well related
to the sensing of the speaker.
Peak 4, which is just observable after the largest peak (between time 55 and
60), does not clearly correspond to a light source. One would expect to detect
L1, both intuitively as from the sensing of the speaker. Sensory channel s1 does
indeed show a peak here, but s0 shows the highest peak. Peak 4 is also interesting
from another point of view. As will be shown below, the segmentation will not
recognise this segment. According to the definition just given, it is part of the
same region of interest as peak 3 because the intensity does not drop below the
noise value.
Usually, the sensing takes about 1.5 seconds, so the robots obtain approxi-
mately 60 subsequent data points. Since the robots have 4 sensory channels,
they will have a spatial view of about 60 · 4 data points. Because the speed of
rotation is not always constant and it also varies depending on the energy level
of their batteries, the number of data points can vary per language game. During
the sensing the sensory data is sent to the pc, where the data is processed further.
The onset and offset of the rotation induce two problems. They cause a warped
signal on the sensory channels, which is a source of noise, and they do not guar-
antee a full 360o rotation. Therefore, the robots rotate approximately 720o while
starting with their backs towards each other. The sensing, i.e. the data acquisi-
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tion starts when the front of the robot faces the opponent robot. This is detected
with infrared. It ends 360o later when the robot again detects a maximum in the
infrared. The robot stops rotating approximately 180o later when the left back
infrared sensor senses infrared. When a robot finished rotating, it sends a radio
signal to the other robot. This way both robots can enter the next state in their
finite state automaton that controls the planned behaviour of the robots. If the
first robot finishes, the second robot can start its sensing, while the first robot
waits.
So, during the sensing each robot records a spatial sensory data about its sur-
roundings. To identify the regions of interest that correspond to the referents
and to describe these regions consistently, the robots segment their data.
3.4.1.2 Segmentation
Sensing results in a set of approximately 60 observations for the 4 sensory chan-
nels for each robot. As shown above, the sensing yields a signal from which
relevant information can be extracted concerning the observation of the light
sources. The signal needs to be filtered for noise and the relevant regions of in-
terest have to be recognised. The recognition of these regions is done by a process
called segmentation.
The filtering of noise is modelled with the function H(si,j − Θi), where si is
the sensory channel of sensor i at time step j,4 Θi is the noise value of sensory
channel i and H(x) is the Hamilton function:
H(x) =
{
x if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0
(3.1)
Suppose that τ i,j is the result of applying the Hamilton function to the sensory
channel data of sensor i at time step j, i.e. τ i,j = H(si,j−Θi). The for noise reduced
sensing data can be described by a series (s0, . . . , sn−1)where n is the number of
sensory channels and each si = (τ i,0, . . . , τ i,M) for M data points.
The regions where one of the for noise reduced sensory channels is greater
than 0 is supposed to relate to the sensing of a light source. Therefore, the seg-
mentation should construct regions in which this is the case. Hence the segmen-
tation in a set of segments {Sk} where Sk = {sk,0, . . . , sk,n−1} consists of a series
of sensory channel data. Each sensory channel sk,i = (τk,i,0, . . . , τk,i,m) where
m is the length of the segment and for which τk,i,j > 0 in at least one sensory
channel at each time step j. The different sensory channels sk,i that have some
4 Note that a time step designates at which angle the robot is sensing.
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overlap will constitute one segment. For simplicity, the term sensory channel
will also be used for the sensory data after noise reduction.
It is very common in perceptual systems that the amount of input needs to
be reduced for, e.g., computational reasons. Usually the raw image contains one
or more regions of interest. These regions of interest may be dependent on the
task of the agent. To give an example: for a frog, only small moving spots on
the visual field are interesting, since these may be edible flies. In the application
described here, the regions of interest are indirectly defined by the goal of the

















Figure 3.6: The for noise filtered sensed view of robot r0 as seen in Figure 3.4.
What does a robot detect of a light source? From Figures 3.4 and 3.5 it becomes
clear that the robots detect peaks of intensity of the sensory stimuli in contrast
to some background noise. Applying the Hamilton function to Figure 3.4 results
in Figure 3.6. Each region where the response is greater than zero will from now
on be called a segment. It is assumed that each segment corresponds to a light
source. Although in the original figure only 4 regions of interest were identified,
the above method identifies 6 segments. The two additional segments come from
small perturbations in the landscape that exceed the noise values a little bit. This
does not necessarily mean that these perturbations cannot be due to noise, but
it can also be due to reflection.
To filter out these segments, an additional rule is applied that a segment should
contain more than one data point. Nevertheless, this will not guarantee that all
irrelevant regions are filtered out. Neither are all relevant regions segmented. If
68
3.4 Grounded language games
two peaks (partly) coincide, this segmentation fails to extract the relevant seg-
ments. Nevertheless, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, the segmentation
makes it possible to ground the sensing of the light sources.
The segmentation of the spatial view of Figure 3.5 does not recognise peak
4 (Table 3.4), because the signal of sensory channel s0 does not decrease the
noise value between peaks 3 and 4. Hence these two peaks are recognised as one
segment.
3.4.1.3 Feature extraction
The segments that result from the segmentation have different lengths and may
still have a lot of data. Therefore, it is desirable to describe each segment with
one vector of low and equal dimension. Low dimension benefits computational
efficiency. Equal dimension is used for consistency in the data, which makes the
computations easier.
In line with pattern recognition and computer vision such a vector represen-
tation will be called a feature vector (see e.g. Fu 1976). The elements of this
feature vector will be called features. The extraction of the features is called fea-
ture extraction. The aim of the feature extraction is to extract features that bear
invariant information about the light sources.
The feature extraction is applied to each segment Sk. It extracts for each sen-
sory channel i the value τk,i,j that has the highest value in Sk. Or, in other words,
it gives the highest intensity of a sensory channel in the segment. But the ab-
solute intensities have information about the distance of the light source, which
is not an invariant property. Therefore, this highest value is normalised to the
absolute highest value of all sensory channels in the segment.
Formally the feature extraction of segment Sk for sensory channel i can be
described by a function ϕ(sk,i) : S → S ′, where S = [0, 255] is the sensory






This function will yield a value 1 for the sensory channel on which the sensor
reads the highest peak in a segment. For all other sensory channels the feature
extraction yield a value between [0, 1]. Naturally, the values of these other fea-
tures are irrelevant. However, this inference can easily be made by humans, but
it should be unknown to the robots. This is so because in more complex environ-
ments this need not be an invariant property, and it is not the purpose to give
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the robots much knowledge. In addition, the so constructed invariance helps a
human observer to analyse the experiments easier.
The result of applying a feature extraction to the data of sensory channel i
will be called feature fi, so fi = ϕ(sk,i). A feature thus designates a property of
the sensed segment. In this case, the property can be described as the maximum
intensity of a sensory channel in the segment relative to the maximum intensity
of this segment.
Segment Sk can now be related to a feature vector fk = (f0, . . . , fn−1), where n
is the total number of sensory channels. The space that spans all possible feature
vectors f is called the n dimensional feature space F = S ′n, or feature space for
short. Although this need not be so, in the current experiment the dimension of
the feature space is equal to the number of sensory channels.
Applying the feature extraction of Equation 3.2 to the sensing of Figure 3.6
would result in the context given in Table 3.5. Consider for example segment
1 of Figure 3.6. In this segment the top of sensory channel s0 has a value of
200, the top of s1 has value 4 and the two other sensory channels have values
0. Normalising the tops of this segment to the highest value yields f0 = 1.00,
f1 = 0.02, f2 = 0.00 and f3 = 0.00 (cf. Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Feature vectors f after applying the feature extraction measuring the
relative intensity of a sensory channel in a given segment.
f t f0 f1 f2 f3
1 7 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
2 18 0.94 1.00 0.07 0.00
3 28 0.00 0.90 1.00 0.03
4 40 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00
5 50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
6 59 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The complete process of sensing and segmentation results in what is called
the context. This context Cxt is a set of segments Si that relate to their feature
vectors, so
Cxt = {S0, . . . , Sm} → {f0, . . . , fm}(3.3)
where m is the context size.
The feature extraction that calculates the relative intensities is the only trans-
formation used in the experiments reported here. In Steels & Vogt 1997 and Vogt
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1998b the feature extraction function calculates the absolute peak values. Other
functions have been introduced for categorising spatial categories as in Steels
1996a. Still other functions have been designed for use in the Talking Heads ex-
periments (Belpaeme, Steels & van Looveren 1998; Steels & Kaplan 1999). In the
Talking Heads experiment as well as in this application, the functions were de-
signed by hand. de Jong & Steels (1999) and Belpaeme (1999) have shown that
such functions can be learned or evolved, respectively.5
3.4.2 Discrimination games
In a language game each robot is interested in categorising one or more segments
from the context they constructed. The speaker is interested in the segment
which it wants to communicate and the hearer is interested in the segment(s)
that the speaker can possibly communicate. The segment that the speaker wants
to communicate is called the topic. For the hearer these segments are called
the potential topics. For each (potential) topic the robots individually play a
discrimination game.
As explained in Section 3.4.1, a segment is related to a feature vector. This fea-
ture vector is a point in the feature space. The first step of the discrimination
game is to categorise this feature vector with one or more categories that the
robot has stored in its memory and that resemble this point in the feature space.
A category is defined as some region in the feature space. A feature vector is cat-
egorised with that category for which the feature vector falls within that region.
When the segments are categorised, the robots need to select the categories of
the topic that are not used to categorise any other segment in the context. The
process that does this is called discrimination (cf. Steels 1996d). The discrim-
ination can have different outcomes. If one or more categories are found, the
discrimination is successful and hence the discrimination game is a success. In
this case, the resulting categories can be used in the naming phase of the lan-
guage game. If no distinctive category is found, this means that the repertoire
of categories in the robot’s memory is not sufficient to do the task. At the start
of each experiment, the repertoire of categories (or ontology) is empty. So, no
categorisation can be found and hence no discrimination game can be successful.
To overcome this problem in the future, the robot can expand its repertoire of
categories.
The complete task of categorisation, discrimination and adaptation is modelled
by a discrimination game (Steels 1996d). The basis of the model has not changed
5 Note that Belpaeme calls the feature extraction function “feature detectors”.
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since its first introduction in 1996, but the implementation and precise details
have been adjusted ever since. The first robot implementation of the model can
be found in Steels & Vogt 1997 and Vogt 1998a. The model exploits a selectionist
mechanism of generation and selection of categories. This results in the self-
organisation of categories and has the properties of a dynamical system.
Different types of methods for representation in the discrimination game have
been developed: the binary tree method (Steels 1996d), the prototype method (de
Jong & Vogt 1998; Vogt 1998b) and the adaptive subspace method (de Jong & Vogt
1998; de Jong 2000). The prototypemethod and a variant of the adaptive subspace
method, which will be called the binary subspace method are investigated in
this book and shall be explained in this section. Before doing so, a more general
description of the discrimination game model is presented.
Following Steels (1996d), the discrimination game can be defined formally as
follows: Assume that the robots can relate their feature vectors to categories and
suppose that the robots have categorised a set of categories Ck = {c0, . . . , cn−1}
for the feature vectors relating to segment Sk. Let St be the topic. The topic is
the segment for which the robots try to find distinctive categories. A category is
distinctive if it is related to the topic, but not to any other segment in the context
Cxt. The distinctive categories are temporarily stored in a distinctive category set
DC. If DC ̸= ∅, the discrimination game is a success. DC is passed to the naming
game model that the robots use to communicate. If DC = ∅, the discrimination
game fails and one or more new categories should be created. Consequently,
there are three parts in the discrimination game:
1. The distinctive category set DC is constructed according to the following
relation:
DC = {ci ∈ Ct | ∀Sk ∈ Cxt\{St} : ¬ci ∈ Ck}(3.4)
2. If DC ̸= ∅, the discrimination game is a success. Possibly adapt the scores
of ci ∈ DC and pass the DC to the naming game model.
3. If DC = ∅, then create a new category as ill be explained below.
So, how are feature vectors categorised and how are categories created? The
two models that do this are explained hereafter.
3.4.2.1 The prototype method
The prototype method is the main method investigated in this book. In this
method the categories are defined in terms of prototypes. In the pattern recogni-
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tion literature, (see e.g. Banks 1990), a prototype is defined as “a single represen-
tative sample” in the feature space, i.e. as a point in the feature space. However,
a category is defined as a region in the feature space. For a prototype, this re-
gion can be defined by those points in the feature space that are nearest to this
prototype. Therefore, a prototypical category can be defined as a region in the
feature space that is represented by a prototype.
The prototypical categories are represented by prototypes and some scores:
c = ⟨c, ν, ρ, κ⟩, where c = (x0, . . . , xn−1) is a prototype in the n dimensional
feature space, and ν, ρ and κ are some scores. As mentioned, categorisation
is the process of finding categories for which the feature vector lies within the
region that is defined by the category. The categorisation of this is done with the
1-nearest neighbour algorithm. The 1-nearest neighbour algorithm returns the
prototype that is nearest to observed feature vector.
It can be useful to define categories at different levels of generality or speci-
ficity. If two segments are very distinctive, i.e. the distance between them in
the feature space is large, then these segments can be categorised using general
categories. However, if the two segments are relatively close to each other in the
feature space, the categories may need to bemore specific. Thismeans that the re-
gions should be smaller. When sensing a referent under different circumstances
in different language games, the extracted feature vectors of the segmented seg-
ments differ as well. To select the categories as consistent as possible for various
feature vectors relating to some referent in different language games, a general
category is most useful. The region of a general category is larger, thus enhancing
the chance that different segments of a referent from different language games
is represented with the same categories. To enable discrimination under these
different conditions and allowing both generality and specificity the categories
are constructed in different versions of the feature space.6 Each version has an
increasing resolution of the feature space.
If the discrimination game is a failure, the ontology has to be expanded. Some
new prototypes will be constructed and stored in the robot’s memory. It is done
by exploiting one arbitrary dimension (or feature) of the feature vector in one
of the versions of the feature space. Suppose there are versions of the feature
space Fλ , where each λ designates the resolution of the feature space. In each di-
mension of the feature space Fλ there are a maximum of 3λ exploitations, where
λ = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The choice of 3 is more or less arbitrary, but should not be too
large.
6 Note that the term “specificity” is defined differently in the next chapter. There it is defined as
a measure that indicates how well a robot names a referent. Here “specificity” is used in the
more intuitive and common sense.
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Suppose that in the discrimination game the robot tried to categorise feature
vector f = (f0, . . . , fn). New categories are created now as follows:
1. Select an arbitrary feature fi > 0.
2. Select the feature space Fλ that has not yet been exploited 3λ times in
dimension i for λ as low as possible.
3. Create new prototypes cj = (x0, . . . , xn−1) where xi = fi and the other xr
are made of already existing prototypes in Fλ .
4. Add the new prototypical category cj = ⟨cj, ν j, ρj, κj⟩ to the feature space
Fλ . ν j is a category score that indicates the effect of discrimination. ρj is the
effectiveness score that indicates the use of the category in the language
game. κj indicates how general the category is. The initial values of ν j and
ρj are set to 0.01. κj is a constant, which is calculated as in equation 3.7.
The reason to exploit only one feature of the topic, rather than to exploit the
complete feature vector of the topic is to speed up the construction of categories.
The scores are introduced to enable a better selection in the naming game and
are updated after a discrimination game (ν) or a naming game (ρ) as follows:
• The categorisation score ν is used to indicate how often the category is
used to distinctively categorise a feature vector. It is calculated according
to the following equation:




1 if categorised distinctive
0 if categorised, but not distinctive
where η is a learning rate. The default value of the learning rate is set to
η = 0.99.
• The effectiveness score ρ is used to indicate the effective use in the lan-
guage. I.e.




1 if used in language game
0 if distinctive, but not used in language game
where η is the learning rate.
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• Another score that is calculated is the depth score κ. It indicates how gen-
eral the category is. As mentioned, if possible it is preferable to use cate-
gories that are as general as possible. A category is as general as possible
if it is in a feature space S ′λ with λ as small as possible. Because of the
resolution of the sensors, the resolution cannot increase in a feature space





This score implements a preference for the most general category, which
is conform with Steels 1996d.
• In the naming game, the three scores are taken together to form a meaning
score μ. Note that it is allowed to talk about meaning, since this score is




· (ν + ρ + κ)(3.8)
The value of μ is averaged so that it can be scaled separately when using
it in the naming phase as will be explained in the next section.
Because once the scores ν and ρ become greater than zero, they will never
become zero again, they can by way of updating (equations 3.5 and 3.6) only
approach zero asymptotically. In order to give new categories a chance to be
selected, their initial values are not set to 0, but to 0.01.
There is another adaptation that is done with a prototypical category when it
has been successfully discriminated. If the category is used as the meaning in a
language game successfully, i.e. it has been the subject of a successful communi-
cation, the prototype of the category is shifted towards the feature vector that it
categorises according to equation 3.9:
c′3 = c3 + ε · (ft − c3)(3.9)
where c′3 is the new vector representation of c3 after shifting this category with
a step size of ε towards ft. In the experiments ε = 0.1. This way the proto-
typical category becomes a more representative sample of the feature vector it
categorised.
Because the resolution of a sensor is limited to six feature spaces, F0 to F5 are
the only ones available. Another reason to keep the number of feature spaces
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limited is to keep the computational efficiency within limits. Besides, as will
become clear in the experiments, F1 will usually be sufficient to discriminate.
The prototype method is a variant of an instance-based learning technique
(see e.g. Aha, Kibler & Albert 1991; Mitchell 1997). As mentioned, it uses the k-
nearest neighbour algorithm, where k = 1. Instance-based learning assumes a
set of training examples (prototypes) that consists of both positive and negative
examples of some categorisation. However, in the prototype method training
examples are added to the feature space when a categorisation failed. The val-
idation of a positive or negative example is based on the discriminative power
of the categorised prototype. The adaptation of scores that help to select the dis-
tinctive categories in the naming phase is very much like the update of Q values
in reinforcement learning (see e.g. Sutton & Barto 1998).
3.4.2.2 An example
The prototype method can be illustrated with an example. Suppose there is an
ontology of prototypes on F0 and F1 as displayed in Figure 3.7 (a) and (b). In
Figure (a) there is one prototype c0 = (0.20, 0.90). In Figure (b) there are two
prototypes c1 = (0.25, 0.75) and c2 = (0.65, 0.75). Left of the division line in
the space is category c1 and right is category c2. Suppose the robot has related
topic t with a feature vector ft = (0.30, 0.10) and it has another segment s in
its context related with feature vector fs = (0.15, 0.80).7 Then both ft and fs are
categorised with {c0, c1}. Hence the categorisation of topic t is not distinctive.
So, the ontology has to be expanded.
The robot selects one dimension of the feature space to exploit. Suppose this
is dimension wl1. In this dimension, the topic has a feature with value 0.10. The
robot has to select a feature space on which there is still place in the selected
dimension. In F0 each dimension can be exploited 30 = 1 time. This has al-
ready happened, so the robot checks if it can exploit the next space, F1. In this
space each dimension can be exploited 31 = 3 times. Dimension wl1 has only
been exploited once, so this dimension can still be exploited. New prototypes are
constructed with the points (x, 0.10), where x is filled in with the corresponding
co-ordinates of the already existing prototypes. If some dimensions are not ex-
ploited yet, the new prototypes will not become active until all dimensions of the
feature space are exploited. This yields two new prototypes c3 = (0.25, 0.10) and
c4 = (0.65, 0.10), see Figure 3.7 (c). Since each dimension of F1 can be exploited
up to 3 times, the robot can exploit each dimension of this space only once more.
7 Note that these vectors are made up to illustrate the example.
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(d) F1 - iii
Figure 3.7: These figures show feature spaces F0 (a) and F1 (b), (c) and (d), each
with their prototypes (x) as used in the example. The figures are dis-
played in two dimensions for illustrative purposes; in the actual im-
plementation the spaces have 4 dimensions.
This has been done for one dimension in Figure 3.7 (d).
When the robot needs to find distinctive categories in this new ontology based
on the same feature vectors as before, ft will be categorised with {c0, c3} and fs
with {c0, c1}. Yielding distinctive category set DS = {c3}. Now c3 may be used
in the language game as the meaning of the symbol that is communicated. If this
is done successfully, the category is shifted in the direction of the observation by
using the following equation (see Equation 3.9):
c′3 = c3 + ε · (ft − c3)
so, in this case, c′3 = (0.255, 0.3).
Figure 3.8 shows a 2 dimensional version of a possible feature space F2. There










Figure 3.8: A possible feature space F2. In this space each dimension may be
exploited up to 9 times. Again for illustrative purposes the space is
shown in 2 dimensions. Note that the prototypes here are displayed
as small points.
feature space F0 there is one place per dimension to be exploited, in F1 there are
3 places etc. So, F0 has a maximum of 1 prototype, F1 has a maximum of 34 = 81
prototypes (recall there are 4 dimensions), in F2 there are 94 = 6561 possible
prototypes, etc.
3.4.2.3 Binary subspace method
The prototype method will be compared with the binary subspace method. The
binary subspace method makes use of another way to make categorical distinc-
tions. It is based on the original model introduced by Luc Steels (1996d) that
has previously been implemented on the mobile robots (Steels & Vogt 1997; Vogt
1998a). In the original model categories are constructed from trees that make
binary divisions of only one dimension of the feature space. The categories that
are constructed may have one dimension, but can also be a conjunction of more
dimensions. Hence they do not necessarily cover the n dimensions of the feature
space. Figure 3.9 shows how the trees are constructed.
The binary subspace method combines the binary tree method with the adap-
tive subspace method (de Jong & Vogt 1998; de Jong 2000). In the adaptive sub-
space method, the categories (or subspaces) are always in the n dimensions of
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Figure 3.9: Categories represented as binary trees. Every sensory channel (like
wl, ml and ir) is associated with a category tree. The root node of
the tree is sensitive to whole range of the sensory channel. The tree
is incrementally constructed during the evolution of discrimination
games. Every time the discrimination game fails, two new nodes may
be constructed by splitting one node.
the feature space. In the binary subspace method, the co-ordinates of a feature
space Fλ are splitted in one dimension at a time. When all dimensions are thus
exploited, the first categories at this space are born.
Categorisation in the subspace is done by relating feature vectors to those sub-
spaces in which the feature vectors fall.
A subspace is defined as an n dimensional rectangle that is surrounded by their
boundaries in each dimension of the feature space Fλ . Note that this shape of a
subspace differs from the one introduced by Oja (1983). Suppose there is a lower
boundary xi and an upper boundary yi in dimension i ofFλ . These boundaries do
not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of Fλ . A category cj can be defined
by these boundaries in each dimension ofFλ: cj = ⟨x0, y0, . . . , xn−1, yn−1, ν j, ρj, κj⟩
for n dimensions. Like for the prototype method, ν j, ρj and κj are scores.
A feature vector f = (f0, . . . , fn−1) can be categorised with category cj if xi <
fi ≤ yi for all dimensions of the feature space.
At the start of the experiment the category of F0 is given. This category spans
the complete feature space. When a discrimination game fails, new categories
should be formed. This is done by exploiting only one dimension every time the
game fails. The following list describes how this is done step by step. Suppose
that f is the feature vector that has been the topic of the discrimination game.
1. Select the category c = ⟨x0, y0, . . . , xn−1, yn−1, ν, ρ, κ⟩ that categorised f in
the feature space Fλ for which λ is greatest. This means that no categori-
sation is made in Fλ+1.
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2. Select a dimension i of c that has not been exploited yet in feature space
Fλ+1 and for which fi > 0.
3. Create the following lower and upper boundaries: x′i = xi, y
′
i = xi +
1
2 ·
(yi − xi), x′′i = xi +
1
2 · (yi − xi) and y
′′
i = yi.
4. If there are lower and upper boundaries xrp and y
r
p for some r in all other
dimensions p of feature spaceFλ+1, then construct new categories by com-
bining all these lower and upper boundaries and adding scores. This yields
categories like cq = ⟨xr0, yr0, . . . , xkn−1, ykn−1, νq, ρq, κq⟩.







i to the set of lower and upper boundaries in Fλ+1.
The binary subspace method differs from the binary tree method of Steels
(1996d) in that a category covers all the n dimensions of the feature space. Steels
defines categories in 1 to n dimensions, by taking conjunctions of the nodes in
the binary trees. Conjunctions can have nodes at different hierarchical layers.
Processing all these possible categories is computationally very costly. Suppose
there are six hierarchical layers in the tree (as in the prototypemethod, the binary
subspace method has six feature spaces) and 4 dimensions, which is completely
filled. Then there are 6·4 = 24 one-dimensional categories. There are 62 ·2! = 216
two-dimensional categories. There are 63 ·2! = 432 three-dimensional categories
and 64 = 1296 four-dimensional categories. This makes a total of 1968 possible
categories to be explored. The binary subspace method only considers n dimen-
sional conjunctions of nodes each layered at the same layer in the tree. This
yields a maximum of only 6 categories to be explored.
The adaptive subspace method developed by Edwin de Jong also differs from
the binary subspace method (de Jong & Vogt 1998; de Jong 2000). Like in the
binary subspace method, de Jong splits a category from feature space Fλ in Fλ
very similar to the binary subspace. However, de Jong’s agents directly create a
new category, which is the former category splitted in one dimension. Every time
this is done, only two new categories are made. In the binary subspace method,
more categories may be made. Another difference is that de Jong lets his agents
do not create new categories every time the discrimination game fails, but it is
done after a fixed number of failures. The choice which subspace is splitted and
in which dimension is calculated from some statistics of previous failures to find
distinctions. For a detailed explanation of the adaptive subspace method see de
Jong & Vogt 1998 and de Jong 2000.
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Figure 3.10: The binary subspace method splits the feature space at the lower
layer (i.e. λ is smaller) in each dimension at a time. The split divides
the former subspace in two equal halves in one dimension. As the
plot in Figure (b) did for c0 in Figure (a). A category is not formed
until each dimension is exploited. If another split is made as in Figure
(c), new categories are formed. Figures (d) and (e) are two subsequent
splits of category c3 from Figure (c). The last split results in four new
categories on F2. If a split would be made on c1 in dimension wl1 of
Figure (c). Again four new categories are constructed.
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Unlike in the prototype method, once a category is made, it is static, i.e. it does
not shift in the feature space. Like the categories of the prototype method, the
binary subspaces are associated with some scores. These scores are the same as
for the prototype method.
Onemajor difference of the binary tree, binary subspace and adaptive subspace
with the prototypemethod is that there is not necessarily a categorisation in each
feature space Fλ where there are categories. In the prototype method, the entire
space is always covered once a category is there. This is not the case in the other
methods.
A more fundamental difference with the prototype method is that the binary
subspace method, like the binary tree method and the adaptive subspace method
is biologically less plausible. Humans do not make binary distinctions of the
world. The feature space of observations is usually not divided in binary distinc-
tions.
The binary subspace method, like the adaptive subspace method (de Jong 2000)
is a type of adaptive resolution generalisation. In these methods a multidi-
mensional space is divided in subregions based on some criteria in order to solve
some tasks. Examples of such learning techniques can be found in Chapman &
Kaebling 1991 and Moore & Atkeson 1995.
3.4.2.4 Summary
In this section the discrimination game model has been introduced. The aim of a
discrimination game is to find distinctive categories that categorise one or more
segments. Categories can be defined differently. In this book two methods are
compared. The prototype method defines a prototype as a point in the feature
space and a category is then defined as the region in the space where the points
are closest to the prototype. The binary subspace method defines a category as a
subspace that is constructed by splitting another space in two equal halves at one
dimension. Categories are structured in different versions of the feature space,
where each version has a different resolution. This allows making distinctions
that are more general or more specific.
The prototype method is used in almost all experiments. In one experiment
the binary tree method is used, and in still another experiment a fuzzy approach
of the prototype method is used. This latter method is explained in Chapter 5.
The feature vector that relates to the topic is categorised with a category that
covers the feature vector. A category is distinctive if it is not related to any other
feature vector in the context than to the topic. If distinctive categories can be
found, the discrimination game is a success. In this case the distinctive categories
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may be adapted, e.g. by shifting them, and one of the categories can be used as
the meaning in the naming phase. If the discrimination game is a failure, new
categories can be constructed.
3.4.3 Lexicon formation
Now that each robot has categorised the (potential) topic(s) distinctively, they
can communicate these distinctive categorisations. Communication is establish-
ed by the speaker and hearer. The speaker names the category. The hearer tries
to interpret this name, i.e. it tries to identify the uttered word-form so that it
corresponds to the categorisation of the topic. The topic is supposed to relate to
the referent that the speaker’s utterance stands for.
In some experiments the hearer already knows which topic this is prior to
the verbal communication. This means that there is some sort of joint attention
on the topic. This knowledge is exchanged from the speaker by means of extra-
linguistic communication. In other experiments the hearer does not know yet
what the topic is. The hearer then only has the uttered word-form and the dis-
tinctive categories at its disposal. The availability of such information is a source
of discussions in the psycholinguistic literature (see e.g. Barrett 1995) and the dis-
cussion in Chapter 1. Therefore it is interesting to investigate whether and under
what circumstances the robots can deal with these different types of knowledge.
When the hearer interpreted the utterance, the language game is successful
when both robots communicated about the same referent. In case where the
hearer already had this knowledge at its disposal, this is the case. Otherwise, the
robots may evaluate whether they did so. This evaluation is called feedback. The
evaluation of feedback is, like joint attention, done by means of extra-linguistic
communication. Again, the availability of feedback to a language learner is of
much debate in the psycholinguistic literature (see e.g. Bowerman 1988). So, is
this really necessary?
Both types of extra-linguistic information is subject of investigation of this
book. For this reason different types of language games have been developed:
the ostensive game, guessing game, observational game and xsl game.
When the experiments start, however, the robots have no language to their
disposal yet. They have to construct this. In the experiments the question of how
grammar is evolved is left aside and only a lexicon is developed. How are forms
associated with meanings? And how can both robots acquire a shared lexicon?
To model this, the robots can adapt their lexicons. This lexicon development
is based on the three mechanisms that Luc Steels (1996c) proposed for lexicon
formation: individual adaptation, cultural evolution and self-organisation.
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The previous section presented the discrimination game model by which the
first two steps (iconisation and discrimination) of the grounding problem is tack-
led. Themodel tries to find categories that relate to the topic, but not to any other
segment that has been observed in that context. Such a category can be related
to a form. If this is done, the category functions as the meaning of a semiotic sign
in the Peircean sense. When this form is either arbitrary or conventionalised (e.g.
through language) the sign becomes a symbol according to Peirce (see e.g. Chan-
dler 1994). Since it is assumed that meaning co-evolves with language (Chapter 1),
the symbol is grounded in language and hence the form will be conventionalised.
The naming game model implements how the form is conventionalised.
The lexicon formation is based on the naming game model introduced by Luc
Steels (1996c). The naming game implements the communication between two
agents that try to name the meaning of the referents they sensed in their envi-
ronment. One of the agents plays the role of the speaker and chooses a topic
from the segments that constitute the context. It searches its lexicon for a form-
meaning association of which the meaning matches the category of the topic.
The associated form is “uttered” and in turn, the hearer tries to understand the
utterance. The hearer does so by searching its own lexicon for a form-meaning
association of which the form matches the utterance. If there exist such an el-
ement, the hearer compares the associated meaning(s) with the category of the
topic. If there is a match and both the speaker and the hearer named the same
topic, the naming game is successful. Otherwise there is a failure. According to
the outcome of the game the lexicon will be adapted.
3.4.3.1 Different language games
One of the issues that will be investigated in this book is what type of extra-
linguistic information is necessary to guide a meaningful lexicon formation. As
mentioned above and in Chapter 1, it is not clear what extra-linguistic informa-
tion infants have at their disposal when learning language. Do they establish
joint attention prior to the verbal communication? Or do they receive feedback
on the effect of a linguistic interaction? Or is neither at their disposal?
To investigate whether robots can develop a shared lexicon under these dif-
ferent circumstances, four types of language games have been implemented. In
these language games different configurations of the availability of joint atten-
tion and feedback have been implemented as shown in Table 3.6. The different
games can be summarised as follows:
Ostensive game This game is conform with the original naming game model
(Steels 1996c). The speaker informs the hearer prior to the linguistic com-
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munication what the topic is, e.g. by means of pointing at the referent.
Hence joint attention is established. It then produces a (linguistic) utter-
ance, which the hearer tries to understand. Feedback is evaluated to check
if both robots finally identified the same topic. This game has also been
implemented in Steels & Vogt 1997.
Guessing game In the guessing game (Steels & Kaplan 1999), the speaker does
not provide the hearer with topic information. It produces an utterance
and the hearer has to guess which referent the speaker is naming. As in
the ostensive game feedback is evaluated to check if both robots finally
identified the same topic. The guessing game has first been implemented
in Vogt 1998c and will be the model of most experiments in this book.
Observational game This game is influenced by the work of Mike Oliphant (1997).
First joint attention is established, so the hearer knows in advance which
segment is the topic. Access to this kind of information is what Oliphant
calls “observation”. The speaker produces an utterance, which the hearer
tries to interpret. No feedback on the game’s effect is evaluated, so the
lexicon is adapted independent of the effectiveness of the game.
XSL game The xsl game is to check if either joint attention or feedback is really
necessary. It is to show that lexicon formation does not work without joint
attention of feedback. So, without providing topic information, the speaker
produces an utterance. The hearer tries to interpret the utterance. The
robots adapt their lexicons despite the fact that they have no idea what the
other has been communicating. Note that xsl stands for “cross-situational
learning” (Pinker 1984; Siskind 1996), which is the learning mechanisms
on which this model is based. (As noted in the preface, this was not noted
at the time of writing this book, so no further reference to the literature of
cross-situational learning is made.)
The four games differ in the availability of joint attention and feedback as illus-
trated in Table 3.6. In most of the experiments reported in this book the guessing
game is applied. The remainder of this section explains the different subparts of
the naming: joint attention, production, understanding, feedback and adaptation.
3.4.3.2 The lexicon
Each agent constructs a lexicon. How does the lexicon look like? A lexicon is a set
of form-meaning associations that an individual robot stores in its memory. The
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Table 3.6: A schematic overview of the extra-linguistic information that is avail-
able in the different language games.





lexicons of the two robots in the experiments can differ and are shared when
the lexical entries are used such that both robots can communicate a referent
successfully. So, the lexicon consists of elements of form-meaning associations.
Each form-meaning association FM is a tuple of a form F, a meaning M and an
association score σ . So, the lexicon L can be defined as:
L = {FM0, . . . , FMN}(3.10)
where N is the size of L and form-meaning FMi = ⟨Wi,Mi, σ i⟩. At the beginning
of an experiment, L = ∅. It is constructed during the experiment. The form F is
an arbitrary string of characters from the alphabet. The shape of a form is given
as a “cvcv” string where c is a consonant and v a vowel.
Note that there may be more entries with the same form or with the same
meaning. So, there may be a many-to-many relation between form and meaning.
The adaptation of the lexicon is done by form-invention, form-adoption (both in
which new FM associations are constructed) and the adaptation of scores. During
the experiments, where thousands of games are being played, the form-meaning
associations that have been effective in the past (i.e. their scores are high) tend
to be used more often than ineffective form-meaning associations. This way a
more or less coherent communication system emerges.
3.4.3.3 Joint attention
Asmentioned, the robots establish joint attention in two types of language games:
the ostensive game and the observational game. Joint attention means that the
two robots participating in a language focus their attention on the same topic.
To be more concrete, both robots know what the topic is. In the experiments it
is established prior to the verbal communication. To establish joint attention the
robots use what is called extra-linguistic communication. In human cultures, it
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can be established by means of pointing, following eye-gaze and other means
that humans have at their disposal to communicate extra-linguistically.
Joint attention is modelled by comparing the feature vectors of the speaker’s
topic with the feature vectors of the segments in the hearer’s context. To allow a
single algorithm for the hearer’s understanding, the cases where there is no joint
attention is modelled as if there would be joint attention.
More formally, the availability of joint attention is modelled by calculating a
topic score ϵS for each segment S ∈ Cxt. The idea of the topic score is to estimate
the likelihood that segment S is the topic. There are different ways to calculate ϵS
(e.g. Vogt 1998c). Here two methods are implemented: a correspondence method




1 if S corresponds to ts
0 otherwise
(3.11)
where ts is the speaker’s topic. This information is drawn from the topic
that the speaker observed.
Of course this method for calculating the topic score is very unlikely to ex-
ist in nature. Agents usually are not capable inspecting the internal state of
other agents. However, to increase the reliability of the topic information,
establishing joint attention here is simulated by internal inspection.
No joint attention
∀S ∈ Cxt : ϵS = Constant > 0(3.12)
The first method is used in the ostensive and observational games. The latter is
used in the guessing and xsl games. Both joint attention (by means of corre-
spondence) and no joint attention are modelled by the topic score. This has the
advantage that the understanding phase of the naming game can be modelled
with one algorithm. As will be explained, for this ϵ must be greater than zero.
In Vogt (1998b) ϵ was calculated using cross-correlations and using information
about the angle under which the topic was observed. Both methods work less
well than the correspondence method used in this book, because there was too
much stochasticity in the system.
In the experiments the hearer has to identify the topic of the speaker without
using verbal communication. Attempts to implement joint attention physically
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on the mobile robots failed. A form of pointing has been implemented, but this
led to unsatisfactory results (Steels & Vogt 1997; Vogt 1998a). The simplistic lego
robots have no sophisticated means to establish joint attention without using
language. It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss why this is the case. For
more discussions on this technical issue, see Vogt 1998b,c.
To overcome this technical problem in the current implementation, it is as-
sumed that the robots can establish joint attention and it is simulated using a
trick. The robots inspect the feature vectors of each other, so that they can com-
pare them. The hearer compares the feature vector of the speaker with the fea-
ture vectors of its own context. If a feature vector corresponds, the segment that
relates to this feature vector is assumed to be the topic. Two feature vectors cor-
respond when they have a feature with value 1 in the same dimension. This is
conform the fact that the sensor at the same height as a light source reads the
highest intensity and hence this sensor corresponds to the light source.
3.4.3.4 The speaker’s production
Whether or not joint attention is established, the speaker will try to name the
topic. From the discrimination game, it has found a set of distinctive categories.
If the discrimination game failed, the speaker cannot name the topic. Otherwise,
it will select one of the categories and searches its lexicon if there is an entry that
is consistent with this category. If such an entry exists, the speaker can name the
topic. Otherwise, it has to invent a new form. This form will be associated with
the category and a new lexical entry is born. This form is then uttered, so that
the hearer can do its part of the naming phase.
So, when the speaker categorised the topic, which yielded a nonempty set of
distinctive categories, the speakerwill try to name one of these categories. Which
category is selected may depend on several criteria and the selection method
used. One method has been implemented that could be called a “lazy search
method”. In this method the speaker orders the categories in linear order of
decreasing representation score μ. Then it tries to match these categories with a
lexical entry one by one until a matching association has been found.
Suppose that DC′ = DC is the ordered set of distinctive categories, L =
{⟨Fi,Mi, σ i⟩} is the lexicon, U = nil is the utterance (“nil” means that the ut-
terance has no value yet) and σmax = 0 is the maximum score. The algorithm,
based on Steels (1996c) for finding a matching entry can be described as follows:
1. Set L′ = L.
2. If DC′ ̸= ∅ and U = nil, take out the first category ci from DC′, set DC′ to
the remainder of this set and goto 3, else goto 5.
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3. If L′ ̸= ∅, take out the first element ⟨Fj,Mj, σ j⟩, set L′ to the remainder of
this set and goto 4, else goto 1.
4. If Mj = ci and σ j ≥ σmax, then U := Fj and σmax := σ j. Goto 2.
5. If U = nil, goto 6, else goto 7.
6. Create new form F as an arbitrary string of consonant-vowel-consonant-
vowel with a certain probability, set U := F, M := c (where c is the first
element of DC) and σ := 0.01. Add the new entry ⟨F,M, σ⟩ to L. Goto 7.
7. Send U to the hearer. Stop.
In natural language: As long as there are distinctive categories, the speaker tries
to name the first (and best) distinctive category. It searches its lexicon for a form-
meaning association for which the meaning matches the distinctive category. If
there are more such associations, it selects the entry for which the association
score is highest. If there are no such associations the speaker takes the next
distinctive category and repeats the above, else it continues as follows. If no
lexical entry is found, a new form may be invented with a certain probability
(this is discussed in more detail when the adaptation is discussed). If a new form
is invented, a new lexical entry is added to the lexicon and this entry is selected.
The form of the selected entry is uttered.
Note that as soon a distinctive category will be used in a language game where
it relates a form with a referent, this distinctive category is called the meaning.
3.4.3.5 The hearer’s understanding
In the understanding phase, the hearer tries to select a lexical entry that fits the
utterance best. This way it is able to select which topic it “thinks” the speaker
meant. When the hearer receives an utterance that is relevant (i.e. not nil), it tries
to interpret the utterance. It does so by searching its lexicon for associations that
fit the utterance. From the associations found and that are consistent with the
distinctive categories of the potential topic(s) the most effective one is selected.
The effectiveness is based on information about the likelihood of the potential
topic, the effectiveness of the meaning in the past and the effectiveness of the
association in the past. Themost effective entry determines the hearer’s selection.
If no such entry exists, a new entry must be made. This is done in the adaptation
phase as will be explained below.
The hearer’s understanding is a little bit more complex than the production.
It first of all depends on what knowledge the hearer receives about the topic
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other than the linguistic exchange. Secondly, it may depend on how effective a
distinctive category has been in the past. And finally, it depends on how effective
a certain form-meaning association has been.
Suppose that D = DCp is the set of distinctive category sets of potential topics
p. Each potential topic p has a non-zero topic score ϵp. And suppose that U =
nil is the utterance received from the speaker, t = nil is the topic, L′ = L is
the lexicon and P = nil is the best selection so far. The hearer’s understanding
algorithm is based on the stochastic naming game model (Steels & Kaplan 1998)
and can be described as follows8:
1. If L′ ̸= ∅, then select first element ⟨Fi,Mi, σ i⟩. Else goto 8.
2. If Fi = U, then goto 3, else goto 1.
3. Set D′ = D. Goto 4.
4. If D′ ̸= ∅, then select first element DCp from D′ and goto 5, else goto 1.
5. If DCp ̸= ∅, then select first element cj from DCp and goto 6, else goto 4.
6. If cj = Mi, then calculate Σ = w1 · ϵp + w2 · μj + w3 · σ i, where the wk are
weights. Goto 7.
7. If Σ > Σmax, then set P := ⟨Fi,Mi, σ i, p⟩ and Σmax := Σ. Goto 5.
8. If P ̸= nil, then t := p where p is part of P. Stop.
In the experiments the weights are set to w1 = 1, w2 = 0.1 and w3 = 1. This
way the meaning score μ has little influence on the selection process. Only when
either μ is very large, or when there is a conflict between the topic scores and as-
sociation scores of different elements, the meaning scores influence the selection
process.
So, the hearer looks for the topic that can be related with a form-meaning
association that best fits the expressed form and a distinctive categorisation of
a potential topic. The language game may be evaluated by means of feedback.
Whether or not feedback is actually incorporated depends on the type of lan-
guage game being played. To have a consistent implementation, however, there
is always a feedback model as explained hereafter.
8 Note that Steels & Kaplan (1998) lets the hearer construct a matrix fromwhich similar decisions
are made.
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3.4.3.6 Feedback
It might seem obvious that an agent has to know whether the language game it
is participating is effective in order to learn a language: it needs feedback. What
type of feedback is present is an important issue in the psycholinguistics, (see
e.g. Bowerman 1988). Is the feedback of a language game about its effectiveness
or not? Is it only positive or is it negative as well? In the experiments reported
here, the feedback gives information on the language game’s effectiveness, both
positive and negative. Since the robots should be able to determine this feed-
back themselves (possibly with each other’s help), some mechanism has to be
developed to achieve this.
Feedback has been implemented by means of correspondence. Both these
methods work similar to the methods explained used for joint attention. Both
methods are used to provide feedback in the ostensive and guessing games, pro-
vided that both robots activated a form-meaning association. The observational
and xsl games do not use such feedback. However, for consistency in the im-
plementation, no feedback is implemented similarly. Instead of a topic score ϵ, a
success score ε is computed. This success score indicates the likelihood that both
agents have identified the same topic.










1 if both robots have selected a lexical entry
0 otherwise
(3.14)
The above methods implement feedback in terms of success. In the case of no
feedback, the success is based on the ability to select a form-meaning association.
This could be called feedback, but the feedback meant in this book is in terms of
the actual success of a language game, i.e. both robots should have identified a
symbol that has the same form and that stands for the same referent. So, what
are the outcomes of the feedback using the correspondence criterion? If the topic
is related to the same referent that the speaker intended, the language game is
successful and ε = 1. If it is not, there is a misunderstanding (or “mismatch in




Besides the evaluation of the success, there are other types of “feedback” in
the system. First, if the speaker cannot produce an utterance, the hearer need
not to do anything, except skip the current language game. The speaker can
easily determine its own shortcomings. Second, sometimes the hearer cannot
understand the speaker. This is because it does not recognise the uttered form in
the current context. Either it does not have the form in its lexicon, or its meaning
does not match one of the distinctive categories. In this case, the speaker must
be informed that the language game is a failure. The third and most common-
practice is that the hearer did interpret the form in the context. However, it may
have misinterpreted to what referent the speaker’s utterance referred. So, both
agents have to find out that they both identified the same topic. Attentive readers
will recognise that this is technically the same problem as when the hearer when
the speaker and hearer need to establish joint attention on the topic.
Why not use language as a means of providing feedback? Since language is
the issue of learning, it does not seem to be the most reliable source of attention
mechanism. If the robots do not know the language yet, how can they use lan-
guage as a source of feedback? Therefore a non-linguistic means is preferable.
Such means have already been defined for joint attention.
Like was the case with joint attention, one attempt has been made to imple-
ment this by means of physical pointing (Vogt 1998b). Since this method did not
work well, the technical problems have been set aside and providing feedback
has been simulated assuming the robots can do it properly. The methods used
are the same as in the case of joint attention. The lexicon is adapted according to
the outcome of the game as will be explained hereafter.
3.4.3.7 Adaptation
The naming game may fail in various ways. Both at the production level as at
the understanding level. Especially in the beginning when there are no or few
lexical entries. In these cases the robots have to adapt their lexicons. They may
have to invent new word-forms or they may need to adopt a word-form from
the other robot. In order to increase the chance that effective lexical entries will
be selected more often than ineffective ones, the association scores have to be
adapted. This can happen when the language game is a failure, but it should also
happen when the language game is a success. It is important to realise that the
robots adapt their lexicons individually.
As made clear before, there are several possible outcomes of a language game.
First, the game can already fail during categorisation. This will put pressure to
the agent to increase its repertoire of categories as explained in Section 3.4.2.
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Another failure could be due to the fact that the speaker does not have a form
association matched to category to be named. In this case the agent can invent a
new form to associate with the category. If the hearer does not understand the
speaker, this can mean that it does not have a proper form-meaning association.
The expressed form can be adopted and associated with one or more categories.
When there is a mismatch in reference and when the language game was a suc-
cess, the association scores are updated. When all this is not the case, the lan-
guage game is a success. The adaptation is based on (Steels 1996c), although the
updates of the association scores is a little bit different.
No lexical entry speaker The speaker has no form associated with the categories
it tried to name. In this case, the speaker may invent a new form as an
arbitrary string of characters. It does so with a creation probability Ps that
is kept low to slow down the form creation rate. In most experiments
Ps = 0.02. This way the lexicon will become less ambiguous. The invented
form is associated with the category that has the highest meaning score
μ. The new lexical entry is related with an association score σ that is set
to 0.01. (Not to 0.0, because then it may never be selected, as explained in
Section 3.4.2.)
No lexical entry hearer The hearer has no association in its lexicon where the
form is associated with a meaning that is consistent in the current con-
text. The hearer now may adopt the form from the hearer to associate it
with a segment of which it has a non-zero topic score (ϵt > 0). In this case




If there are more than one segments for which equation 3.15 holds, then
one segment is selected at random. This is e.g. the case in the guessing
game, where all segments have equal topic score. The meaning of the se-
lected segment is then associated with the word-form and the lexical entry
is related to an association score σ = 0.01.
Mismatch in reference The hearer misinterpreted the speaker’s utterance. I.e. the
topic’s of both robots do not coincide. In the case that both robots selected
a form-meaning association, but when the topics did not coincide, at least
according to their own evaluation, the robots decrease the association
score σ of the used association:
σ := η · σ(3.16)
93
3 Language games
where η is the learning rate. In some experiments the hearer also adopts
the form with another segment.
Communicative success Both robots communicated the same referent and hence
the language game was a success. The used association is strengthened
while association scores of other form-meaning associations are laterally
inhibited. Let FM′ = (F′,M′, σ ′) ∈ L and FM = (F,M, σ) ∈ L be form-
meaning associations. Here FM′ are the form-meanings to be adapted and
FM is the association used in the communication. The scores are updated
as a walking average:




1 if FM′ = FM
0 if (FM′ ̸= FM) ∧ ((F′ = F) ∨ (M′ = M))
In all other cases, i.e. when ((F′ ̸= F) ∧ (M′ ̸= M)), nothing happens.
The adaptation scheme thus implements generation, cultural evolution and
selection. Generation is part of the adaptation through invention. Cultural evo-
lution is implemented by form adoption. Whereas the selection is influenced by
the excitation and inhibition of the association scores. The seemingly effective
associations are excited and the ineffective ones are inhibited.
The learning of the lexicon for each individual is based on reinforcement
learning (see e.g. Sutton & Barto 1998). In reinforcement learning, a task is
learned according to the reward that is evaluated from the effect of some action.
In the naming game, the action is the communication, the reward is based on the
effect of the communication and it is evaluated with the feedback.
3.5 Coupling categorisation and naming
This chapter presented the language game model. It explained sensing, segmen-
tation, feature extraction, categorisation, discrimination and lexicon formation
in detail. The different processes that make up the language game are, together
with the data flow illustrated in Figure 3.11. This section explains how the cou-
pling of the different aspects of the language game model work together in order
to develop a shared and grounded lexicon.
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It is important to realise that in an experiment the robots play a series of lan-
guage games. Typically there are thousands of language games played in one
experiment. The robots play language games at different locations in their en-
vironment under different conditions. The different conditions are caused by
changing light conditions, different energy levels and wear. Under these differ-
ent conditions, the robots acquire a different sensing of the light sources. Al-
though different sensations of a light source can be categorised with one cate-
gory, the different sensations induces different categorisations. The number of
different (distinctive) categorisations in an experiment can be very high.
In order to have an efficient communication system, the number of forms that
are used should not be too large. Ideally, there is a one-to-one mapping between
referent and form. As explained, the categories that are used in the language
games make up the meaning of the symbols. They interpret the sensing of the
referent and are associated with a form. Since there are many meanings used
in the language games, while there are only four referents (light sources) in the
environment, there are one-to-many mappings between referent and meaning.
So, to come to an ideal one-to-one mapping between referent and form, there
should be a many-to-one mapping between meaning and form.
Theway the lexicon formation is modelled, themany-to-one relations between
meaning and form are allowed. Although the speaker invents a one-to-one map-
ping betweenmeaning and form, the hearermay adopt a (possibly already known)
form with more than one categories it has related to the sensing of a referent.
This way the many-to-one relations are made. However, there may also emerge
one-to-many mappings between meaning and form.
In different language games, one meaning can be associated with different
forms. The two robots have different categorisations of the world. Partly because
they create different categories and associations, but also because in a language
game, they view their world from different locations. Suppose that one robot in
a language game is at a different location than in previous language games, and
suppose that the other robot is in a location it has visited before. The first robot
is likely to have a different categorisation of a light source than before, so it may
use a different form than in other language games. But if the other robot views
the light source from more or less the same location as before, it would prefer
the form used in the other language games. It may not know the new form yet
and might associate this one with the meaning it already had. Another reason
for this one-to-many mapping is that the hearer adopts a word-form with a cat-
egorisation of an arbitrary selected segment. It may well be that this category
is already associated with another word-form. Logically, if there may be both
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one-to-many and many-to-one mappings between meaning and form, it is likely
there exist many-to-many mappings.
The many-to-many mappings makes the system more complex, especially
when one realises that the mappings differ per robot. The reinforcement type of
learning (selection and adaptations depending on the rewards) allows the robots
to converge a system where the effective associations are used more often. The
robots have mechanisms to select associations that have been most effective in
the past. This selection is based on the scores which are adapted according to
the rewards that are given to the agents. The rewards are based on successful
language games. Since a language game is successful when both robots commu-
nicate the same referent, the forms that are exchanged will be selected more and
more to relate to the same referent. This is so, because in the different language
games, the robots have different but returning locations. Once a language game
has been successful, the used associations for the robots are reinforced. In an-
other language game, where one robot is at the same location, while the other
is not, the latter can learn that the form that is communicated relates to this
new situation. If this newly learned association is applicable in a later language
game, this game may be successful. Hence this association is reinforced. The
more these associations are reinforced, the better the robots can deal with the
different categorisations in different locations.
When an association is used successfully this association is reinforced, where-
as lateral associations are inhibited. So, there will be a competition between
the different form-meaning associations. This appears to antagonise the force
of the dynamics explained above. The adaptations are mainly made at the form-
meaning layer. Nevertheless, it will be shown that the robots are capable to
deal with this. Because hearer processes the data in different directions (cf. Fig-
ure 3.11), the selection it can make often depends on the availability of a dis-
tinctive category rather than on the selection preference in its lexicon. This is
especially a strong principle when the robots use joint attention. The selection
based on the scores is more important when it is not available. In this case the
robots are depending on the rewards (feedback) given. Since both joint attention
and feedback is provides information about the topic of the language games, the
tendency to use a minimal set of forms to name a referent emerges.
As will be shown in the experimental results, the robots do not develop a one-
to-one relationship between the referents and the forms, but the results are pretty
good nevertheless. In the most successful experiments (see Chapter 6) there is
almost a one-to-few relationship between referent and form.
So, there is a strong level of co-evolution of meaning and form. Since there is
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a one-to-many relation between referent and meaning, it is necessary to have a
damping mechanism between meaning and form. The dynamics of the cultural
interactions between the robots and the joint attention or feedback mechanisms
(actually a part of the cultural interactions) are the damping mechanisms that
allows the “self-organisation” of a shared and grounded lexicon.
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Now that the model has been described, it is time to present experimental results.
The results will be presented in three forthcoming chapters including this one.
The current chapter presents the complete outline of one experiment that will
form the basis withwhich the results ofmost other experimentswill be compared.
This experiment will be called the basic experiment and implements the guessing
game.
Chapter 5will showhow some parameters andmethods influence the language
game. Some experiments will be discussed in which the quality of the communi-
cation completely breaks down, but most experiments will show which parame-
ter settings and methods improve the language game.
Before the experiments are discussed some methodology and measures have
to be defined. This is done in the next section. The physical recording of the
sensory data is discussed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the basic experiment.
Both the effectiveness and evolution will be discussed. A summary is given in
Section 4.4.
4.1 Measures and methodology
4.1.1 Measures
As in any empirical investigation, measures are needed to monitor the effective-
ness of the system. For the experiments presented here seven measures have
been proposed, each measuring a certain aspect of the system. Three measures
monitor the categorisation: discriminative success, distinctiveness and par-
simony. The other four measures are involved with the quality of the communi-
cation system: communication success, actual success, specificity and con-
sistency. All measures are values between 0 and 1; 0 means complete failure and
1 complete success.
The measures distinctiveness, parsimony, specificity and consistency were in-
troduced by Edwin de Jong (2000). These measures are based on the entropy
measure taken from information theory (Shannon 1948). Entropy measures the
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uncertainty about a set of elements. The higher the entropy, the higher the un-
certainty introducing chaos. Low entropy means order and less uncertainty. In-
formation theory defines entropy as follows:
LetX be a randomvariablewith a set of possible outcomesAX = {a1, . . . , an},
having probabilities PX = {p1, . . . , pn} with P(x = ai) = pi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and∑n





Pi · log Pi(4.1)
with the convention for Pi = 0 that−0·log 0 = 0. The information theoretic
entropy used here should not be confused with entropy in physical systems,
as in the second law of thermodynamics, although there is a relation in that
both forms of entropy measure disorder (de Jong 2000: 76).
All measures that are used can now be described as follows:
Discriminative success To monitor the ability of the robots to discriminate a seg-
ment from other segments in the context, discriminative success (ds) has
been introduced (Steels 1996d). At each instance, the discriminative suc-
cess measures the average success of an agent to discriminate over the
past 100 language games. Although a robot may play more discrimination
games than language games, it is opted to measure the success over 100
language games for simplicity. So, if during 100 language games a robot
played 120 discrimination games, the discriminative success measures the
average success of those 120 discrimination games. On the other hand, if
there are only 80 discrimination games played, the discriminative success
monitors the success of these 80 games as a function of the 100 language
games. So, the discriminative success monitors the evolution of categori-
sation, although its information is not always equally reliable. Note that
the discriminative success is calculated for each individual robot.
Distinctiveness “Intuitively, distinctiveness expresses to what degree a meaning
identifies the referent.” (de Jong 2000) For this we can measure how the
entropy of a meaning in relation to a certain referentH(ρ|μi) decreases the
uncertainty about the referent H(ρ). For this we can calculate the differ-
ence between H(ρ) and H(ρ|μi). Here ρ are the referents ρ1, . . . , ρn and μi
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relates to one of the meanings μ1, . . . , μm for robot R. The distinctiveness













i=1 Po(μi) · dist(μi)
m
(4.4)
where H(ρ) = log n and Po(μi) is the occurrence probability of meaning μi.
The use of Po(μi) as a weighting factor is to scale the importance of such
a meaning to its occurrence. In de Jong (2000) this has only been done for
specificity and consistency, because there the occurrence of meanings and
referents was a normal distribution.











i=1 Po(ρi) · pars(ρi)
n
(4.7)
with H(μ) = logm. Parsimony thus calculates to what degree a referent
gives rise to a unique meaning.
Communicative Success The communication success (cs) is calculated similar to
the discrimination success. communicative success is the average success
in communication over the past 100 games. It must be noted that when a
language game ends in communicative success, the robots not necessarily
communicated the same topic. The robots considered the language game
successful as a result from the feedback. Since the feedback is not always
sound, the communicative success does not always say anything about the
robots ability to communicate about a certain referent.
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Actual success In order to say more about the actual success of a language game,
when the communicative success is not the ideal measure, the measure ac-
tual success (as) has been introduced (Vogt 1998b). The actual success mea-
sures the success of a language game as if it were observed by an objective
observer. The objective observer may regard the language game success-
ful when it is so according to the correspondence criterion, i.e., when the
topic of both robots correspond to the same light source. This method
is not completely sound, because at larger distances to a light source the
correspondence criterion is not sound. But in most cases it suffices. The
actual success measures the average success over the past 100 language
games. When feedback is provided by the correspondence criterion, the
actual success is the same as the communicative success.
Specificity “The specificity of a word[-form] is […] defined as the relative de-
crease of uncertainty in determining the referent given a word that was
received.” (de Jong 2000) It thus is a measure to indicate how well a word-
form can identify a referent. It is calculated analogous to the distinctive-





−P(ρj|σ i) · log P(ρj|σ i)(4.8)






i=1 Po(σ i) · spec(σ i)
q
(4.10)
where H(ρ) = log n is defined as before and Po is the occurrence probabil-
ity of encountering word-form σ i.
Consistency Consistency measures how consistent a referent is named by a cer-




−P(σ j|ρi) · log P(σ j|ρi)(4.11)
102







i=1 Po(ρi) · cons(ρi)
n
(4.13)
where H(σ) = log q and Po(ρi) is defined as before.
Distinctiveness, parsimony, specificity and consistency are all calculated ev-
ery 200 language games. Obviously calculations can only take place when the
pairs referent – meaning or referent – word-form are used. This happens ei-
ther when the discrimination game is successful (influencing distinctiveness and
parsimony) or when a robot produced or understood a communication act (influ-
encing specificity and consistency).1
4.1.2 Statistical testing
Every experiment (unless otherwise mentioned) consists of 10 runs in which ei-
ther 5,000 or 10,000 language games are played. When appropriate, the results
are presented in a plot that displays the average evolution of the experiment.
However, to save space, most results are presented in a table where the global
averages of an experiment are given. Using global averages means that the av-
erage measure of each complete run (5,000 or 10,000 games) is averaged over 10
runs. This average is given with its standard deviation of the population. When
comparing to other experiments, the results are usually displayed in a bar chart.
In addition, statistical significance testing is done by these comparisons.
All statistical significance testing is done using the two-tailed Mann–Whitney
U test, also known as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Applying the Mann–Whitney
U test requires that the population does not show a normal distribution. Inves-
tigations of the distributions revealed that the populations were not normally
distributed.
The null-hypothesis of the test may be rejected when p < α for some low α. In
all testing, the null-hypothesis states that two populations of measurements are
the same, with the alternative hypothesis that they are not the same. For stating
that one result is significantly better than another, the distributions of the two
populations of measurements need to be similar. This has not been observed, so
the only inference one can make of a low p-value is that the two populations are
1 Note that this does not necessarily mean that the language game was successful.
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not the same. However, if one measurement is higher than another, the assump-
tion will be made that this is the case if a p-value is low. The value α will not be
filled in as the reader may decide whether or not the difference is significant. For
readers unfamiliar with statistical testing, the literature usually takes α = 0.05,
which becomes α = 0.025 for a two-tailed test. The used method and tables are
taken from Aczel (1989).
Other methods will be used to evaluate an experiment’s success. These meth-
ods include semiotic landscapes, competition diagrams and others, and will be
introduced with their initial appearance.
4.1.3 On-board versus off-board
In the original experiments all the processing, including the meaning and lan-
guage formation, was done on-board the robots (Steels & Vogt 1997). But, since
the robots failed to enhance the lexicon due to the lack of on-board memory and
because the robots’ batteries only work for one hour while the experiments take
much more time, a large part of the processing is done off-board on a personal
computer. The sensory information that the robots detect during sensing is sent
to the pc by the radio link. After the robots recorded the sensory information of
a language game, segmentation, categorisation and naming are further processes
on the pc. There are many advantages for off-board processing:
1. Larger internal memory
2. No loss of data during change of batteries
3. Faster processing
4. Repeatable experiments to compare parameter settings and methods more
reliably
5. Debugging
After approximately one hour of experimenting, the robot’s batteries die. The
robots have no persistent data storage on-board. So, when the batteries are empty
and the robot shuts down, the memory built up disappears unless it is saved off-
board first. Of course, the robots may be powered by a cable, but in practice this
proves to be rather cumbersome. The advantage would be that a serial cable can
be attached to monitor the internal dynamics of the robots during a game, but
this could also be done using radio communication.
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The recording of one language game when the robots need to look for each
other takes approximately 1.5 min. Recording a minimum of 5,000 language
games takes therefore 125 hours, which takes 25 days or 5 weeks assuming that
there are 5 effective experimental hours a day.2 If nothing goes wrong, naturally!
This period can be reduced to 5 days if the researcher manually brings the robots
together after which the robots play a series of, say, 10 games in a row.
Now suppose that one wants to tune a parameter by varying this parameter 5
or 10 times. Or that one wants to change a method, or what if the researcher finds
a bug in its program. For all these reasons off-board processing is the outcome.
Another important advantage is that one can use the same recordings over and
over again across different experiments, so comparing different experiments is
more reliable.
Debugging is a good reason to process data as much as possible off-board as
well, it saves huge amounts of time. Many more advantages can be found, but
the biggest have been stated. However, if one divides a system in on-board vs.
off-board processing, then one should be careful to define the division line. The
experiment should not loose its embodied and situated character, otherwise one
is better off using simulations.
4.2 Sensory data
As mentioned in Chapter 3 the sensory data of the sensing during a language
game is recorded to further process the game off-board. For convenience the
sensing is segmented in advance, using the method described in Chapter 3. The
same is done for the feature extraction. The data set thus consists of the contexts
described by the feature vectors of the two robots participating in the experiment.
The two contexts that relate to one language game will be called a situation.
For obvious reasons of time, a few data sets of only 1,000 situations have been
recorded. One of these sets is used for the experiments of this chapter, the oth-
ers will be presented in Chapter 5. As will become clear soon, an experiment
requires approximately 3,000 language games before the communication system
becomes more or less stable. In most experiments 5,000 games are played. In
these experiments the 1,000 recorded situations will be used over and over again.
Some people may ask if the reuse of situations will bias the system. But it is un-
likely that two language games in the experiment are the same. Every language
game one situation is selected. One of the robots is then randomly assigned to




play the role of the speaker. The speaker then randomly selects one of the seg-
ments to be the topic. Since, on average, each context consists of approximately
3–4 segments (1017 in the first data set to be precise), a situation can be used in,
say, 7 different ways. Assuming perfect randomness of the system, each possible
setting (situation, role assignment and topic choice) has been explored only once
after approximately 7,000 games, which justifies this method.
The data set is first run through linearly, i.e. the system that runs the experi-
ment reads the data set in recording sequence. The situations are stored in a list
and each situation is then selected in random order.
The 1,000 situations have been recorded as described in Chapter 3. The record-
ing of each data set took approximately 8 hours of work, spread over two days.
Before the results of the cognitive processing is presented, it is useful to look
at some statistics of the basic data set. Some additional statistics of the basic data
set are presented in Appendix C. This appendix shows the distribution of the
feature values measured by the robots. This distribution shows one reason why
it seems impossible that a real-world environment can be simulated.
Table 4.1 shows the average context size ⟨|Cxt|⟩ of each robot together with
its standard deviation. In addition, this table shows the potential understand-
ability Ur of each robot. The potential understandability of a robot is a mea-
sure that indicates how well a robot can be understood by another robot ac-
cording to their context sharing. Suppose that robot r has segmented context
Cxtr,l = {S1,r,l, . . . , Sn,r,l} for situation l, then the understandability Ur for n situ-

















where the symbol ⊑ is used to denote the relation whether the segment on the
left hand side of ⊑ corresponds to one of the segments in the context of the
other robot. L is the total number of situations recorded. So, the global potential
understandability Ur is the average of the average potential understandability
per situation. In Table 4.1 this average is given with its standard deviation.
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Table 4.1: The average context size ⟨|Cxt|⟩ and average potential understandabil-
ity Ur of the recorded data set.
r0 r1
⟨|Cxt|⟩ 3.33 ± 1.07 3.54 ± 1.21
Ur 0.81 ± 0.27 0.78 ± 0.27
The potential understandability is lower than 1, because the two robots do not
always share a similar context. That this happens has already been discussed in
the preceding Chapter 3.
What can be expected in the experiments when observing the statistics of this
data set? The first thing that can be said is that the a priori probabilities that both









So, if the robots perform better than 30 % in their communicative success, they
are actually learning a meaningful language. The second observation that can
be made is that it is impossible to reach a communicative success of 100 % since
the robots are in principle not capable of understanding each utterance given the
current context setting. They are not likely to perform better than approximately
80 %, as has been calculated from the potential understandability. Third, it is
likely that the robots will learn to name L0 better than others, since this light
source is detected most often. Given these expectations and conclusions it is
time to see how the robots do in the language formation.
4.3 The basic experiment
This first experiment will be referred to as the basic experiment. It is called so
because this experiment will serve as the basic experiment from which param-
eters and methods are changed to investigate their influence. That it is not the
best experiment will be shown in subsequent chapters.
The experiment is a guessing game with feedback obtained by means of cor-
respondence (see Section 3.4.3.6).
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Table 4.2: Parameters of the system. The parameters include the step-size δ by
which the categories shift towards an observation, the learning rate
η controlling the adaptation of scores, the creation probability Ps by
which the speaker may invent new word-forms, the adoption proba-
bility Ph by which the hearer may adopt a new word-form when it
does not find a matching word-form with an associated meaning it
also categorised, and the success threshold ΘF by which the success of






Table 4.2 shows the parameter settings of the most important variables that
have been introduced in Chapter 3. Unless otherwise mentioned, the parameters
are not changed in the different experiments.
4.3.1 The global evolution
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 4.1. Note that the actual suc-
cess is not shown. This is because the actual success is calculated under the same
criteria as the feedback of the language games, namely the correspondence crite-
rion. Therefore the actual success is equal to the communicative success. In the
experiments where the feedback is provided using the correspondence criterion,
the plot of the actual success will not be provided.
In Figure 4.1 (a) the evolution of the communicative success is shown. The
communicative success first increases rapidly towards a value of 0.2 after 500
language games, then the communicative success slowly grows to a value of 0.45
after approximately 5,000 language games. The low success is partly due to the
relatively poor performance the robots’ physical behaviour. This poor behaviour
causes the robots to acquire an incoherent context, so a completely successful
system cannot emerge. However, the potential understandability predicts a max-
imum success 80 %. So this cannot explain why the success stays around 40 %
in the last 3,000 games. Note however that the success is still increasing, but the
success stabilises around 55 % after approximately 8,000 games, as will be shown
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Figure 4.1: The results of the basic experiment showing (a) the communicative
success, (b) discriminative success, (c) specificity, (d) distinctiveness,
(e) consistency and (f) parsimony. Objective success is not shown,
because in this experiment it holds no value (see text).
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in Section 4.3.5. Although the communicative success is low, some important
observations can be made when a closer look is taken at the evolution of the
communication system. This is done from Section 4.3.3.
Figure 4.1 (b) plots the discriminative success of the two robots r0 and r1. As
can be seen, the discriminative success grows to a value around 95 %. This success
rate is reached quite rapidly. Already after approximately 500 language games
a success larger than 90 % is achieved. That the discriminative success does not
converge to 100 % is due to (1) the hearer does not play a discrimination game in
all language games and the discriminative success is a function of the language
games, and, (2) a success-rate of 100 % can never be reached. This latter finding
is due to the fact that on the average about 0.5 % of the segments in one context
are the same.
Figure 4.3 shows the discriminative success of an experiment where all possi-
ble configurations are used in the discrimination games. The robots interacted
as if they were playing language games, only they did not communicate. The
speaker only categorised its selected topic, the hearer categorised all its detected
segments. Note that more discrimination games are played than when the robots
also communicate, since the hearer only plays a discrimination game when it re-
ceives an uttered word-form. Furthermore, since each agent plays a discrimina-
tion game every language game, the discriminative success is independent of the
language games. The average distinctive success over 10 runs of 5,000 language
games is 0.984±0.001 for robot r0 and 0.987±0.000 for r1. Due to limitations of
the implementation it is difficult to extract all possible configurations, so these
experiments are not used for language formation.
Figures 4.1 (c) and (e) show that the specificity and consistency is rather good.
When a communication act establishes, whether or not it is successful,3 the
robots’ utterances specify the referents prettywell and they are also pretty consis-
tent in naming the referent. So, in principle theymastered a good communication
system.
Themeanings that are used almost uniquely identify a particular referent. This
can be seen in Figure 4.1 (d), which shows the distinctiveness of the two robots.
When the robots are able to discriminate a segment corresponding to some ref-
erent, they do so rather parsimonious (i.e. they tend to use the same meanings),
but not very well. The parsimony (Figure 4.1 (f)) is around 0.85.
So, when the robots are successful in communicating and categorisation, they
do so with high accuracy and invariance. Table 4.3 shows the average (Avg)
3 A communication act is established when the speaker produced an utterance and when the
hearer found a matching wm association. This is independent of successful communication.
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scores of the different measures over 10 runs of the complete experiments. All
scores given with their standard deviation of the averages over the population
of 10 runs. In forthcoming experiments tables and bar charts with the average
scores will be the main comparison source. Plots like in Figure 4.1 will only be
used when it is useful to make a certain point.
In Figure 4.2 the communicative success of one run is shown. It is obvious that
this run shows a different evolution than the averaged evolution, as has been
shown in Figure 4.1. The next section will discuss the evolution of the run for
which the communicative success has just been shown.
Table 4.3: The table listing the average scores for the different measures. The
suffix 0 or 1 indicates from which robot the score is (r0 or r1). The
second column gives the global average of the experiment, together
with its standard deviation over the population of 10 runs.
Score Avg
CS 0.351 ± 0.010
DS0 0.916 ± 0.004
DS1 0.920 ± 0.004
D0 0.956 ± 0.002
D1 0.955 ± 0.002
P0 0.852 ± 0.004
P1 0.851 ± 0.002
S0 0.822 ± 0.017
S1 0.817 ± 0.011
C0 0.816 ± 0.008















Figure 4.2: The communicative success of one run. The evolution shows a fast
increase towards 30 %, after which it slowly grows to 50 % at the
end. The evolution further shows a lot of fluctuations. Apparently
the robots learn to communicate with ups and downs. A lot of these
fluctuations are caused by polysemy and synonymy in the system as















Figure 4.3: The discriminative success of 10 runs of 5,000 language games in
which only discrimination games were played (i.e. without communi-
cation). The discrimination games here considered all possible config-
urations of categories in their contexts.
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4.3.2 The ontological development






































































Figure 4.4: The development of prototypes in dimension WL0 of feature spaces
F1 to F4. Note that the x-axis shows the number of language games
and the y-axis shows the value of the prototype in dimension WL0.
Similar evolutions are observed in the other dimensions of the feature
spaces.
Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of prototypes in dimension wl0 of feature
spaces F1 to F4. Similar development is observed for the other dimensions. Re-
call that each feature space Fλ allows a maximum of 3λ exploitations in each
dimension. The first exploitations in the different feature spaces are constructed
quite rapidly. It is interesting to note that only the prototypes of feature space
F1 are continuously changing (Figure 4.4 (a)). This means that they are used
successfully to name a segment and shift towards the feature they categorised.
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The lower and upper exploitations remain close to 0 and 1, respectively, the mid-
dle values shift toward values somewhere in the middle between 0 and 1. The
categories have the tendency to move towards what could be called the central
tendency of the features for which the prototypical categories have been used
successfully in the language games.
At the other feature spaces from Figure 4.4, an increasing amount of proto-
types are constructed, but once they are introduced they hardly change. Ap-
parently, these prototypical categories are not often used successfully in the lan-
guage games. So, the robots appear to be sufficiently effective with the categories
constructed in feature space F1. This does not mean that in a more complex en-
vironment, the further refinements would not be effective.
Table 4.4: The legend of some of the meanings represented by their prototypes.
The subscript indicates the feature space Fλ at which the prototypes
are stored. The given meanings are taken from the ontology after 5,000
language games.
M5 (0.02, 0.01, 1.00, 0.02)1
M6 (0.04, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)2
M18 (0.56, 0.99, 0.02, 0.02)1
M20 (0.02, 0.01, 1.00, 0.44)1
M27 (0.02, 0.31, 1.00, 0.44)1
M30 (0.02, 0.99, 0.02, 0.02)1
M37 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)3
M53 (1.00, 0.01, 0.02, 0.02)1
M55 (1.00, 0.31, 0.02, 0.02)1
M58 (0.02, 0.01, 0.30, 0.99)1
M61 (0.02, 0.01, 0.02, 0.99)1
M67 (1.00, 0.99, 0.02, 0.02)1
M90 (0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.00)5
M393 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.01)4
M394 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.01)5
Table 4.4 gives a sample of some meanings that are present in the competition
diagrams. An additional legend can be found in Appendix D. Each meaning is
a set of categories of which the values are given in a vector notation. So, the
category is a 4 dimensional prototype of the (4 dimensional) segment. The first
dimension corresponds with sensory channel wl0 (the lowest light sensor), etc.
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The subscript index indicates feature space at which the categories are stored.
Most prototypes have a value of 1 (or 0.99) at the dimension that corresponds to
the referent for which they are mostly used.
There are some exceptions, like for m6, m37, m90, m393 and m394, which have
all values of (almost) 0. These meanings are used in the beginning of the exper-
iment in which a certain feature space is explored. The relating categories were
distinctive, despite the low values in each dimension, because the other segments
in the context were categorised with other categories at sensory channels that
had higher values in another dimension.
An interesting meaning is m67, which has low distinctiveness. This meaning
is used both in relation to light sources l0 and l1. Table 4.4 explains why. The
prototype has high values for both dimension wl0 and wl1. If a light source is
sensed from a large distance, the sensory channel adjacent to the corresponding
sensory channel, both sensory channelsmay detect intensities close to each other,
conform the characteristics shown in Chapter 2. After feature extraction, the
feature vector has high values in these dimensions. Hence meaning m67 might
be activated.
Meanings m53, m55 (both l0), m18, m30 (l1), m5, m20, m27 (l2), m58 and m61
(l3) all have values of 0.99 or 1.00 in the corresponding dimensions. So, the dis-
crimination process clearly selects the invariant property of correspondence. The
meanings that have values of 0.99 in one dimension of their prototypes are used
successfully to categorise a feature vector that has a value lower than 1 in this
dimension. In such cases the prototypes evolve to a value lower than 1 since it
shifts towards the feature vector. If this prototype would be used only to cate-
gorise feature vectors with value 1 in some dimension, this dimension will end
up with value of 1.
4.3.3 Competition diagrams
Up to now only superficial measures have been presented, which already gave
useful information on the quality of the emerged communication system. Al-
though the communicative success is low, the system is performing better than
chance and a reasonable system seems to have emerged. There is another way of
looking at the system that emerged, namely by inspecting so called competition
diagrams. A competition diagram takes one entity at its basis (e.g. a referent)
and shows which elements of another entity (e.g. meanings or word-forms) com-
pete to mean or name this basis.
Figure 4.5 shows the competition diagram with the referents at the basis and

























































Figure 4.5: Competition diagrams referent-meaning (or rm diagram).
All plots in this figure show the competition diagrams of robot r0 for each refer-
ent l0, l1, l2 and l3. Each plot shows the relative frequency of the co-occurrence
of themeaningwith the referent, where the referent is taken as the basis to which
the frequencies are compared. These relative frequencies are calculated every 200
language games. A co-occurrence of meanings and referents does not imply they
were successfully used. It is obvious that each referent has been categorised by
different meanings, although each referent has a clear winning meaning. Hence
there is a one-to-many relation between referent and meaning.
All frequently used meanings are active at feature spaceF1 (see also Table 4.4).
It appears that, mostly the discrimination is successful using meanings from this
feature space.4 Although this is not shown here, meanings from a feature space
with λ > 1 tend not to be used much. Obviously they may just as well be distinc-
4 Note that categories from feature space F0 cannot be distinctive unless there is only one seg-
ment in the context.
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tive, but they are not used in the communication, otherwise they would move in
the feature space. That this is not the case is observed in Figure 4.4. So, at higher
feature spaces, there are more prototypes, but those are selected less frequently.
This makes their competition for the referent harder and less successful.
The occurrence frequency of meanings m53, m30, m5 and m61 constitute the
parsimony of the system. It can be inferred that referents l0, l1 and l3 have a
relative high parsimony, whereas l2 has relative low parsimony. The higher the
parsimony the better a referent is categorised by a single category.
Figures 4.6 (a)–(d) show themeaning-form competition diagrams (mf diagrams)
of the winning meanings in the referent-meaning competitions. Figure (a) shows
the competition of meaning m53. The word-form huma clearly wins the compe-
tition right from the beginning. Little competition is given by xomu, poma, lyzu
and kyga. Similar competitions can be seen with meanings m30 and m5 (Figures
4.6 b and c). So, every meaning shows one-to-many relations between meaning
and form. This is highest in for m30 and m61. Such one-to-many relations are fed
by mismatches that arise in the communication. The mismatches cause word-
form adoption, so that a meaning can be associated with several word-forms.
The mismatches are mainly due to the rather high level of one-to-many relations
between referent and meaning as shown in the referent-meaning diagram.
The dynamics on the association scores allow the different other lexical ele-
ments a chance to compete. Lateral inhibition of competing associations is a
main ingredient of the self-organising effect that one element wins the compe-
tition. Note again that occurrence in the competition diagram does not equal a
language game’s success.
Meaning m61 (Figure 4.6 d) shows a different competition than m53, m30 and
m5. Initially word-form kyga wins the competition. This word-form is also the
winning competitor for m5, so there is representational polysemy in the system.
After game 1750 or so, word-form lyzu starts to win the competition for m61 and
kyga is then solely used for m5. Thus the lexicon is somewhat disambiguated.
Disambiguation is established by excitation of scores of successful association
and the lateral inhibition of competing associations.
Figure 4.6 (e) shows the opposite competition of form humawith its associated
meanings, i.e., it shows the form-meaning competition for huma. Again there
is a clear winner, namely m53 as would be expected. Furthermore some small
competition is observed from other meanings. Notably is meaning m30, which
is ‘the best of the rest’. m30 is winning competitor referring to l1 (see Figures 4.5
b and 4.6 b). In Figure 4.6 (b) huma also wins the competition of the meanings









































































Figure 4.6: Competition diagrams (a) to (d) meaning-form (mf), and (e) form-
meaning (fm).
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Figure 4.7: Competition diagrams (a) referent-form, (b) form-referent, (c) and (d)
meaning-referent. Meaning m53 (c) uniquely refers to referent l0.
naming m5, m30 and m61, although in a lesser extend. So, there is a one-to-many
relation between huma and some meanings, and there is polysemy is present for
huma. Polysemy means that there are one-to-many relations between the form
and referent. Polysemy is one of the causes why the communicative success is
lower than the potential communicative success.
In Figure 4.7 some different competition diagrams are shown. Figure (a) shows
the referent-form competition for l0. The synonymy (one-to-many relation be-
tween referent and form) is high, as can be inferred from the low relative fre-
quency of winning word-form huma and the competing elements at the bottom
of the plot. Note that not all competitors are shown in this plot. There are quite
some more, but these have lower frequencies than the ones that are shown. The
synonymy is a result of the relatively low parsimony (i.e. one-to-many relations
between referent and meaning) combined with the one-to-many relations be-




Polysemy of the word-form huma is also shown in Figure 4.7 (b). At first there
is competition between all referents. After 1,000 language games, the tendency
to use huma for naming l0 wins the competition. Thus influencing the specificity
positively. However, the polysemy antagonises the communicative success. Pol-
ysemy is caused by a combination of one-to-many relations between form and
meaning and one-to-one relations between meaning and referent, cf. Figure 4.7
(c).
Distinctiveness is high, as can be seen in the meaning-referent diagram for m53
(Figure 4.7 c). The relative frequency in using m53 for referring to l0 goes to 1
where it remains. Some meanings have lower distinctiveness like m61 (Figure 4.7
d), which after its introduction around language game 1,200 keeps on competing
between l0 and l1. That this competition has little influence in the global distinc-
tiveness of robot r0 is seen in Figure 4.1 (d). This is so because the occurrence
frequency of m67 is relatively low.
4.3.4 The lexicon
One way of inspecting the resulting lexicon is looking at the competition dia-
grams. Another way of presenting the lexicon is a table. In such tables word-
meaning associations of the two robots are given. Although such tables give
good information about an individual’s lexicon, it provides difficult to read and
incomplete information about its structure in the language using society. Similar
tables can display the ontology of the robots in relation to their use for referents.
The tables of the lexicon and ontology are given in Appendix D.
4.3.4.1 Semiotic landscape
Still another way the lexicon can be presented is by a semiotic landscape as in
Figure 4.8. In a semiotic landscape the semiotic relations between referent, mean-
ing and form are displayed for the two robots. The connections are weighted by
their co-occurrence frequencies, like given in the tables (see Appendix D). En-
tries with very low frequencies are left out for clarity. When no connections are
drawn, these associations have frequencies lower than 0.01.
Figure 4.8 clearly shows that winning associations (bold connections) always
make closed couplings, thus constituting the successfully grounded and shared
symbols. The associations also show coherent connections of referent and form
between both robots. This way the sign can be said to be conventionalised. Hence
it becomes a symbol. Another interesting observation that can be made is that
word-forms like huma, kyga and xomu (only for r0) show one-to-many relations
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LEGEND:
WINNING ASSOCIATION
WINNING ASSOCIATION ON ONE SIDE
OTHER ASSOCIATIONS WITH P >= 0.05




M-53 M-55 M-67 M-169 M-43 M-30 M-18 M-16 M-5 M-20 M-27 M-23 M-22 M-26 M-61 M-58 M-393 M-394 M-169 M-238 M-121
M-4 M-51 M-55 M-39 M-81 M-13 M-0 M-22 M-78 M-68 M-75 M-65 M-242 M-85 M-389 M-42 M-44 M-363 M-102 M-62M-5
huma xomu wosa kyga vyqa guhe lyzu poma puga wely
r0
r1
Figure 4.8: The semiotic landscape of one of the experiments.
between form and meaning, but they show hardly any polysemy. Ideally a figure
should emergewhere for each referent there is a closed graphwhere no polysemy
or synonymy is shown. In such a graph the referents are orthogonal to each other.
Most word-forms that show one-to-many relations between form andmeaning
also show some polysemy and incoherence. A word-form is incoherent when
one robot uses it to name another referent than the other robot. Incoherence can
be seen for the word-forms wosa and vyqa. Such incoherence can be caused by
language games that are evaluated to be successful inappropriately or that the
meanings have no other associations.5
4.3.4.2 Lexical and ontological growth
How does the lexicon and ontology grow through time? Is the growth incremen-
tal as has been observed in studies on language acquisition and as is likely to
5 Recall that co-occurrence does not imply a successful language game.
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have happened in language evolution (Aitchison 1996)? Incremental growth is
typically illustrated with an S-shaped logistics curve as shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.10 shows a similar evolution of growth. These figures show the growth
of elements that have been used successfully in the language games averaged
over the ten runs. After a short while the number elements start to grow rapidly
until the growth seems to stabilise a bit. It is shown that the lexicon growth of
successfully used forms ends up with a lower amount of elements than is shown
in the previous section. Some of the elements of the lexicon discussed in the
previous section have not been used successfully.



































Figure 4.10: The average growth of the word-forms (a) and meanings (b) from
the experiments. The growth is taken over elements that are used
successfully in the language games.
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The number of meanings that are used keep on growing, although slower than
in the beginning. Figure 4.10 (b) actually shows that the 8 word-forms that have
been used successfully are associated with approximately 100 meanings. So, ev-
ery word-form is associated with on the average 12.5 meanings. The semiotic
landscape shown in above shows that this need not be a big problem.
4.3.5 More language games
The experiment introduced was done with 10 runs of 5,000 language games. Most
experiments that are discussed have 10 runs of 5,000 language games, but what
happens when the experiment is run for a longer time. Figure 4.11 shows the
results when the robots play 10,000 games each run (again for 10 runs). As is clear
the system keeps on improving slightly. The communicative success for instance
increases towards a value of 0.5. Also the specificity is increasing continuously.
So, the communication system seems to keep on learning, but slowly.
It is unknown exactly when the slight growth stops, but the system does seem
to stabilise towards the end. Aswill be shown in later chapters, some experiments



































































































Figure 4.11: The evolution of the basic experiment with runs of 10,000 language
games.
4.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the first experimental results in detail. The experiment
that has been presented here in detail will be used as the basic experiment from
which parameters and methods are varied and with which the results of other
experiments shall be compared. The experimental results of the forthcoming ex-
periments will not be presented at the same level of detail. For most experiments
only the global averages will be given. When appropriate, however, the results
will be presented in more detail.
The basic experiment used a data set that has been recorded in advanced and
that is used to process in different runs under different random seeds. The re-
sults have been presented with several measures, notably the communicative
success, discriminative success, distinctiveness, specificity, parsimony and con-
sistency. Although the communicative success is rather low, it is higher than the
a priori communicative success. Furthermore, inspecting the other measures, it
appeared that the robots did learn a reasonable communication system. Competi-
tion diagrams showed how the robots evolve to select preferred elements of their
ontology and lexicon to name the referents. The semiotic landscape showed that
one-to-many relations between referent and meaning need not be a problem as
long as the polysemy is low. However, the system still carries quite some poly-
semy and synonymy.
The next chapters will show if and how a better communication system may
emerge. First the impact from different methods and parameter settings Chap-
ter 5. Chapter 6 reports some optimised systems.
124
5 Varying methods and parameters
Chapter 4 extensively presented the basic experiment. The results were not very
satisfying, although closer investigation revealed not so bad results. In this chap-
ter, variants of the basic experiment are investigated and compared with this
experiment.
What is the impact on categorisation and lexicon formation when a different
categorisation mechanisms is used? What influence has the physical conditions
on the symbol grounding? What is the impact from applying joint attention
and/or feedback? How do various parameter settings of the word-form creation
probability and learning rate influence the experiments? And what if the robots
also adopt word-forms when there is a mismatch in referent? These questions
will be addressed in this chapter.
To answer these questions, a set of experiments have been carried out. Each
experiment is done with 10 runs of 5,000 language games, as in the basic exper-
iment. Unless otherwise mentioned, the basic data set is used in these experi-
ments. Each section of this chapter relates to one of the questions and it presents
some of the experiments. The sections introduce the problem addressed. They
describe the difference(s) of the experiments, usually in relation to the basic ex-
periment. Then the experimental results are given, which is followed by a short
discussion of these results.
The next section investigates three variants of categorisation in the discrimina-
tion games. In Section 5.2, the physical conditions are varied. The four different
types of language games introduced in Chapter 3, the guessing, ostensive, obser-
vational and xsl game, will be investigated in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 investigates
the observational game in more detail. In Section 5.5, the creation probability is
varied. The learning rate is varied in Section 5.6. Additional word-form adoption
is investigated in Section 5.7. The chapter finishes with a summary.
5.1 Impact from categorisation
In the basic experiment the categories are prototypical as introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4.2.1. When a category is used as a meaning that a robot successfully uses
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in a language game, the value of the category shifts towards the feature value
of the relevant sensory channel. What happens if the categories do not shift
towards these feature values?
Categorisation is implemented such that a feature vector is always categorised
with the prototypes that are closest in each feature space. It has been argued
that categorisation is not so clear-cut, but that there may be fuzzy boundaries
between adjacent categories (see e.g. Aitchison 1987 and Lakoff 1987). Especially
around the boundaries of a category’s sensitivity, the certainty of whether a fea-
ture vector belongs to one category or another becomes smaller. For instance,
something that looks like a cup might be categorised by another person as a vase
or bowl as has been shown by Labov (1973). family resemblance (Wittgenstein
1958) is another example of such fuzziness. These are examples at a higher level
of categorisation, but the same may hold at the lower level of categorisation.
These two questions are investigated in this section, together with the binary
subspace method (see Section 3.4.2.3). The results are compared with the basic
experiment.
5.1.1 The experiments
There are the following experiments (all are variants of the basic experiment, and
thus implement the guessing game):
No shifting categories (NS) Once a prototypical category is introduced, its value
does not change through time. Hence the categories are static.
Fuzzy sets (FS) Categories may overlap each other at their boundaries. In this
experiment, a feature is categorised with those categories that are closer
than a certain minimal distance, and if no such category exists, the feature
is categorised with the category that is closest to the feature value.
More formally, a category ck can be defined by region in a feature spaceFλ .
The category ck can be described as ck = ⟨ck, dk, νk, ρk, κk⟩, where ck =
x0, . . . , xn−1 is a prototype in the n dimensional feature space Fλ , dk =
1
2 · 3
−λ is a distance based on the feature space in which the prototype is
stored and νk, ρk and κk are scores as described in Chapter 3. The distance
dk is based on an equal subdivision of the number of exploitations that are
done in the feature space Fλ .
A feature vector is f is categorised with ck if its distance to ck is shortest,
or if in each dimension i the distance between fi and xk,i is smaller than dk,
i.e. |fi − xi| < dk.
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Note that in this way a feature vector may be categorised with more than
one category in each feature space. If the vector is closest to the prototype
of one category, but if it falls inside the region of another category as de-
fined by dk, it is categorised in two or more ways. It is also important to
realise that, like in the prototype method, whenever there exists a proto-
type in some feature space Fλ , a feature vector can be categorised in this
space.
So, instead of one possible categorisation in each feature space, a feature
vector may have several. This increases the chance that a referent is cate-
gorised more parsimoniously and thus increasing the communicative suc-
cess. Note that the discrimination game is unaltered.
Binary subspace method (BIN) See Section 3.4.2.3.
5.1.2 The results
The results compared with the basic experiment are given in Figure 5.1 and Ta-
ble 5.1. These results give the global averaged results of the communicative suc-
cess, discriminative success, distinctiveness, parsimony, specificity and consis-
tency.
Table 5.1: The results of the experiments on categorisations. The columns give the
averaged results with their standard deviation of the basic experiment
(b) compared with experiments ns, fs and bin.
B NS FS BIN
CS 0.351 ± 0.010 0.349 ± 0.017 0.357 ± 0.024 0.264 ± 0.041
DS0 0.916 ± 0.004 0.933 ± 0.007 0.875 ± 0.014 0.893 ± 0.005
DS1 0.920 ± 0.004 0.935 ± 0.006 0.894 ± 0.013 0.895 ± 0.003
D0 0.956 ± 0.002 0.959 ± 0.000 0.956 ± 0.001 0.922 ± 0.005
D1 0.955 ± 0.002 0.959 ± 0.000 0.956 ± 0.001 0.933 ± 0.003
P0 0.852 ± 0.004 0.841 ± 0.005 0.875 ± 0.003 0.856 ± 0.004
P1 0.851 ± 0.002 0.835 ± 0.006 0.875 ± 0.002 0.858 ± 0.007
S0 0.822 ± 0.017 0.813 ± 0.022 0.843 ± 0.022 0.841 ± 0.045
S1 0.817 ± 0.011 0.810 ± 0.015 0.846 ± 0.024 0.852 ± 0.040
C0 0.816 ± 0.008 0.793 ± 0.007 0.835 ± 0.011 0.791 ± 0.016
C1 0.811 ± 0.007 0.793 ± 0.007 0.832 ± 0.008 0.789 ± 0.023
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Figure 5.1: The average scores of the experiments discussed in this chapter: static
categories (ns), fuzzy sets (fs) and binary subspaces (bin) compared
with the basic experiment (b).
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NS Experiment ns shows that there are hardly any significant differences com-
pared to the basic experiment. The discriminative success is about 1.5 %
higher with a significance of p = 0.0052. The parsimony and consistency
appears to be lower with a p-value of p = 0.0432 and p = 0.0354, respec-
tively. All other differences have no significance at all. So, although one
might expect larger differences they have not been observed. If there is a
function for shifting the categories it will be for increasing parsimony and
consistency, but this has not been observed with much certainty.
FS The results of the fs experiments show that, although there are more pos-
sible meanings, the discriminative success is lower than in the basic ex-
periment (p = 0.0000). The communicative success shows an insignifi-
cance difference (p = 0.1230). However, one run showed an exceptional
small communicative success, namely 0.23. When throwing away this run
(which is statistically valid) the average communicative success becomes
0.371± 0.025 which is different with a p-value of p = 0.0504. So, although
this looks better, it is hard to say whether the communicative success of
this experiment is better.
The distinctiveness is equal to the basic experiment. The specificity seems
to be higher than in the basic experiment and the consistency seems to be
lower, but these differences are insignificant (p = 0.2176 and p = 0.1230,
respectively). The parsimony however is slightly higher (0.02) with a sig-
nificance of p = 0.0008.
So, although the discriminative success is lower than in the basic experi-
ment, the fuzzy set approach does not appear to influence the quality of
the communication system that emerges.
BIN When examining the bin experiment, a first thing that strikes is the lower
discriminative success (p = 0.0004). This lower discriminative success is
because it increases slower (Figure 5.2 b). It finally increases to the same
level as in the basic experiment (see Figure 4.1 at page 109).
The communicative success stays well behind the communicative success
of the basic experiment (p = 0.0016). It is not directly clear why the com-
municative success is about 8.5 % lower. The communicative success ap-
pears to stop learning after 1,000 language games, although it seems to
increase slowly again after 4,000 games (Figure 5.2 a). The consistency is
about 0.025 lower than in the basic experiment (p = 0.0354), but parsi-
mony is ±0.005 higher (p = 0.0524). Because the p-values are relatively
high, it is difficult to assign meaning to these differences.
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Most significant difference is the distinctiveness, which is ±0.03 lower
with a significance of p = 0.0002. In contrast to previous plots that have
been shown the distinctiveness does not grow towards a value of 1, but
it stabilises around 0.97 (Figure 5.2 c). So, it seems that the meanings less
reliably refer to the corresponding referents, thus indicating more one-to-
many relations between a meaning and the referents. Specificity is higher
than in the basic experiment, indicating that polysemy is less. This observa-
tion, however, has a low significance: p = 0.1904. Hence lower distinctive-
ness might explain a lower communicative success, since a word-meaning
















































Figure 5.2: The evolution of the some measures for the binary subspace method.
5.1.3 Discussion
When the prototypes do not shift towards the central tendency as is the case
in experiment ns, the communication system that is developed is qualitatively
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about the same. So, in the current set up, the dynamics of categories does not
add any other functionality than possibly a more realistic model.
There is psychological and linguistic evidence that categories overlap making
way for a fuzzy approach to categorisation. An experiment has been done where
categories can overlap near their edges (or even near their centre when they are
very close to each other). The discriminative success is significantly worse than
in the basic experiment and the communicative success improves slightly but this
is not very significant. It was predicted that parsimony and consistency would
improve since the robots get a better chance to choose meanings or word-forms
more consistently. This however has only been observed for the parsimony; the
difference in consistency was insignificant.
The binary subspace method is performing worse than the basic set-up, which
is a bit surprising. The communicative success is lower than chance and the
discriminative success is lower than originally. The latter observation has much
to do with a slow start. If an agent has constructed a category at a particular
feature space in the prototype method, the agent can categorise every segment
at this layer and sensory channel. This is because a feature is categorised with
the category that is closest to the feature value. In the binary subspace method,
this is not the case because each category has a fixed size and a feature space Fλ
needs not to be covered completely with categories. Since a feature value must
be within the sensitivity of an existing category, a segment may not always be
categorised. At a later stage, the feature spaces are covered to a higher degree,
so the discriminative success increases towards the end.
The system’s distinctiveness is significantly different, but for the other mea-
sures parsimony, specificity and consistency the differences are much less signif-
icant or maybe not at all. So, in the binary subspace method more one-to-many
relations between referent and meaning emerge than in the prototype method.
5.2 Impact from physical conditions and interactions
In the basic experiment, the robots decided to stop after two rotations based on
finding a maximum intensity of infrared on the left back infrared sensor. An-
other method described is letting the robots align each other using infrared taxis
(Section 2.3). Besides longer experimental time (due to more error-prone phys-
ical behaviour), the taxis has no influence on the grounding process, since the
taxis is applied after the sensing. Two experiments are done where taxis is used
to align the robots. In the first experiment it was observed that the gearing of
the robots were worn off. In the second experiment the gearing were replaced
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by new ones. These experiments show how co-ordination abilities and physical
fitness may influence the quality of interactions.
In Steels & Vogt 1997 the robots did not rotate twice aligning back-to-back
while doing the sensing, but only once aligning face-to-face. This experiment
has been repeated to see what the differences are.
The adaptation of an agent to its environment and the agent’s ability to detect
the environment with enough precision is likely to be very important. In one
experiment the environment and robots are changed such that the resolution of
the robots’ sensing decreases.
In all the experiments so far there were constantly 4 light sources present in
the robots’ environment. What happens when in each situation there are only
3 light sources present, while the robots’ niche has 4 light sources? The last
experiment of this section investigates this.
5.2.1 The experiments
The experiments of this section all investigate the impact from physical inter-
actions and conditions on the robots’ ability to ground a lexicon. Again all the
experiments are variants of the basic experiment and hence implement the guess-
ing game. The following experiments are defined:
Worn-off gearing (WOG) In this experiment the gearing of the robots were com-
pletely worn-off. As a result the robots had difficulties in rotating during
the sensing task. Taxis is applied to re-align the robots after sensing.
New Gearing (NG) The robots in this experiment are equipped with brand new
gearing. Like in wog, taxis is applied to re-align the robots.
Acceleration (A) In the original implementation, the robots rotate only once start-
ing face-to-face (Steels & Vogt 1997) rather than rotating twice and start-
ing back-to-back. When the robots rotate once they immediately start the
sensing and first have to accelerate, thus the spatial view initially is some-
what warped. When rotating twice they start sensing when the rotating
robot faces its opponent. This way the robot is already moving at a con-
stant speed, whereas in the original implementation the robots first have
to accelerate.
Reducing distinctiveness (RD) In this experiment the difference in heights were
reduced to 1.9 cm instead of 3.9 cm. This way the environment is reduced.
Figure 5.3 shows the characteristics of the sensors asmeasured for different
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distances when facing a light source. It is obvious that the further a robot
gets away from the light source, the closer the different sensor readings are.
Furthermore, it should be clear that when the distance between robot and
light source is larger, correspondence between sensor and light source is
unreliable. Hence, the feedback mechanism is unreliable. Interesting to see
is that when the robot is close to the light source the non-corresponding
sensors hardly sense light, but the intensities increase up to 40 cm. This is
because at close distance the light source is invisible for these sensors and
at larger distance the divergent light emission falls on the sensors. Natu-
rally it is expected that the robots have more difficulty in discriminating
and identifying the light sources.
Dynamic environment (DE) In this experiment there were only three light sources
present in every recorded situation. The height of the light sources were
the same as in the basic experiment. After every few games, one of the light
sources was removed and the one that was already out of the environment
has been placed back. Whereas in the other experiments all light sources
stayed roughly at the same place, the position of the light sources changed
in this experiment as well. This way a dynamic environment was created.
5.2.2 The results
For all the experiments, different sensory data had to be recorded. Investigating
the sensory data revealed the statistics given in Table 5.3.
Looking at Table 5.3, one can already see some interesting results. The wog
experiment reveals highest potential understandability. It also has a context size
closer to 4 than in the other experiments. Apparently, the robots detect the four
referents better when they rotate slower.
The ng experiment reveals data similar to the basic experiment. This is not
surprising, since the only methodological difference with the basic experiment is
taxis, which should not influence the grounding. Moreover, the basic experiment
is recorded immediately after this experiment, so the physical condition of the
gearing were similar. Experiment a has lower understandability. Apparently
the warping during acceleration has some influence. rd has most influence on
the data. Although the context size is similar (and thus the a priori success),
the potential understandability is much lower. It seems there is more confusion.
Making the environment dynamic (de) has a logical consequence that the context
size is almost 3, making the a priori success±35%. The understandability is lower
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Figure 5.3: The characteristics of sensors s0, s1, s2 and s3 of robot r0while looking
at light sources (a) l0, (b) l1, (c) l2 and (d) l3. The light sources are
placed at heights with a difference of 1.9 cm in between. Note that
the characteristics of l3 may be inaccurate since the characteristics is
quite different from all other characteristics.
than in the basic experiment. So, how does the ontology and lexicon evolve in
these experiments? The results are shown in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.4: An overview of the results of the experiments presented in this sec-
tion. Experiments wog, ng, a, rd and de are compared with the basic
experiment (b).
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Table 5.2: The global averaged results of the experiments concerning physical
conditions and interactions.
B WOG NG
CS 0.351 ± 0.01 0.350 ± 0.00 0.379 ± 0.013
DS0 0.916 ± 0.00 0.945 ± 0.00 0.918 ± 0.003
DS1 0.920 ± 0.00 0.944 ± 0.00 0.917 ± 0.003
D0 0.956 ± 0.00 0.956 ± 0.00 0.959 ± 0.000
D1 0.955 ± 0.00 0.960 ± 0.00 0.960 ± 0.001
P0 0.852 ± 0.00 0.852 ± 0.00 0.864 ± 0.001
P1 0.851 ± 0.00 0.880 ± 0.00 0.858 ± 0.002
S0 0.822 ± 0.01 0.849 ± 0.00 0.837 ± 0.014
S1 0.817 ± 0.01 0.869 ± 0.01 0.824 ± 0.018
C0 0.816 ± 0.00 0.802 ± 0.00 0.803 ± 0.006
C1 0.811 ± 0.00 0.828 ± 0.00 0.794 ± 0.004
A RD DE
CS 0.331 ± 0.00 0.281 ± 0.00 0.372 ± 0.018
DS0 0.883 ± 0.00 0.913 ± 0.00 0.927 ± 0.005
DS1 0.891 ± 0.00 0.917 ± 0.00 0.932 ± 0.003
D0 0.957 ± 0.01 0.954 ± 0.00 0.959 ± 0.000
D1 0.956 ± 0.01 0.955 ± 0.00 0.958 ± 0.000
P0 0.861 ± 0.01 0.823 ± 0.00 0.858 ± 0.003
P1 0.855 ± 0.00 0.822 ± 0.00 0.847 ± 0.001
S0 0.826 ± 0.00 0.829 ± 0.01 0.807 ± 0.009
S1 0.823 ± 0.00 0.840 ± 0.01 0.812 ± 0.007
C0 0.818 ± 0.00 0.778 ± 0.00 0.814 ± 0.008
C1 0.809 ± 0.00 0.778 ± 0.00 0.812 ± 0.008
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Table 5.3: The statistics of the sensory data of the experiments investigating the
physical interactions and conditions. The columns display the experi-
ments (Exp), the number of situations recorded (#Sit), the context size
of robots r0 and r1 (⟨|Cxt|⟩r), the a priori success (aps) and the poten-
tial understandability of the two robots (Ur). The basic experiment (b)
is added for comparison.
Exp #Sit ⟨|Cxt|⟩r0 ⟨|Cxt|⟩r1 APS (%) Ur0 (%) Ur1 (%)
B 1017 3.33 3.54 29.1 81.1 78.0
WOG 606 3.64 3.83 26.8 89.7 82.4
NG 934 3.28 3.49 29.6 80.9 77.9
A 1360 3.55 3.35 29.0 72.2 76.4
RD 953 3.53 3.48 28.5 63.9 67.9
DE 980 2.86 2.90 34.7 75.7 73.8
Table 5.4: The results of the basic experiments using only 606 situations from the
basic data set.
Score Avg
CS 0.354 ± 0.016
DS0 0.794 ± 0.009
DS1 0.816 ± 0.008
D0 0.959 ± 0.000
D1 0.960 ± 0.001
P0 0.869 ± 0.004
P1 0.877 ± 0.002
S0 0.849 ± 0.019
S1 0.853 ± 0.007
C0 0.820 ± 0.014
C1 0.831 ± 0.014
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WOG Thewog experiment is in most ways similar to the basic experiment. Only
the discrimination game ismore successful (approximately 2 %, p = 0.0004).
Specificity is higher and consistency is lower, but their significance is low
(p = 0.1704 and p = 0.2798, respectively).
So, although the gearing of the robots were really at their ends, the com-
munication system that emerges is not worse than the basic experiment.
Question is if this result is biased by the fact that this data set only consists
of 606 situations rather than 1,000. Table 5.4 presents the results of the ba-
sic experiment using 606 situations taken from the basic data set used. The
table shows that using only 606 situations does not alter the results of the
basic experiment very much, so the smaller data set does not really bias
the experiment.
NG When the robots have new gearing, the communicative success is 2.8 % bet-
ter than the basic experiment. However, its significance is low (p = 0.1230).
It is also better than the taxis experiment with old gearing with a signif-
icance of p = 0.0752. The discriminative success is more or less equal
compared with the basic experiment and is ±2.5 % lower for the old gear-
ing (p = 0.0008). There are no significant differences when comparing the
distinctiveness, parsimony, specificity and consistency with experiments
b and wog. So, using new gearing does not influence the ability for the
robots to construct ground a language very much.
A The acceleration experiment seems to have little effect on the results. The
discriminative success is about 3 % lower, which is significant (p = 0.0000).
Also the communicative success is lower: 2 %, but with p = 0.0770. All
other differences are insignificant. So, the onset of acceleration cannot be
observed as an important difference.
RD Reducing the environmental distinctiveness has great impact on the lexicon
grounding. The communicative success is around the a priori value; its
significance in comparison to the basic experiment is p = 0.0000. The
discriminative success is similar to the basic experiment.
The distinctiveness seems approximately the same as in the basic experi-
ment, but its p-value is p = 0.0114, which is not very high. It seems likely
that the two experiments yield different distinctiveness, but its difference
is not large (≤ 0.002). Since the difference is so small, no further implica-
tions will be made.
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Besides the specificity which does not show a significant difference, the
parsimony and consistency (p = 0.0068 and p = 0.0028, respectively) are
significantly different and lower than in the basic experiment. Obviously
this has to with the large overlap in the sensory characteristics. Recall that
these results are difficult to interpret, since the method for evaluating the
feedback and thus the communicative success is unreliable due to the new
characteristics of the sensors.
DE When changing the environment dynamically, the communicative success
is about 2.5 % higher than the a priori value. It is about 2 % higher than
in the basic experiment, but this is not very significant (p = 0.0892). Dis-
tinctiveness, specificity, parsimony and consistency show no significant
difference with the basic experiment. Discriminative success looks higher
than in the basic experiment, but its significance is low: p = 0.0630.
5.2.3 Discussion
Clearly, the quality of the physical behaviour influences the lexicon grounding.
This is best illustrated by the fact that the potential understandability in most
experiments is only around 80 %. However, it is difficult to investigate the impact
structurally when the physical behaviour of the robots are difficult to control.
This is because the robots physically behave reactively.
For example experiments wog and ng are qualitatively more or less similar
to the basic experiment. Differences in discrimination success in the taxis ex-
periment with old gearing may lie in the fact that this was the first experiment
after the sensors have been calibrated. It is not unlikely that the accuracy of the
sensors becomes less reliable through time.
The experiment where the robots rotate only once (a) and where there are only
three referents present (de) are also qualitatively similar as the basic experiment.
So, the slow onset of movement has little impact on the robots performance in
these experiments. Furthermore, the robots seem to be well capable of dealing
with a dynamic environment. Although the a priori success is higher, the robots
appear to perform as if there are four referents. All these experiments show that
the data recording can be repeated without influencing the experiments very
much.
When the environment is changed such that it is less distinctive, the perfor-
mance is significantly worse than the basic experiment. Surprisingly this does
not hold for the discrimination success. It seems to have more impact on the abil-
ity to provide reliable feedback. However, the results might indicate the impor-
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tance of agents’ physical adaptation to their environment as a basis for language
origins.
Physical interactions are also a part of how joint attention and feedback can
be provided to the agents. However, these processes additionally require cog-
nitive capabilities. Experiments investigating the influence of these interaction
strategies are presented in the next section.
5.3 Different language games
This section investigates the impact from joint attention and feedback on the lexi-
con formation. The non-linguistic information used by human language learners
is very much debated in the literature (see e.g. Bowerman 1988; Barrett 1995). The
experiments presented here will show that the availability of joint attention and
feedback has much influence on the grounding process. The games investigated
are the guessing, ostensive, observational and xsl game.
5.3.1 The experiments
The four different language games have been introduced in Section 3.4.3. The
properties of the four different language games are summarised in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: A schematic overview of the experiments discussed in this section. The
table gives the properties of the different language games.
Exp Game Joint attention Feedback
ii ostensive Yes Yes
xi guessing No Yes
ix observational Yes No
xx XSL No No
Note that the guessing game (experiment xi) is the basic experiment. All ex-
periments use the basic data set as sensory data, i.e., the same sensory data that
has been used in the basic experiment and most other experiments.
5.3.2 The results
In the experiments where no feedback is used, the communicative success is
different than the actual success. Therefore the results (Figure 5.5 and Table 5.6)
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employ the actual success for the first time. From the actual success, it becomes
clear that the xsl game xx does not work. Although the other measures have
similar values as the guessing, the actual success is 5 % lower than the a priori
success and about 11 % lower than the basic experiment (p = 0.0000).
Table 5.6: The experimental results of the xsl game (xx), the guessing game (xi),
the ostensive game (ii) and the observational game (ix).
xx xi ii ix
CS 0.818 ± 0.006 0.351 ± 0.010 0.671 ± 0.004 0.847 ± 0.003
AS 0.241 ± 0.008 0.351 ± 0.010 0.671 ± 0.004 0.667 ± 0.003
DS0 0.912 ± 0.004 0.916 ± 0.004 0.935 ± 0.002 0.937 ± 0.001
DS1 0.915 ± 0.005 0.920 ± 0.004 0.936 ± 0.002 0.941 ± 0.004
D0 0.959 ± 0.000 0.956 ± 0.002 0.959 ± 0.000 0.960 ± 0.000
D1 0.958 ± 0.000 0.955 ± 0.002 0.960 ± 0.000 0.960 ± 0.001
P0 0.866 ± 0.002 0.852 ± 0.004 0.856 ± 0.001 0.858 ± 0.002
P1 0.860 ± 0.003 0.851 ± 0.002 0.851 ± 0.002 0.851 ± 0.000
S0 0.808 ± 0.031 0.822 ± 0.017 0.647 ± 0.046 0.684 ± 0.144
S1 0.810 ± 0.031 0.817 ± 0.011 0.647 ± 0.045 0.688 ± 0.132
C0 0.814 ± 0.005 0.816 ± 0.008 0.823 ± 0.037 0.772 ± 0.117
C1 0.812 ± 0.005 0.811 ± 0.007 0.821 ± 0.026 0.787 ± 0.099
The ostensive game and the observational game appear to be much better than
the guessing game. This increase in performance is measured by the actual suc-
cess,1 which is almost 30 % (!) better (p = 0.0000). However, the specificity is
much lower: 0.18 for experiment ii and 0.14 in ix (p = 0.0000). This low specificity
indicates that the lexicon is not stable and it must bear much polysemy.
The difference in consistency of the observational game is insignificant (p > 1).
The consistency of ii is hardly different than the basic experiment. Note that
the standard deviations of experiment ix is about 0.1 for both the specificity as
the consistency. The results of the experiments vary a lot from run to run. The
worst run has a consistency of 0.401, whereas the best one has 0.856. The basic
experiment had all its values in between and a standard deviation of 0.007. Similar
1 The communicative success of the observational game is much higher because this is measured
when both robots ‘think’ they are successful. This happens when both robots identified a form-
meaning association consistent with their categorisation. It is independent of whether both
robots referred to the same referent.
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Figure 5.5: Results of experimenting with the different types of language games.
Note that the first plot (a) shows the actual success, while the commu-
nicative success is plotted in the last Figure (f).
findings are also valid for ii that has standard deviation of about 0.05 for the
specificity and 0.03 for consistency.
The discriminative success of ix and ii is slightly higher than the basic exper-
iment (p = 0.0000), but this has to do with the higher communicative success,
which influence the discriminative success. The differences of D and P are both
small and insignificant.
5.3.3 Discussion
When looking at the results, some important observations can be made. A lan-
guage game needs some extra-linguistic information. As expected, no effective
lexicon gets off the ground in the xsl game.
It seems that a more informative lexicon emerges in the guessing game. It
is more informative because the specificity and consistency are higher than in
the ostensive and observational game. More information seems to have a cost
in these experiments, namely a lower actual success. The actual success of the
games that incorporate joint attention, on the other hand, is high. This also has
a cost, namely a lower specificity.
To understand why the experiments that use joint attention have higher actual
success and lower specificity (and to some extend consistency), it is instructive
to look at an example: Suppose a robot has a (part of a) lexicon as in Figure 5.6. If
the robot is a speaker and r1 is the topic, it would select f2 as the utterance inde-
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Figure 5.6: The semiotic landscape of one agent in the example that is described
in the text.
pendent of the type of game.2 If r2 is the topic, it would also select f2. Remember
that the robots select the associations that have highest scores.
Suppose that this robot is a hearer, and it hears f2. If the robot plays a guessing
game, it would select m1 and consequently r1 will be its topic. If however, the
speaker intended to name r2, the game is a failure; there is amismatch in referent.
The score σM1F2 between m1 and f2 is decreased.
But now suppose that the robot plays observational or ostensive games. If the
speaker’s topic is r2, the hearer will also have r2 as its topic, conform the joint
attention principle. If the hearer now hears f2, it will select m2 as its meaning
(since this categorises the only potential topic) and the language game is a suc-
cess. Not only communicative, but also actual. Now the scores are adapted as
follows: σM2F2 is increased and σM1F2 is decreased.
If such games will continue for a while, there will ideally emerge a preference
where r2 is named with f2 and r1 with f1. But if, at some point before this
happens, the robot is again the speaker and it chooses to name r1, it will still
choose f2 to name m1. If a guessing game is played, there is a reasonable chance
that the game ends in failure. The hearer (i.e. the other robot not shown in the
figure) will have a similar but not equal competition of association scores and
it might already be at the point where f2 will preferably be interpreted with
meanings categorising r2. So, the speaker will decrease σM1F2. When, on the
other hand, an observational game is played, and the robot names r1 with f2, it
is very likely that the game will end in success. This is because the hearer knows
what the topic is. So, if it as an association where f2 relates to some meaning
m which categorises r1, the game is a success. As a consequence the association
2 Remember that the guessing game is compared with both the ostensive and observational
game, since what is important is the joint attention.
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score σM2F2 of the speaker increases again, whereas competing association scores
decrease. The attempt to disambiguate f2 in favour of r2 has to start again.
This way the observational game allows more polysemy, yielding lower speci-
ficity. The same argument holds for the ostensive game. Since the robots easily
establish actual success this way, the actual success is relatively high. So, it seems
that establishing joint attention decreases the pressure to exploit the complete
space of possibilities during selection. This is not surprising since joint attention
makes linguistic communication redundant.
5.4 The observational game
In Section 5.3, an experiment with the observational game has been presented.
It has been observed and explained that the specificity is low. So, the lexicon is
unstable and allows much referential polysemy and some synonymy. But since
the actual success is high, it is interesting to see whether it is possible to achieve
good results for specificity and consistency as well.
While looking for working implementations it also has been found that lateral
inhibition is a crucial source of lexicon development. This is conform with the
findings of Oliphant (1997), Steels (1999), de Jong (2000) and Kaplan (2000). To
investigate this a variant of the observational game of the previous section is
presented in which lateral inhibition is absent.
5.4.1 The experiments
The experiments are compared with the observational game.
Creation probability ixp In all experiments up to now, the word-form creation
probability has been Ps = 0.02. In this experiment Ps = 0.4. This way
the speaker is less modest in inventing new word-forms when it cannot
produce an utterance.
Lateral inhibition ixli In this experiment lateral inhibition of the association scores
is not used. So, when an observational game is considered successful by
the robots, only the “winning” association score is increased. All other
scores are unaltered. For the rest this experiment is equal to experiment
ix.
145
5 Varying methods and parameters
5.4.2 The results
The results are presented in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.7, where experiments ixp and
ixli are compared with the observational game (ix) presented in Section 5.3.
Table 5.7: The results of the variants of the observational game.
ix ixp ixli
CS 0.847 ± 0.003 0.827 ± 0.005 0.830 ± 0.001
AS 0.667 ± 0.003 0.657 ± 0.005 0.651 ± 0.002
DS0 0.937 ± 0.001 0.960 ± 0.001 0.937 ± 0.003
DS1 0.941 ± 0.004 0.963 ± 0.001 0.936 ± 0.003
D0 0.960 ± 0.000 0.960 ± 0.000 0.960 ± 0.001
D1 0.960 ± 0.001 0.961 ± 0.001 0.961 ± 0.000
P0 0.858 ± 0.002 0.853 ± 0.001 0.830 ± 0.001
P1 0.851 ± 0.000 0.848 ± 0.001 0.827 ± 0.000
S0 0.684 ± 0.144 0.927 ± 0.002 0.617 ± 0.094
S1 0.688 ± 0.132 0.927 ± 0.002 0.622 ± 0.095
C0 0.772 ± 0.117 0.838 ± 0.003 0.709 ± 0.114
C1 0.787 ± 0.099 0.839 ± 0.003 0.707 ± 0.112
For experiment ixp the communicative success and actual success are more
or less similar as in the experiment of the previous section, and so are the dis-
tinctiveness and parsimony. The difference in consistency is not very significant
(p = 0.1432). The discriminative success is about 2.5 % higher when Ps = 0.4
(p = 0.0000). However, this is an artefact of the method for calculating the dis-
criminative success. Because the speaker invents forms more often, the hearer
plays discrimination games more often. Recall that the hearer only categorises
when it receives an utterance. Since the discriminative success is a function of
language games rather than of the discrimination games, the discriminative suc-
cess is higher.
More important for experiment ixp is the increase of specificity by 0.24 (p =
0.0000). Apparently the system reduces polysemy when Ps is higher. This is
nicely shown by the form-referent competition diagrams of the two experiments
(Figure 5.8). These diagrams show the competition for a word-form that is used
very frequently in both experiments. The two diagrams clearly show the differ-
ence between experiment ix and ixp. The word-form of experiment ix is used for
all four referents almost equally often. The word-form displayed for ixp clearly
evolves to name l0 pretty stable and specific.
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Figure 5.8: The form-referent competitions of experiments ix (preceding section)
and ixp for some form.
In the experiment where lateral inhibition is absent, most measures are also
similar to ix from the previous section. However, both specificity and coherence
is lower than in experiment ix. Hence when there is no lateral inhibition, more
polysemy and synonymy emerges in the system.
5.4.3 Discussion
When the creation probability is higher, specificity is also higher. This can be
explained as follows: When Ps is low, and the speaker cannot name some mean-
ing, the probability is high that it will not invent a new word-form. This leaves
the meaning unassociated, which increases the likelihood that the meaning will
be associated with an already existing word-form. This may happen in a later
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game by means of word-form adoption when the robot is the hearer. This way
the word-form increases its amount of one-to-many mappings and apparently
its polysemy as well. When the Ps is higher, this effect is less, thus increasing the
specificity.
It is interesting to note that the high average actual success is likely to be
mainly caused by the joint attention mechanism and the easiness of establish-
ing communicative success when joint attention is used. Note that, like in the
ostensive game, joint attention makes the linguistic communication redundant.
The ostensive game does not differ very much from the observational game. The
feedback that it provides is more or less the same information that is provided
by the joint attention mechanism.
Recall that the potential understandability is approximately 79 %. When multi-
plying this value with the average communicative success of approximately 83 %,
this yields 66 %, which corresponds nicely to the average actual success. So, it
appears that the difference between communicative success and actual success
is caused by the inability of the robots to construct a coherent context as ex-
plained in Chapter 3. This indicates that there are still other mechanisms that
are responsible for the imperfect communication.
The observational game is inspired by the experiments done by Mike Oliphant
(1997; 1998; 1999), although they are not exactly the same. A big first difference
is inherent on the use of robots.
Oliphant’s agents have access to both the signal and the meaning of it during a
language game, which he calls observation. The learning mechanism tries to con-
verge an ideal communication system based on the word-meaning associations.
This is also done in our experiments. However, the robots have, in principle, no
access to the meaning of a signal other than to its referent. Another difference
is in the learning algorithm (or the update of the scores). Where Oliphant uses
Hebbian and Bayesian learning (among others), a different update rule is used
here.
It is clear that the robots can ground a reasonable communication system with
a reasonable success without the availability of feedback. However, this only
works when joint attention is established and the word-form creation rate is suf-
ficiently high. This confirms the work of Mike Oliphant (1997) and Edwin de Jong
(2000). De Jong also showed in simulations that the naming game needs no feed-
back on the effect of a game. Like Oliphant (1997), Luc Steels (1999) and Frédéric
Kaplan (2000), De Jong argues that lateral inhibition is an essential ingredient
for success. The experiment without lateral inhibition again confirmed this find-
ing. Without lateral inhibition all competing associations can be strengthened
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in successful games. So, the competition between form-meaning associations is
less effective. It is left as an exercise for the reader to invent an example.
5.5 Word-form creation
As has been observed in Section 5.4.1, the word-form creation probability Ps may
have an enormous impact on the lexicon formation. In the basic experiment
Ps = 0.02, which is a setting based upon earlier experiments (Vogt 1998b). In this
section, the influence of the word-form creation probability is investigated more
structurally.
5.5.1 The experiments
The creation probability is varied over 11 experiments. Ps is varied from 0.0 to 1.0
with intermediate steps of 0.1. The experiments further implement the guessing
game and is therefore a variant of the basic experiment.
5.5.2 The results
The results are shown in Figure 5.9. It is trivial that communicative success, speci-
ficity, distinctiveness, consistency and parsimony are 0 when Ps = 0. When no
word-forms are created, no communication can take place. All mentioned mea-
sures are only calculated when linguistic communication can take place. The
discriminative success is approximately 50 % because only the speaker now per-
forms a discrimination game and the discriminative success is calculated as an
average discriminative success per language game. Since the robots can in prin-
ciple discriminate almost perfectly (see Figure 4.3, page 112), the discriminative
success is almost 50 %.
Figure 5.9 shows that there is hardly any difference in the experiments when Ps
is varied between 0.1 and 1. The discriminative success and specificity are slightly
increasing, as it appears monotonically. The communicative success also seems
to be increasing, but it also shows some local minima and maxima. It seems that
when Ps = 0.9, the communicative success is highest, but when Ps = 0.4, the
communicative success is second best. There does not seem to be a relation: dis-
tinctiveness, consistency and parsimony seem to be indifferent for the variation
of Ps.
When 0.1 ≤ Ps ≤ 1.0, then the system outperforms the basic experiment.
Although distinctiveness, parsimony and consistency are more or less the same

































































Figure 5.9: The results of a series experiments where creation probability Ps is
varied from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.1.
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discriminative success is 4 % higher and specificity is approximately 0.09 higher.
All these differences are significant (p = 0.0000).
It is interesting now to see how the number of words grow in the communica-
tion system. Figure 5.10 shows the growth of the number of word-forms that are
used successfully in the experiments. It is clear that the number of word-forms
grows faster when the creation probability increases. Recall that the number of
word-forms in the basic experiment grew to only 8 word-forms. When Ps = 0.1
this already increases to 25 word-forms, and when Ps = 1.0 there emerge more
than 80 word-forms. As a comparison, the basic experiment finished with 12































Figure 5.10: The lexicon growth for different values of the creation probability Ps,
which is varied from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.1.
5.5.3 Discussion
The small differences between the results when Ps = 00.1 and Ps = 1.0 has also
been observed in simulations on the naming game (Kaplan 2000).
From Figure 5.10 it can be inferred that the rate of synonymy thus increases
very much, although this is not obvious from the consistency.3 However, the
robots do significantly better in learning to commentate than when Ps = 0.02
3 Recall that consistency is weighted over the frequency of occurrences of referent-word-form
pairs.
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as in the basic experiment. This may be a side effect of the fact the agents op-
timise their lexicons for word-meaning associations rather than word-referent
associations. When there are more word-forms, there is less need for many-to-
many relations at the form-meaning level. But due to the fact that there is a high
level of one-to-many relations between referent and meaning, synonymy is also
relatively high.
As also observed in Section 5.4, the specificity is higher when Ps is higher.
This is not surprising, since there are more word-forms to name the different
meanings, thus decreasing the level of one-to-many relations between form and
meaning. And since the different meanings are distinctive to a high degree, these
word-forms refer to a unique referent more and more. A higher creation proba-
bility also yields a higher communicative success. The cost however of a higher
creation probability is that there are more word-forms to name the same number
of referents.
5.6 Varying the learning rate
The adaptation scores are adapted using a walking average. These scores are
adapted for the category scores ν, the effectiveness scores ρ and the association
scores σ (Chapter 3). The formula by which the scores s are adapted is repeated
here for clarity:
s = η · s′ + (1− η) · X(5.1)
where η is the learning rate and X is the success factor. The type of score is
dependent on the game being played and so is X. This equation is used to update
category, effectiveness and association scores.
In the basic experiment, the learning rate has been set to η = 0.99. This score
has been chosen to be this value based upon early experiments, which was before
the current implementation has been finished. What would happen if η is varied.
5.6.1 The experiments
The experiments implement the guessing game. The learning rate η is varied
from 0.0 to 1.0 with steps of 0.1.
5.6.2 The results
Figure 5.13 shows the results of these experiments. The experiments where η = 0
and η = 1 perform very poor, poorer than in the basic experiment (p = 0.0000
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in both cases). If η = 0, the scores are completely dependent from the previous
language gamewhere the element is used. When η = 1 the scores are not updated
at all. Obviously, the robots cannot learn the communication system properly
taking only the last game into account. Neither can it be learned when the scores
are not updated. The communicative success when η = 1 is about 5 % lower than
when η = 0 (p = 0.0000). So, taking only the last game into account is better than
doing nothing. Figure 5.11 shows that these communication systems no longer
learn after game 500. That some games are successful is caused by the fact that
form-meaning associations do get formed as normal and the rest is more or less
coincidence.
When η = 0.1, the communicative success is higher than in the basic experi-
ment (p = 0.0000), but it is lower than when 0.2 ≤ η ≤ 0.9 (p = 0.0000 when
compared to η = 0.2). Furthermore, in this experiment the discriminative suc-
cess and specificity are lower than when 0.2 ≤ η ≤ 0.9 (again p = 0.0000 when
compared to η = 0.2). However, Figure 5.12 shows that the communication is
learned when η = 0.1 as well as when η = 0.2. It only takes longer, so the global
averages are lower. Strangely enough the discriminative success and specificity
are also lower when η = 0.1 than when η = 0.0.It is not understood why this is
the case.
Figure 5.13 (a) shows that when 0.2 ≤ η ≤ 0.9 the communicative success
seems to be increasing slightly. Differences, however are hardly significant.
When comparing the case where η = 0.2 with η = 0.9, the difference has a


























(b) η = 1
Figure 5.11: The evolution of the communicative success when (a) η = 0 and (b)
η = 1. It is clear that the communication system is not learned.
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(f) DS (η = 0.2)
Figure 5.12: Comparing the communicative success, specificity and discrimina-
tive success in the cases where η = 0.1 and η = 0.2.
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Figure 5.13: The results of a series of experiments where the learning rate η has




The results showed that a successful lexicon cannot be learned when the scores
are not adapted. Neither can it be learned when the memory of a past interaction
lasts only one re-occurrence of the association.
It is surprising that the system develops more or less equally well when η =
0.2 than when η = 0.9. In the first case the last few interactions have much
more influence on the selection than the complete history of interactions. When
η = 0.9 the vice versa is true. It is not clear why this is the case.
The results of this section show that the difference between the weight with
which past success influences the experiment is high. When the learning rate
η varies between 0.1 and 0.9, the success of the language games is higher than
when η = 0.99. In that case the system is too much based on the past and as a
result the system learns too slowly.
5.7 Word-form adoption
In the basic experiment the hearer only has to adopt a new word-form when it
cannot find a matching form-meaning association. This happens when either the
form is unknown to the hearer or when its meaning(s) do not match a distinctive
category of a possible topic. In the Talking Heads, a word-form may also be
adopted when there is a mismatch in referent (Steels 1999), i.e., when the hearer
did find a matching form-meaning, but the thus identified topic does not cohere
with the speaker’s topic. Intuitively, this strategy seems to be beneficial. If the
hearer misinterprets the speaker, it should learn what the speaker meant.
5.7.1 The experiments
Three experiments are done that investigate the impact from the extraword-form
adoption. All experiments implement the guessing game. It differs from the basic
experiment in that the uttered word-form is adopted by the hearer when the
language game ends in a mismatch in referent. In that case the hearer identifies
a topic. How this topic is selected is subject to variation. If this topic is not the
same as the hearer identified before, the word-form is adopted according to the
rules explained in Section 3.4.3.
The three experiments vary in the way the topic is selected:
Random (R) The topic is selected at random, like is the case when the hearer
adopts a word-form in the basic experiment.
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Correspondence (T) The topic is identified via the correspondence criterion, like
is done when joint attention is established. This is only done when there
is a mismatch in referent.
Double correspondence (TT) Like in experiment t, but now the hearer uses the
correspondence criterion every time it adopts a word-form. This is conform
with the Talking Heads (Steels 1999).
5.7.2 The results
The results in Table 5.8 and Figure 5.14 show that the communicative success is 5
to 6 % higher than in the basic experiment. These differences are significant with
p-values of p = 0.0040, p = 0.0188 and p = 0.0400 for r, t and tt, respectively.4
In all cases the discriminative success is about 3 % higher with a significance of
p = 0.0000 for all experiments.
Table 5.8: The results of the experiment where the robots also adopt word-forms
in case of a mismatch in the language game. In experiment r the
hearer’s new topic is selected at random. Topic information is used
in experiments t (only in case of mismatch) and tt (any time).
R T TT
CS 0.416 ± 0.051 0.415 ± 0.014 0.398 ± 0.004
DS0 0.958 ± 0.001 0.953 ± 0.002 0.957 ± 0.001
DS1 0.958 ± 0.002 0.953 ± 0.002 0.959 ± 0.002
D0 0.960 ± 0.000 0.956 ± 0.001 0.959 ± 0.000
D1 0.960 ± 0.000 0.956 ± 0.002 0.960 ± 0.000
P0 0.837 ± 0.001 0.826 ± 0.003 0.831 ± 0.001
P1 0.836 ± 0.002 0.825 ± 0.004 0.828 ± 0.001
S0 0.705 ± 0.075 0.660 ± 0.062 0.669 ± 0.023
S1 0.711 ± 0.071 0.659 ± 0.063 0.683 ± 0.016
C0 0.825 ± 0.025 0.833 ± 0.007 0.825 ± 0.013
C1 0.825 ± 0.023 0.834 ± 0.010 0.838 ± 0.016
Consistency is about 0.01 higher, but these results are insignificant. Distinc-
tiveness is nearly the same as in the basic experiment. The parsimony is approx-
imately 0.02 lower; differences with significance of p = 0.0000, p = 0.0504 and
4 Note that only 9 runs of 5,000 language games have been run in experiment tt.
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p = 0.0400 for r, t and tt, respectively. The specificity is 0.10 to 0.17 points
lower (p = 0.0004, p = 0.0078 and p = 0.0000, respectively). Although the com-
municative success increases in comparison to the basic experiment, the cost
appears to be a higher level of referential polysemy. This is not really a surprise,
since the robots now construct more form-meaning associations with already
existing word-forms. Thus representational polysemy increases, and apparently
also the referential polysemy.
The above comparisons are made in contrast to the basic experiment. When
comparing the results with each other, the differences have a significance with
p-values that are higher than p = 0.4894. Hence no significant differences are
observed.
5.7.3 Discussion
According the communicative success, the results improve when the hearer uses
more opportunities to adopt existing word-forms. However, this strategy has
a negative side effect. As word-forms are adopted when there is a mismatch
in referent, this means that the hearer already had a lexical entry with this form.
Hence the level of representational polysemy increases. In turn this increases the
chance for referential polysemywhen the different meanings categorise different
referents.
Remains the question which experiment has performed best. Intuitively, one
would say tt, then t and finally r. However, the results indicate otherwise. But
since the observed differences are insignificant, no such conclusions can and
shall be made. In more complex environments it is not unlikely that the (halfway)
random strategies (r and t) will fail.
5.8 Summary
Starting from the basic experiment introduced in Chapter 4, this chapter has
been used to investigate different interaction and learning strategies as variations
on the basic experiment. Some variations have not shown much difference in
performance whereas others have.
In Section 5.1 the influence of different categorisation schemes have been intro-
duced and it appeared that the scheme applied in the basic experiment worked
more or less the best. This categorisation scheme will be used in this chapter.
Varying physical interaction schemes on the robots contributed mainly in stra-
tegies that had negative influence on the performance (Section 5.2). Although the
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significance was small, the case where taxis has been applied when the robots
had new gearing appeared to be best.
In Section 5.3 the influence of joint attention and feedback has been explored.
It appeared that when joint attention was applied the success rate increased enor-
mously. However, the cost was a lower specificity.
When investigating the observational game inmore detail, the specificity could
improve under a higher word-form creation probability Ps. This latter finding has
also been observed when the creation probability has been varied in the guessing
game (Section 5.5). It appeared that the previously used probability of Ps = 0.02
was much too low. When this parameter varied between 0.1 and 1.0, not many
differences are found in the success, but the lexicon grows drastically when Ps is
high.
Like the creation probability, the learning rate η has been investigated on its
impact. The experiments revealed that the adaptation of scores is crucial. Fur-
thermore, the scores should be adapted fast enough (the initial value of η = 0.99
was much too slow), but not too fast.
Besides varying the mentioned parameters, three different word-form adop-
tion schemes have been investigated. When the hearer is allowed to adopt the
speaker’s utterance when the hearer misinterpreted the utterance (i.e. when the
hearer’s topic referred to a different light source than the speaker’s topic), the
results were observed to work best. The topic with which the utterance may be
adopted can be selected at random or by the criterion of correspondence.
Naturally, more parameters and methods could be investigated. Some of these
variations have been investigated, but did not reveal interesting results and have
been left out this book for clarity. For additional analyses of parameters and




6 The optimal games
In the previous chapters various aspects of the different language games have
been investigated. Chapter 4 introduced the basic experiment. Variations that
have been investigated in Chapter 5 indicated some possible improvements on
the basic model. This chapter combines some proposed improvements in the
most interesting language games: the guessing game and the observational game.
The first set of experiments that will be investigated involves the guessing
game. Although not most successful at first sight, the guessing game scenario is
an important scenario that is also applied in the Talking Heads experiment. To
enable a fruitful discussion with the Talking Heads experiments, this scenario
is investigated first and in most detail. This experiment is investigated in Sec-
tion 6.1.
The observational language game is explored as a second experiment in Sec-
tion 6.2. The results of this experiment in Chapter 5 were very promising, and it
is possibly a very common strategy in language development.
Instead of doing 10 runs of 5,000 language games, each experiment is done
with 10 runs of 10,000 language games. This will make it harder to compare these
experiments with previous experiments. On the other hand the resulting systems
can be investigated more reliably, because many systems were still learning after
5,000 games.
6.1 The guessing game
6.1.1 The experiments
The two experiments presented in this section implement the guessing game. The
basic experiment has been optimised by changing the following strategies and
parameters:
• The categorisation is unaltered, i.e., the prototype method is used, because
no drastic improvements have been observed in the other methods and the
implemented method is relatively fast.
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• The physical interaction is improved by applying newgearing on the robots.
Although the differences were not very significant, the results were better
than the basic data set.
• The creation probability is set to Ps = 0.4 in one experiment (P.4) and
Ps = 0.1 in another (P.1), because these values revealed most promising
results in Section 5.5.
• Learning rate η is set to η−0.9, a value that holds a relatively long history
of interactions and allows sufficiently fast learning.
• Word-forms are adopted under all proposed circumstances, i.e., when novel
word-forms are encountered, or the matching meaning does not match the
relevant topic. The topic with which the form is adopted is selected at ran-
dom, since no overt differences have been observed in the experiments of
Section 5.7.
The differences are summarised in Table 6.1. Instead of 10 runs of 5,000 games,
10 runs of 10,000 games are played. The two experiments of this section are now
defined as above with the two variants:
P.1 Word-form creation probability Ps = 0.1.
P.4 Word-form creation probability Ps = 0.4.
Table 6.1: The set-up of the optimal guessing game.
Type of change Value
Data-set new gearing




The experiments are done with 10 runs of 10,000 guessing games. Figures 6.1 and
6.2 show the evolution of the qualitative measures and the averaged results of
both experiments are shown in Table 6.2. The two experiments are qualitatively
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very much the same. Only the specificity differs from each other significantly
p = 0.0000. The specificity in experiment P.1 is 0.075 higher as in the basic
experiment (p = 0.0000). In P.4 the specificity is even 0.12 higher. As discussed
in the previous chapter, the higher specificity has to do with the higher Ps. When
comparing the evolutions of the specificity in Figures 6.1 (c) and 6.2 (c), it is clear
that the specificity in experiment P.1 is still increasing towards the end. So the
difference becomes less near the end.
Clearly, the communicative success approaches the potential understandabil-
ity of 80 % in both experiments. After 10,000 games, the csis approximately 75 %
on the average. The discriminative success is on the average about 97 %, thus
approaching 100 % at the end of the experiment. On the average the distinctive-
ness is about 0.02 higher than in the basic experiment. Parsimony is only a little
higher than in the basic experiment (0.861 vs. 0.851). Consistency is about 0.045
higher than in the basic experiment. All these differences have a significance of
p = 0.0000.
Table 6.2: The averaged results of the optimal guessing game experiment.
Score P.1 P.4
CS 0.624 ± 0.008 0.628 ± 0.001
DS0 0.972 ± 0.001 0.976 ± 0.001
DS1 0.972 ± 0.001 0.977 ± 0.001
D0 0.979 ± 0.000 0.979 ± 0.000
D1 0.979 ± 0.000 0.979 ± 0.000
P0 0.864 ± 0.001 0.864 ± 0.001
P1 0.859 ± 0.000 0.859 ± 0.000
S0 0.898 ± 0.005 0.941 ± 0.002
S1 0.894 ± 0.005 0.940 ± 0.003
C0 0.860 ± 0.001 0.860 ± 0.002
C1 0.857 ± 0.002 0.860 ± 0.001
So, the system finally becomes very good in constructing a lexicon by which
the robots can communicate about the things they detect in their environment.
The run that will be discussed in more detail below resulted in the lexicon that
is displayed in the semiotic landscape shown in Figure 6.3 and is taken from ex-
periment P.1. This figure shows the connections with a strength that represents
the frequency of connections that are successfully used. Ideally, the connections
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Figure 6.1: The evolution of the optimal guessing game experiment P.1.
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Figure 6.2: The evolution of the optimal guessing game experiment P.4.
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between referent-form-referent would be orthogonal, i.e., the couplings of a ref-
erent and its form should not cross-connect with other referents.
sema tyfo demiluvumety katezigi
sema tyfo demiluvumety katezigi
L0 L1 L2 L3
L0 L1 L2 L3
M-3 M-5 M-10 M-15 M-19 M-76 M-85 M-24 M-29 M-36 M-70 M-37 M-42 M-45 M-49 M-72 M-74 M-33 M-50





Figure 6.3: The semiotic landscape of the optimal experiment with Ps = 0.1.
This orthogonality criterion is achieved for mety, luvu and possibly zigi. The
word-forms kate and demi have cross-connections, but these are relatively unim-
portant because they have low frequencies. More referential polysemy is found
for sema and tyfo. As will be shown in the discussion, tyfo gets well established
to name l1 almost unambiguously. sema however, provides some instability in
the system.
Comparing this landscape with that of the basic experiment (Figure 4.8 at page
121), the system shows more orthogonality and there are less word-forms. l0
and l2 have synonymous connections, but these are not a big problem, since the
different forms are most frequently used to name one referent, i.e., they show
low polysemy.
One important result of experiment P.1 is that the number of word-forms the
agents use successfully in the language is much lower than in P.4. The robots
used 16 word-forms successfully at the end vs. 34 in P.4 (Figure 6.4 (a), solid lower
line). Furthermore, the number of word-forms does not grow after approximately
3,500 games, whereas the vocabulary size increases until the end when Ps = 0.4.
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The number of word-forms that have been created by the robots is only slightly
above the number of word-forms that have been successfully used. Apparently










































Figure 6.4: The vocabulary and ontological growth of experiments with P.1 and
P.4. The growth is shown for successful usage (indicated with cs) and
just those elements that are used. The concepts that are just used are
those that have found to be distinctive.
The one-to-many relations between form and meaning of both systems is high
as can be derived from Figure 6.4. Figure 6.4 (b) shows the ontological growth
of categories that are distinctive and of those that are successfully used in the
communication (as indicated by “(cs)”) for creation probabilities Ps = 0.1 and
Ps = 0.4. The total numbers of distinctive categories that the agents categorised
are ranging from 2,600 for P.1 and 3,100 for P.4. The number of meanings (cat-
egories that are used in communication) they successfully use is around 500,
which is substantially lower than the number of concepts that could be used.
So, the number of successfully employed concepts is roughly 15 times higher
than the word-forms that are used when Ps = 0.4 and it is 31 times higher when
Ps = 0.1. It appears that in case when the creation probability is lower, the robots
have more time to associate existing word-forms with meanings rather than to
create new ones. This way the amount one-to-many relations between form and
meaning increases as a possibly beneficial side effect. The cost of this is that there
appears to be a higher level of polysemy. To see whether this is problematic, it is
instructive to look at the various competition diagrams of experiment P.1. This
is done in the discussion that follows.
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6.1.3 Discussion
The results make clear that with the current settings and strategies, the robots
construct a communication system that meets its limits. The communicative suc-
cess is in the end nearly as high as the potential understandability.
Both the discriminative success and distinctiveness are very close to 1, and the
specificity is also close to 1. When a robot uses a symbol successfully, it almost
always refers to the same referent. The polysemy is very low. The parsimony and
consistency are somewhat lower. Hence, there are some one-to-many relations
between referent and meaning and between referent and form in the system. The
semiotic landscape already showed that most of the synonymy does not necessar-
ily mean that the communication is difficult. Usually, the hearer can rather easily
interpret any speaker’s utterance. The landscape also shows that a one-to-many
relationship between form and meaning does ot necessarily mean polysemy. It
is also beneficial, since it antagonises the one-to-many mapping of referent to
meaning for a great deal. This is nicely illustrated by the following discussion
of some competition diagrams that are taken from the same run as the semiotic
landscape. The discussion also explains some of the dynamics of the language
games.
6.1.3.1 One-to-many relations between form and meaning
Figure 6.5 shows various competition diagrams of robot r0, relating to referent
l1 in one of the runs of experiment P.1. Figures (a) and (b) show the referent-
form competition. In Figure (a) the co-occurrence frequencies of referent and
form independent of their success are displayed. Figure (b) shows the successful
co-occurrence of referent and form. Very infrequent occurrences are left out
for clarity. Where Figure (a) shows that form tyfo clearly wins the competition,
Figure (b) shows that in successful games, this form is nearly used uniquely1.
Hence light source l1 has very little synonymy.
Although there is hardly any synonymy, there is substantial conceptual syn-
onymy. This is nicely shown in the referent-meaning diagram for L1 (Figure 6.5
(c)). Two meanings are used rather frequently, m24 and m70. When looking at
the form-meaning diagram for word-form tyfo (Figure (d)), a similar competition
is observed. The frequent meanings that co-occur with tyfo are m24 and m70. So,
the lexical one-to-many relations between form andmeaning antagonises out the
negative side effect of the one-to-many relations between referent and meaning,
1 Note that this diagram is the same for robot r1, since it shows successful co-occurrences only.
By definition of the success, they must be the same for both robots.
170









































































Figure 6.5: Some competition diagrams of robot r0 in one run of experiment P.1.
Figures (a) and (b) show referent-form competitions for L1, (a) show
its use and (b) shows the successful use. Figure (c) shows the referent-
meaning competition for L1 and (d) shows the form-meaning compe-
tition for tyfo. Both Figure (c) and (d) show the use. Figures (e) and
(f) show the form-referent diagrams for tyfo, where (e) shows its use,
and (f) its effective use.
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yielding almost one-to-one relations between form and referent. So, there is little
synonymy and polysemy.
That there is hardly any polysemy can be seen in Figures 6.5 (e) and (f). These
figures plot the form-referent diagrams for used (e) and successfully used (f) co-
occurrence frequencies. Although some polysemy can be observed, it is hardly
present in successful games after, say, 4,000 language games. Table 6.3 shows the
legend of some of the meanings that are discussed. Note that most meanings are
uniquely used to stand for a particular referent. So, there are mostly one-to-one
























Figure 6.6: Meaning-referent competition of r0 for meanings M70 and M72.
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Table 6.3: The legend of some meanings of robot r0 in the optimal guessing game
as represented by their prototypes. It should be clear that the mean-
ings mostly bare the invariant property that the sensory channels have
values (near) 1 corresponding to the referents they are used for which
has values in the middle. This meaning acts at feature space F0, which
can only be distinctive if there is only 1 referent in the context of a lan-
guage game. This meaning is mainly used to categorise l0, although
not very frequently. The semiotic landscape (Figure 6.3 shows that m19
(in the upper half) is also used to categorise l2. Another interesting
meaning is m37, which has high values in dimensions wl2 and wl3. It
has been used most frequently to categorise l2 in the beginning of the
experiments. Later it has been used less frequently. m49 shows that
the sensory channel wl3 adjacent to the corresponding sensory chan-
nel wl2 reads relatively high values when the robot detects l2. This
can be inferred from the fact that both dimensions wl1 and wl3 have
high values. That this does not happen all the time is shown with m72,
which has low values in each dimension that does not correspond with
l2.
M-5 (0.96, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05)1
M-15 (0.96, 0.60, 0.03, 0.05)1
M-19 (0.53, 0.19, 0.71, 0.20)0
M-24 (0.38, 0.99, 0.03, 0.05)1
M-33 (0.03, 0.01, 0.03, 0.96)1
M-37 (0.03, 0.01, 1.00, 0.96)1
M-49 (0.03, 0.01, 1.00, 0.46)1
M-50 (0.03, 0.01, 0.28, 0.96)1
M-70 (0.03, 0.99, 0.03, 0.05)1
M-72 (0.03, 0.01, 1.00, 0.05)1
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6.1.3.2 Polysemy and lexical dynamics
That relations and competition between referent, meaning and form are not al-
ways as nice as in the case above is shown in Figure 6.7. The competition is
taken from the same run as the semiotic landscape and the previous example, so
Ps = 0.1.
Figure 6.7 (a) shows the referent-form diagram of successful co-occurrences of
referent l2 with some forms. After an initial period in which tyfo is used, the
diagram is dominated by a competition between luvu and kate. It appears as if
luvu is the most dominant of the two. To investigate this competition in more
detail, one should look at the referent-meaning diagram (Figure 6.7 (b)).
The referent-meaning diagram shows that there appear to be two meanings
which are used more or less equally frequent: m49 and m72. There are more
meanings that compete at the bottom of the graph. Apparently there is a strong
one-to-many relation between referent and meaning.
Figures (c) and (d) show the mf diagrams of the two dominant meanings. It
should be clear that a weighted superposition of the two diagrams resemble the
referent-form diagram very much. Hence these diagrams also show the dynamic
competition between luvu and kate. So, the synonymous referent-form competi-
tion cannot directly be explained by the fact that l2 is categorised by two mean-
ings. These meanings themselves show similar mappings between referent and
meaning. This is not so odd, since light source l1 (Figure 6.5) was not named with
two forms, whereas it is related with two meanings.
The apparently unstable competition returns in the form-meaning diagrams
of the two relevant forms (Figures 6.7 (e) and (f)). luvu, which appears to be the
most dominant form for l2, evolves in a competition between m49 and m72. The
competition for kate appears to be more chaotic. This is probably due to the fact
that kate is used infrequent in the period where it shows most chaos (between
game 6,000 and 7,000).
It is difficult to tell exactly what factors cause the dynamic competition. There
aremany factors that can influence the dynamics of language games that it seems
impossible to explain what happened. The most important factors are the adap-
tation of association scores, its lateral inhibition, the one-to-many relation be-
tween referent and meaning, the different ontologies and lexicons of the robots,
the different contexts and situations, language game failures and possibly many
more. The observed dynamics are probably caused by an interaction between
these factors.
Although it is not completely understood, here follows a possible explanation.
In the periods where kate is more (or even most) dominant in the competition,
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m49 appears to be the most dominant meaning in the form-meaning competition
for kate and least dominant for luvu. Check the periods around games 4,000 and
8,000. This is also observable in the mf competition for m49.
If one looks at the meaning-form competition for m72, kate is the dominant
form in the period between 3,000 and 4,000, just before it becomes dominant for
m49. In this period, the other robot (r1) must have acquired kate and uses it also
to name l2. Through the linguistic interactions it is not unlikely that our robot
(r0) starts to use kate also successfully for m49. The association scores are later-
ally inhibited, so when kate is successfully used to name m49, this association is
strengthened, but the associations between kate and m72, and luvu and m49 are
inhibited.
If such dynamics continues, there will be a break point where there is a trade
off between the dominant associations. At that point, katemay become dominant
m49, and luvu becomes dominant for m72. This dominance is very stable until the
end of the run where kate starts to win again. A short while after luvu became
dominant for m72, it also started to win the competition for m49.
It seems as the dominance for one meaning is taken over by the dominance for
the other meaning. This take over is antagonised with the take over of another
form for the first meaning. This in turn can feed the competition similarly; thus
a vicious circle emerges.
To finish the discussion, look at figures (g) and (h). These figures show the
form-referent diagrams of successfully used occurrences of luvu (g) and kate (h).
Clearly these forms are specifically used to name l2. So, there is huge compe-
tition showing one-to-many relations between referent and meaning, meaning
and form, and form and meaning. However, there is little polysemy. Note by the
















































































































Figure 6.7: Various competition diagrams of r0 concerning light source l2. The
referent-form (a) and form-referent diagrams (g) and (h) display com-
petitions of successful occurrences. All other diagrams show compe-
titions of used occurrences.
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6.2 The observational game
6.2.1 The experiment
The final experiment that will be reported is the experiment in which there is
joint attention, but no feedback available to the agents. Hence the robots play
observational games. The experiment takes the same improved parameters as
the guessing game (see Table 6.4). However, it only investigates form creation
probability Ps = 0.4. Note that the robots have no extra word-form adoption,
since for this mechanism the robots have to know whether they mismatched in
referent. For this they would need feedback, which the observational game lacks.
Besides the robots already know what the topic is, so they will not be able to find
a mismatch in referent.
Table 6.4: The set-up of the optimal observational game.






The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 6.8 and Table 6.5. As the figure
and table make clear, the global measures have similar results as the guessing
game. Except the actual success is about 6 % higher than the communicative
success of this experiment (p = 0.0000). Note that the actual success of the
guessing game is the same as its communicative success, because the feedback
of the guessing game is provided by the correspondence criterion.
6.2.3 Discussion
Apparently the observation game yield better results than the guessing game. It
seems that the robots are better at developing a lexiconwhen they knowwhat the
topic in advance rather than when they need feedback to guide their success. If
the guessing game would not be able to construct a similar system is not proven.
However, it would certainly take longer (compare Figure 6.2 with Figure 6.8).
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Figure 6.8: The results of the optimal observational game.
Table 6.5: The averaged results of the optimal observational game experiment.
Score Avg
CS 0.879 ± 0.005
AS 0.698 ± 0.003
DS0 0.973 ± 0.000
DS1 0.974 ± 0.000
D0 0.979 ± 0.000
D1 0.979 ± 0.000
P0 0.873 ± 0.001
P1 0.867 ± 0.001
S0 0.946 ± 0.004
S1 0.946 ± 0.005
C0 0.860 ± 0.006
C1 0.862 ± 0.006
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Figure 6.9: Referent-form diagrams of the observational language game.
Do the observational games yield a similar evolution of word-form and mean-
ing? To see this, one can investigate the various competition diagrams. The
referent-form competition diagrams (Figure 6.9) shows the successful co-occur-
rences of one of the runs of this experiment.
For three out of four referents there are clear winning word-forms, although
light sources l0 and l3 both show a short period where another word-form takes
over. l2 does not show a clear winning word-form. Two word-forms are used
with almost the same frequency. One of these word-forms keni is used to name
both l2 and l3. Hence there is apparently some polysemy, see also Figure 6.10.
This has not been observed at this level in the guessing game.
Figure 6.10 shows that there is some polysemy, especially for keni. So, it would
be interesting how the competition around keni evolves. It is good to begin with
some referent-meaning diagrams of both robots for light sources l2 and l3 (Fig-
ure 6.11). From these figures it is clear that for l2 there is a high level of one-to-
many mappings between referent and meaning, whereas l3 does not show this
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Figure 6.10: Form-referent diagrams of the observational games.
very much. Striking is that it is almost equally strong for both robots. Appar-
ently, the synonymy in the lexicon reflects itself on these one-to-many relations
between referent and meaning for both robots. It is not unlikely that one of the
robots took over these one-to-many relations in its effort to disambiguate the
synonymy initiated by the other.
For robot r0 there are basically three meanings that compete for light sources
l2 and l3. The meaning-form competitions of these meanings are shown in Fig-
ures 6.12 (a) to (c). Meaning m12, which is used to categorise l3 almost unambigu-
ously, has very little synonymy and keni clearly wins the competition. This is not
very surprising, since l3 is both categorised parsimonious and named consistent.
The two meanings of l2 (m28 and m36) reveal more one-to-many relations be-
tween meaning and form. For m12, keni is most frequently used and for m36 this
is xihu. In both cases the other name is also competing for these meanings, i.e.
xihu is also competing for m12 and keni for m36. This competition, however is at
a low level. The polysemy of keni is also found back at the lexical level (i.e. in the
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Figure 6.11: Referent-meaning competition for l2 and l3 of robots r0 and r1.
one-to-many relations between form and meaning), cf. Figure 6.12 (d).
Another striking observation when comparing the competition of this experi-
ment with the competition in the guessing games is that at the bottom there is
more and stronger competition here, compare e.g. Figure 6.7 (a) and Figure 6.9.
Apparently, the observational game strategy is pretty well at developing a coher-
ent lexicon, however the lack of directive feedback allows quite some synonymy.
So, although the update principle of the scores works relatively good (conform
the naming of referents l0 and l1), the system still allows both many-to-many re-
lations at each level of comparison, except between meaning and referent, which
is almost one-to-one. Recall that the association scores are updated according
to an association’s use, since the robots consider themselves to be successful
whenever they communicated an association. Apparently the use alone cannot




















































Figure 6.12: Meaning-form competition of robot r0 for (a) m12, (b) m28 and (c) m36.
Figure (d) shows the form-meaning competition of keni.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter the experiment has optimised two games: the guessing game and
the observational game. Several parameters and methods that were found to
improve the system in Chapter 5 were combined in these experiments.
The optimised experiments revealed that the robots are well capable of devel-
oping an ontology and lexicon by which they can communicate pretty well. The
important features of the optimised experiment are: (1) using new gearing, (2)
adopting word-forms additionally when the robots misidentified the topic, (3) a
different learning rate and (4) a higher creation probability.
Furthermore it has been shown that the robots learn the communication sys-
tem almost up to its potential when they play an observational language game,
a result that is not yet reached in the guessing game.
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Establishing joint attention prior to the linguistic communication, however,
has a cost. The lexicons that emerge under this condition show a higher level of
synonymy. It seems that the pressure to disambiguate is too small because the
joint attention makes communication more or less redundant.
The results of the experiments reported here shall be discussed more thor-
oughly in Chapter 7.
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Up to now this research is presented first by describing the model, followed by
the presentation of a series of experiments. Themodel is built such that the robots
can engage in language games, for which the physical interactions have been pre-
programmed. The language games consists roughly of four parts: (1) the robots
detect their surroundings, (2) the sensing is categorised, (3) the speaker names
one topic and the hearer tries to understand the speaker’s utterance, and (4) the
robots adapt their ontologies and lexicon.
An important feature of the experiment is that the robots do not have any
prior knowledge about the ontology or lexicon. They only have knowledge how
they can communicate and how they can invent, adopt and select ontological and
lexical items that enables them to develop a coherent communication system.
The main questions raised in the introduction of this book were:
1. Can the symbol grounding problem be solved with these robots by con-
structing a lexicon through individual adaptation, (cultural) interaction
and self-organisation? And if so, how is this accomplished?
2. What are the important types of extra-linguistic information that agents
should share when developing a coherent communication system?
3. What is the influence of the physical conditions and interaction on devel-
oping a grounded lexicon?
Question (1) can reasonably be answered with yes, at least within the current
application and experimental set-up. There are some drawbacks on this answer,
because some important assumptions have been made and the physical capabil-
ities of the robots prevent to enable perfect sensing and communication. The
two assumptions were that the robots could establish joint attention and provide
feedback on the outcome of a language game. Previous experiments on physical
pointing revealed that this method does not work with the currently used robots
(Vogt 1998b), and hence the robots still need to have a way in doing so. In the
experiments the robots were able to inspect each other’s internal feature vectors.
This way the robots were able to construct a shared and grounded lexicon. The
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symbol grounding problem has been solved in the experiments reported by a
number of subtasks as will be discussed in the next section.
The answer to question (2) is not complete, because not all possible forms of
information have been investigated. Nevertheless, some important forms have
been found. It appeared that establishing joint attention is very important in
the development of a coherent lexicon. When joint attention is not established,
feedback plays a crucial role.
The last question is harder to answer, because not all experiments yielded as-
tonishing results. However, there are some important conclusions that can be
drawn. The sensing and segmentation resulted in set of situations in which ap-
proximately 20 % did not have a coherent context. So only in 80 % of the language
games the robots could establish communicative success, because in the other
cases the hearer did not detect the topic that the speaker was communicating.
The impact from varying physical conditions has not been shown convincingly
in all proposed directions, although they indicated some influences.
This chapter will discuss the results in more detail, and will compare the find-
ings with other literature on the topic. Section 7.1 will discuss how the grounding
problem is solved. The effect of joint attention and feedback will be the topic of
Section 7.2. The experimental results will be discussed around psychological is-
sues about joint attention and feedback in language learning. The influence of
the physical interactions will be discussed in Section 7.3. Especially the robots’
adaptation to the environment (or vice versa) is the key issue. In Section 7.5 the
results will be compared with other experiments on grounding language, espe-
cially the Talking Heads (Belpaeme, Steels & van Looveren 1998) and the work
of Billard & Hayes (1997).
7.1 The symbol grounding problem solved?
The key problem that had to be solved for physical robots to develop a shared
lexicon about the things they detect is the symbol grounding problem (Harnad
1990). The problem is how seemingly meaningless symbols can becomemeaning-
ful in the real world. In Chapter 1 three sub-problems of the grounding problem
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The three sub-problems will be discussed in more detail below. Solving the
symbol grounding problem is known to the roboticists as a fundamentally hard
problem (see, e.g., Pfeifer & Scheier 1999). It is especially hard, because the robots
have different sensings of some real world object when detected under different
circumstances. It appears to be very hard to acquire invariant categorisations of
these different sensings.
The symbol grounding problem has been attacked with a semiotic view to-
wards symbols (or signs). In this Peircean view a symbol is a semiotic sign where
its form is either arbitrary or conventionalised. The sign is a triangle of which the
edges resemble a referent, a meaning and a form. It has been argued that a robot
can ground a symbol when a semiotic triangle can be constructed successfully.
Its success is measured with the success of a language game, but it can also be
measured otherwise. When the symbol is used successfully in a language game,
the form is said to be conventionalised.
In the experiments the real world consists of light sources about which the
robots try to construct a lexicon. The word-forms and referents are the overt part
of the symbols that the robots ground. The covert part is a hybrid chain of inter-
nal and possibly external structures fromwhich the meaning is constructed. Part
of these structures are activated by the robot’s sensing. The sensing is segmented
and feature vectors are extracted. These feature vectors are then categorised. The
robots were able to successfully incorporate the distinctive categories that con-
stitute the meaning in language use (i.e. in naming the referents). It should be
clear that when the robots communicate successfully, the utterance refer to one
of the light sources their environment. Whether or not this justifies to conclude
that the robots have meaning in the philosophical sense (where meaning is often
ascribed in terms of intentionality and consciousness) remains a philosophical
question. Technically, the robots closed the semiotic triangle (or square) and con-
ventionalised the form. Hence the physical symbol grounding problem is solved
by these robots.
7.1.1 Iconisation
Iconisation is the first step in solving the symbol grounding problem. It is re-
lated to the following question: How does the analogue sensation of a referent
project on an internal representation of the robot? This representation is still
sub-symbolic. Iconisation is solved in the presented application through sensing,
segmentation and feature extraction. Segmentation of the raw sensory stimuli re-
sults in a set of segments that are supposed to relate to sensed real world objects.
The segments consist of for noise filtered raw sensory data. Feature extraction
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result in a vector of features that describes each segment with invariant proper-
ties of the sensing of a real world object. This latter process is very crucial for the
result of the grounding problem. Although this issue has not been a key issue in
this book, the problems became clear during the development of the system.
First of all, the segmentation process has to identify those regions that are
interesting and should relate to the sensing of a referent. Ideally, segmentation
should identify each referent that could be detected. The robots move around
in their environment and the lighting conditions may change or something can
obscure (a part of) the environment. Therefore, the sensing of the different robots
are not likely to be identical and neither are the different sensings in different
situations. A rather simplistic segmentation scheme has been used, which is
prone to errors.
Segments are identified when the sensor value of a certain sensor exceeds a
pre-determined noise value. But when, for instance, two light sources are de-
tected shortly after each other with the consequence that one or more sensors
did not get back to drop below the noise value, the two light sources will be taken
as one segment. This is one of the reasons why the robots do not establish a co-
herent context. “Why not identify only the top of the peaks? This way you solve
this problem.” is an often heard remark. However, the sensors are not extremely
reliable and show fluctuations during the sensing of a region of interest, resulting
in local maxima when looking for real maxima. Thus yielding the same problem
of context incoherence. One region of interest may be segmented in several re-
gions, making it hard to solve discrimination and identification. Increasing the
noise level would cause the robots to miss light sources that are further away.
When a segment is found, the sensory data of such a segment is transformed
into a multidimensional feature vector, where each dimension corresponds to
one sensory channel. This is done by means of feature extraction. The feature
extraction is done by a real valued function from the sensory channel space to
the feature space. The feature space is typically taken as a real valued domain
between 0 and 1 in all dimensions. The goal of this feature extraction is (1) to
reduce the amount of sensory data and (2) to extract information that is ideally
invariant in the different situations. In the current implementation, all maxima
that are found for the different sensory channels inside a segment are normalised
to the maximum intensity of the sensory channel that has the highest maximum
intensity in this segment. The absolute maximum of a sensory channel in a seg-
ment tells the observer to which light source the segment corresponds. Applying
the feature extraction to this sensory channel results in a feature with a value of
1. Application to the other sensory channels yield values lower than 1. After
188
7.1 The symbol grounding problem solved?
feature extraction, the segment can be described with a low dimensional vector
with a value of 1 where the sensory channel has the highest intensity. The other
features have, depending on the distance of the robot to the corresponding light
source, a value between 0 and 1. This is most often close to 0.
So, the segmentation and feature extraction is an important pre-process in the
process of solving the grounding problem. This is a widely accepted phenomenon
that is applied both in (computer) vision (Cotter 1990) and speech perception
(Damper 2000). Cotter notices the fact that in a survey amongst different animal
species, the optic pathways where the initial filtering takes place differ in details,
although there are fundamental similarities:
Such differences – differences in size of the pathways and development in
nuclei in visual centres – represent variations on a theme that are due to the
evolution of the visual system, the accentuation of specific sensory systems
and ultimately the attainment of a specific ecological niche by individual
species. (Cotter 1990: 11)
This makes it plausible that pre-processing of visual stimuli is very important
for categorisation. Furthermore, it sheds light on the nature of embodiment. Dif-
ferent ways of sensing yield different categorisations. Obviously, the feature
extraction functions could be evolved genetically as is shown in Belpaeme 1999,
and once primitive functions are present, the feature extraction functions could
also be developed onto-genetically into more complex ones as shown by de Jong
& Steels (1999).
In spite of its importance, the segmentation and feature extraction is not a key
issue of this book. The segmentation and sensory channels are relatively simple
and not very well developed.
7.1.2 Discrimination
The second part of the solution of the grounding problem is discrimination. Har-
nad (1990) applies the notion of discrimination to the level of sensing. According
to Harnad, discrimination should find out how the perception of something dif-
fers from the perception of something else. This can already be done at the per-
ceptual level. This perceptual level can be compared to the sensing, segmentation
and feature extraction in the current application. Although some of the discrim-
ination is already done with segmentation and feature extraction, it is mainly
pursued at the categorisation level. Segmentation yields the different sensings
of the different referents. The feature extraction describes what properties the
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different segments have. However, it is only at the categorisation level that the
model proposed tells the robots how the different segments differ.
In the current book, discrimination is solved by modelling discrimination
games (Steels 1996d). In a discrimination game, an individual robot categorises
the feature vectors that relate to the segments. Then the agents select categories
that can distinguish a segment from the other segments in the context. So, the re-
sulting distinctive categories only are distinctive in contrast to the context. This
is conform with a pragmatic approach. As a consequence, part of the mean-
ing is in the robot’s environment, making it a situated approach (Clancey 1997).
Since the meaning is constructed based on the robot’s experience, it is embodied
(Lakoff 1987). This dialectic approach favours what Jordan Zlatev (1997) called sit-
uated embodiment. It is also an argument for talking about the physical symbol
grounding problem rather than the physical grounding problem (Brooks 1990) or
the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990).
So, discrimination already starts at the segmentation level. At this level, the
different interesting regions are identified, thus distinguishing one region from
another. However, this does not answer the question how one segment is differ-
ent from another. This can be answered more constructively at the categorisation
level.
The first step of the discrimination game is categorising the feature vectors of
the segments. The main method that has been used was the prototype method.
Here the categories are represented by prototypes, and the feature vectors are
categorised with those prototypes that are nearest to the feature vectors in the
different feature spaces. The categories are organised in different feature spaces
to allow categories that resemble more generalised and specialised samples of a
feature vector.
The second step in the discrimination game is to extract the categories that
distinguish one segment from the other segments in the context that a robot has
constructed in a language game. This phase is the actual discrimination.
Initially, there are no categories at all. When the discrimination fails, new
categories are created for which the features of a feature vector acts as exem-
plars. These prototypical categories are organised hierarchically in the different
versions of the feature space. Each version of the feature space has a different
resolution, thus allowing generality and specificity of the categories. In de Jong
& Vogt 1998 no such hierarchical layering was imposed and the robots had great
difficulty in developing a coherent communication system.
The categories have been made dynamic in the sense that the prototypes move
in the feature space and thus their sensitivity range changes in time. It is thought
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that this would let the prototypical categories evolve towards a more represen-
tative sample of the feature vectors that have been extracted. In turn, this is
supposed to increase the quality of the categorisation and discrimination. The
experiment where this dynamical mechanism has been left out showed that this
does not necessarily contributes to a higher performance. This, however, may be
due to the simplicity of the robots’ visual environment. Perhaps in a more com-
plex environment it may well be very beneficial to have dynamically changing
categories.
The feature vectors that the robots extract from the segments are categorised
in each feature space with that category that is nearest to the feature vector.
The prototypes of a feature space cover the entire space. This has the advantage
that whenever there is a category in some feature space the feature vector will
be categorised. When the categories are constructed with the binary subspace
method, or in the binary tree method (Steels 1996d) as is the case in the Talking
Heads, a category is only activated when the feature vector to be categorised
falls inside the sensitive region of a category. This is because these categories do
not necessarily cover the entire feature space. Furthermore, the binary category,
once established, is not dynamic, i.e. its sensitivity does not move. Whether
these are problems is not really shown. The fact that in the prototype method
explored here, the robots can exploit more categories in the discrimination games
increases the chance of success. This is probably themain reasonwhy this system
outperforms the experiment incorporating the binary subspace method.
Although it might be beneficial allowing fuzzy boundaries on the categories’
sensitivity, this has not been observed in the experiment which investigated this.
No big and significant differences have been observed, except in the discrimi-
nation success, which was slightly lower. The reason for this can be found in
the fact that in the fuzzy approach a feature vector can be categorised in more
ways than in the non-fuzzy prototype method. This increases the probability that
more feature vectors share the same categories. Hence discrimination would be
more difficult. Applying the fuzzy boundaries in more complex environments,
might still be beneficial, but the problem in applicability lies in the increase of
computational power.
The discrimination works well. In the basic experiment the discrimination suc-
cess was already approximately 92 %. It has been argued in Chapter 4 that the
discrimination success did not go to a 100 % because: (1) A success-rate of 100 %
simply cannot be reached. (2) The discrimination success is partly a function
of the number of language games and the hearer does not play a discrimina-
tion game every language game. When the speaker did not utter a word-form or
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when the hearer does not know the word-form no discrimination game is played.
These reasons are confirmed with the results of letting the agents only playing
discrimination games. It appeared now that the average discrimination success
rose to 98.7 %.
The meanings that emerge are used very distinctive. In all experiments the dis-
tinctiveness is higher than 0.95 and usually ends up with a value of 1. So, when a
distinctive category is used in the communication it refers to the same referent
with a high certainty. It is well shown in the meaning-referent competition dia-
grams that after a very short period, the meanings that are used in the language
refer to the same referents about 100 % of the time. The parsimony however is
lower. The probability that when trying to categorise a referent with a previously
used category is around 0.85. It can be explained by the fact that in different sit-
uations the segments differ and hence are categorised differently, thus yielding
a strong one-to-many relationship between a referent and the distinctive cate-
gories.
In these experiments, the categories all bear the invariant property that the
dimension of the feature vector with value of 1 corresponds to a unique referent.
In the Talking Heads invariance is filtered out using the notion of saliency. How-
ever, as the statistics of the sensory data revealed (Appendix C), saliency does
not guarantee to find the invariance. This is because another dimension of the
feature vector might have a value very close to 1, which may not be most salient.
However, there may be selection criteria in the discrimination or naming game
that allows a more controlled categorisation of invariant properties of the dif-
ferent feature vectors. A possible mechanism preference could be the selection
of categories that have maximum values at their sensory channels. However,
this would require to implement more knowledge on the categorisation, which
is against the non-nativist approach that is pursued. On the other hand, selection
for maximum intensity is so simple and uniform that such a selection principle
could have evolved genetically. Still another selection criterion may be how well
a feature vector correlates with a prototype. I.e. an agent may prefer those cat-
egories of which the extracted feature values best resemble the categories. This
way a prototype effect (Rosch et al. 1976) could be modelled. Naturally, these
different criteria could be combined yielding a hybrid mechanism.
According to Harnad (1990), one of the aims of discrimination is to reduce the
amount of symbolic structures that relates to a certain referent. As Figure 6.4
showed, the number of distinctive categories that have been proposed can in-
crease up to more than 2,500 for categorising 4 referents! Although it has not
been shown in this book, it has been observed that when counting all different
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(non distinctive) categories that has been proposed before discrimination was ap-
plied, more than 5,000 (sometimes even 10,000) categories were constructed. So,
the discrimination already yields a substantial reduction in the amount of cate-
gories that relate to the different segments. The naming phase further reduces
the number of categories to, say 500 meanings that are used successfully in the
communication. Of these 500 meanings, most are rarely used, while a few are
used most frequently as observed in the various competition diagrams. It should
be clear that discrimination games alone cannot solve the grounding problem
sufficiently. Still too many distinctive categories are categories for the four ref-
erents.
7.1.3 Identification
A final process in symbol grounding is identification. Identification is reducing
the symbolic structures relating to a segment even more than is the case in dis-
crimination yielding invariant symbols. As argued before, the identification pro-
cess of symbol grounding takes place at the language level. In other applications
or types of problem solving, identification may take place at a different level de-
pending on the type of problem to be solved. For planning a path, for instance, a
robot also has to identify symbols with which it can reason. Then identification
succeeds when the robot successfully incorporates the symbols to plan a path.
In language this is at the communication level. When a language game is un-
successful, at least one of the robots failed to identify the referent and it is not
sure which robot failed to do so. Therefore, identification is successful when the
language game is a success.
It is at the identification level that a distinctive category becomes a meaning.
As argued, a meaning is some categorisation that is used in language. It is a part
of the symbol that has been defined in semiotics. There the meaning is the sense
that is made of the symbol. According to Wittgenstein (1958) the meaning can
only be interpreted by its use in language. Therefore, it should be related with
a form that can be used in a language game. This trinity (referent, meaning and
form) is what Peirce called a symbol.
The basic experiment already showed that the robots solved the grounding
problem in successful language games. They successfully identified symbols that
stand for a referent. However, there was still quite some polysemy. Although
higher than the a priori success, the communicative success-rate was relative
low. In Chapters 5 and 6 it has been shown that the success could increase and
thus identification improved. The main factors that improved the success were:
assuming joint attention, increasing the form creation rate and learning rate, and
assuming a different form-adoption scheme.
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The influence of the form creation probability (Ps) has been shown in Sec-
tion 5.5. It appeared that increasing the creation probability increased the success
in communication. It also increased the specificity, i.e. the likelihood that when
a word-form is used it would refer to the same referent it previously referred to
increased. Increasing the creation probability, however revealed a major draw-
back: the number of word-forms used increased proportionally up to 83 when
Ps = 1.0. This sums up to more than 20 word-forms per referent, which is not
very efficient. The point is that a high creation probability decreases the amount
of many-to-many relations between meaning and form, which in turn increases
the specificity because the meanings uniquely refer to a particular referent. This
is nice, but it increases synonymy. The number of word-forms used are much
lower when Ps = 0.1 and the communicative success is not much lower than
when Ps = 1.0 (only a few percent, but significantly). Now only 25 word-forms
are used, yielding slightly more than 6 word-forms per referent.
When, in addition, the hearer is allowed to adopt the speaker’s word-form
when it misinterpreted the speaker’s utterance, the success grows even more
and the number of word-forms used decrease even more. In the optimal guess-
ing game experiment (Ps = 0.1), where also the learning rate is different from
the basic experiment, the number of word-forms used are 16, most of them used
rarely. Inspecting the experiment more closely, there are only 6 word-forms that
are used frequently. The communicative success grows up to approximately 75 %
after 10,000 language games. So, it seems that adopting the word-forms after
misinterpretation is one of the necessary factors of the model. Furthermore, in
less reliable robots, a modest creation probability is very useful: It allows the
word-forms to be associated with more meanings, thus increasing the amount
of one-to-many relations between form and meaning. The adaptation of the as-
sociation scores and lateral inhibition causes improved selection and through
self-organisation a more coherent and invariant lexicon emerges. This way ref-
erential polysemy and synonymy remain low.
A high learning rate, controlling the adaptation of the association scores, in-
creases the influence of past success and has low influence on failures. When the
learning rate is too high (η = 0.99), the system does not find a suitable equilib-
rium in the scores. Failures are not punished and will be made again, thus the
success does not increase. Lateral inhibition is small and the lexicon does not
converge well enough to an attractor. A suitable lexicon also does not emerge
when the learning rate is too low, i.e. when η ≤ 0.1. If there is no word-form
adoption when the hearer misinterpreted the speaker, the self-organising effect
that the score adaptation should control does not reveal itself.
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So, identification in the language games takes place at the language level. The
invariance of the symbols are therefore to be found in the consistent use of these
symbols in the language. This way the ambiguous categorisation of the various
sensings of some referent is disambiguated in the successful use of the symbols
in the language games.
7.1.4 Conclusions







Figure 7.1: The semiotic square of the language games.
The hybrid processes of sensing, segmentation, feature extraction, categorisa-
tion, discrimination, naming and feedback transforms the symbol grounding in
the formation of a semiotic coupling (or structural coupling) between the robots’
environment, their internal states and their mutual interaction. Some of the
lexicons that result from the experiments have been plotted in semiotic land-
scapes showing the structural couplings that emerged. These landscapes showed
that the many-to-many relations between form and meaning can serve cognitive
agents to decrease the amount of polysemy and synonymy that is necessary to
ground their sensing of the environment invariantly.
The meaning of the utterances are always in contrast to the rest of the con-
text as a result of the discrimination game. However, the experiment with only
three of the four light sources present in every situation showed that the robots
acquired a lexicon similarly to the basic experiment. Hence the system learns to
communicate about the four referents in their world, while only sensing three
in their environment. Nevertheless, the use of the language depends on the situ-
ation that the agents are in.
So, the symbol grounding problem is solved by a hybrid of relative simple
mechanisms: sensing, segmentation, feature extraction, categorisation, discrim-
ination, naming and feedback. The principles are based on interactions of the
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agents with their environment and each other, individual adaptation and self-
organisation. A complex structure of couplings emerges from the co-evolution
of language andmeaning, and can well be used to communicate about the agents’
environment. Summarising, the three phases of the symbol grounding problem
are modelled by the following:
1. Iconisation: Sensing, segmentation and feature extraction
2. Discrimination: Discrimination game
3. Identification: Naming and adaptation
One of the main findings was that the robots tend to categorise the various
sensings of a particular referent differently. Thus yielding one-to-many relations
between referent andmeaning. This is not problematic as long as this is cancelled
out by one-to-many relations between form and meaning. This results in low, or
ideally no polysemy and synonymy as illustrated in Figure 7.2 (a). The proposed
model is pretty well capable of doing just this. Figure 7.2 shows how a symbol
thus can be visualised by a set of semiotic triangles. These types of symbolic
structures may well explain the notions of family resemblance (Figure 7.2 (b))
and object constancy (Figure 7.2 (c)).
Family resemblance (Wittgenstein 1958) is the observation that seemingly dif-
ferent things are called the same without being ambiguous, like the meaning of
games. Where soccer and chess are typical games, a game like swinging is not
typical. Swinging lies near the border of the “conceptual space” of games. It has
no direct resemblance with games like soccer and chess (referents r1 and r2 Fig-
ure 7.2 (b)), but it has some resemblance with other games that in turn do have
resemblance with soccer and chess. Such categorisation process can be explained
with the one-to-many relations between form andmeaning. Theword “games” is
associated with different meanings of soccer, chess and swinging. The successful
use of these meanings in different situated language games allows the system to
emerge a family of resemblance.
One of the reasons that makes the symbol grounding problem hard is the no-
tion of object constancy. How can an object be recognised as being the same
when different sensings of such an object results in different sensory stimuli,
for instance because it is partly obscured? In the experiments, the robots detect
the light sources from different positions, resulting in different sensings as the
continuum of sensings P in Figure 7.2 (c) shows. This may also yield different
meanings. Nevertheless, the system identifies the objects pretty consistently, be-
cause the one-to-many relations between form and meaning is damped at the
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level of form and referent. That the robots actually learn to identify the referents
has been shown in an experiment where there were only three of the four ref-
erents available in each situation. The robots could learn to name all referents
equally well as in the basic experiment whereas they only could detect three of





































Figure 7.2: Illustration of three semiotic relations between referent r, meaning
m and form f. Figure (a) shows how one-to-many relations between
referent and meaning cancels out synonymy and polysemy by one-
to-many relations between form and meaning. Figure (b) shows how
the model may explain family resemblance. The ovals should be in-
terpreted as Venn–diagrams of the meanings r1 and r2. In Figure (c),
the continuum of possible sensings p of referent r are displayed as a
rectangle. Some part of the rectangle may be interpreted by m1 and
another by m2. When both meanings relate to the same form, this
mechanism may solve the problem of object constancy.
7.2 No negative feedback evidence?
The experiments in Chapter 5 showed the importance of either joint attention
or feedback in the language formation. One experiment has been done in which
neither are present: the xsl game. In this experiment the robots used association
scores based on the co-occurrences of word-meaning associations to select them.
A xsl game was considered to be successful when the hearer “thought” it under-
stood the speaker. The communicative success from the robots’ viewpoint was
around 82 %, but the actual success was in fact less than 25 %, which is lower
than the a priori success.
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Many psycholinguists hold that children learning language hardly get any
feedback on their language use. This is the so-called “no negative feedback ev-
idence” (see e.g. Braine 1971 or Bowerman 1988).1 Other psycholinguists claim
that, when children make (structurally the same) mistakes, they do get feedback
from their language teachers like their parents (Demetras, Nolan Post & Snow
1986). Furthermore, the influence of feedback on language acquisition is thought
to be crucial by some scientists (Clancey 1997; Demetras, Nolan Post & Snow
1986; Clark & Clark 1977; Tomasello & Barton 1994). The results of the guessing
game and the xsl game make clear that this model seems to be unable to work
without feedback. The fact that the robots’ mismatch in referent word-form adop-
tion benefits the communicative success provides a strong reason why feedback
is needed in the guessing game.
Although less successful in communication than the observational game, or
perhaps only slower, the guessing game appears to converge best on the lexicon.
Mostly, a clear winning name is used by the robots and the competition at the
bottom is not successful. Since the hearer has no knowledge about the topic prior
to linguistic communication, it has to trust completely on the linguistic informa-
tion. The robots have to disambiguate the lexicon for which feedback is required.
When the feedback only depends on the co-occurrence of word and meaning as
is the case in the xsl game, the robots cannot disambiguate the system well. The
feedback must be on the success of the language game. Since communication in
the guessing game is not redundant as in the ostensive and observational games,
there is more pressure to disambiguate. Hence the robots are better at it.
When joint attention is established prior to the communication, directive feed-
back appears to be less important. Experiments revealed that when the robots
established prior topic knowledge (or joint attention prior to the communication)
the lexicon formation improved, whether or not feedback was used.
The observational language game has been inspired by the work of Mike Oli-
phant (1997) and appears to work best. In this game no directive feedback is
required. The agents use feedback based on the use of word-meaning pairs,
not on their success in the game. This strategy works provided the agents have
prior topic knowledge, established through some joint attention mechanism, and
provided that scores are updated with lateral inhibition. This is conform with
the findings of Oliphant (1997; 1998) and confirmed by Edwin de Jong (2000).
Oliphant found that lateral inhibition is important in a comparison experiment
where the associationswere updated following (1)Willshaw learning and (2) Heb-
1 Recall that feedback in this book is about the effect of a language game; not to correct one
another.
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bian learning. Hebbian learning uses lateral inhibition, which allowed Oliphant’s
agents to establish a coherent lexicon, whereas the Willshaw method that does
not use lateral inhibition did not.
When investigating a lexicon developed by the observational language game
more closely, it appeared that the system still allows quite some polysemy and
synonymy, especially at the bottom of the competition. If the no negative feed-
back evidence argument is correct, this might explain why children tend to use
overgeneralisations during their lexicon development. Having more examples
and directive feedback (possibly evaluated from the environment by the lan-
guage learners themselves) could disambiguate such overgeneralisations. It is
interesting to note that each type of language game revealed some level of over-
generalisation at the beginning of the experiments. Usually there was quite some
referential polysemy in the beginning of the experiments, which died out after
approximately 1,000 language games.
So, in what way does this reflect on our knowledge of child language acquisi-
tion, it has been found in several observations of mother-child interactions that
joint attention is established prior to the linguistic act (Schaffer, Hepburn & Col-
lis 1983; Harris, Jones & Grant 1983; 1984; Tomasello & Todd 1983; Tomasello,
Mannle & Kruger 1986 as cited in Barrett 1995). In particular Tomasello & Todd
(1983) and Tomasello, Mannle & Kruger (1986) found that there was a positive
relation between the period of joint attention and the child’s later vocabulary
size.
Although children seem to be able to select the right referent, there is no
complete consensus how. It is likely that there is some trade-off between us-
ing ostensive and non-ostensive contexts in the lexical acquisition phase. The
guessing game on the one hand and the ostensive and observational on the
other hand showed that robots can learn a lexicon in both the ostensive and
the non-ostensive case. This is conform with Tomasello and Barton’s (1994) re-
sults. Tomasello and Barton investigated children’s language acquisition under
conditions that are similar to those in the guessing game and observational game.
In addition, Barrett’s (1995) conclusions that the lexicon is learned better under
joint attention prior or simultaneously to the linguistic act hold as well. This is
also conform the discussion placed at the 2000 Evolution of Language conference
by Jean-Louis Dessalles (2000).
To put the conclusion in light of the empirical data available in the psycholin-
guistic literature as from Braine (1971), Demetras, Nolan Post & Snow (1986) and
Tomasello & Barton (1994), it is likely that infants (and probably humans in gen-
eral) use a combination of strategies to learn and develop a language. For instance
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when the context is clear and the child has a high likelihood of identifying the
topic (possibly prior to the communication), feedback on the outcome of a game
is not necessary. When such a precondition is not satisfied and a child makes
structural mistakes, feedback on the success becomes more important, and may
be provided by adult speakers. Other strategies for associating words with mean-
ings are likely to exist, like the filling up of knowledge gaps by language learners
when the context is clear (Clark 1993).
Joint attention and feedback were simulated in the current experiments. There-
fore, the question how joint attention and feedback are established is left as an
open question. Probably there are several strategies. For instance, pointing can
be used to draw attention or to provide feedback. But also gaze following, at-
tention monitoring, novelty and evaluative rewards on a language game may be
sources of establishing joint attention or feedback.
The feedback provided on the outcome of language game is the same for both
robots. Naturally, this is not very plausible. It is interesting to investigate how
robots can establish joint attention and evaluate feedback autonomously. For this
it would be good to have a more task oriented approach, where joint attention
and feedback are implicit in the accomplishment and success of the task.
7.3 Situated embodiment
As obvious the influence of the physical interactions and the body of the robots
is very important. Especially the results of Chapters 4 and 5 must have made
this clear. First, the physical condition and the bodily adjustment of the robots
relevant to the task appear to have some influence. And second, the most im-
portant influence seems to be in how the robots interact with their environment,
including each other.
Due to the fact that the robots have unreliable control, they have difficulties
in co-ordinating their interaction physically. This is one of the reasons for the
robots’ poor ability to construct a coherent context. In turn, this has set a limit
to the potential understandability around 80 %. Using more reliable robots could
solve this problem to some extent. However, the physical unreliability is not the
only reason for context incoherence. More fundamental is the problem, that the
robots are at different locations from which they cannot sense the same. Since
the robots only communicate the “here and now”, this problem cannot be solved
in principle.
The idea that the robots physical condition and bodily adaptation to the robots’
environment appears to be trivial to some people, but this is not so. Why is it
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that humans are the only creatures on earth that use language? Answering that
they have a different body, which enables them to learn language is simply not
enough. It presumably has a lot to do with it, but to what extend and in what
ways? When the robot’s visual apparatus could not neatly detect the world with
enough resolution, the robots performed much worse at grounding the language.
The communicative success was around the a priori value. And when the robots
had new gearing, the performance increased a little bit. Although these results
were not significant, the robots can rotate more smoothly, giving noise in the
sensing less chance. It is likely that physical fitness and co-ordination abilities
are important ingredients in language learning. Humans are organisms that have
great co-ordination abilities, which especially become handy in setting up coher-
ent contexts and joint attention.
The most important influences observed came more from the experiments
where different strategies of joint attention and feedback were investigated.
Many of the results have already been discussed in the previous section, so they
will not be discussed again.
To obtain reasonable results in the experiments themethods for obtaining joint
attention and feedback have been simulated. The result of the simulations were
that the robots could inspect the internal states of each other. Obviously this is
not very plausible. These mechanisms did not change the principle of language
acquisition, but it required the assumption that the robots had a mechanism by
which they could establish joint attention extra-linguistically. This requires that
the problems of establishing joint attention and evaluation of feedback on the
robots still needs to be developed. It should be clear that establishing joint atten-
tion requires good physical co-ordination of the agents’ bodies.
The different results showed the importance of a good co-ordination of the
robots in their environment. Hence the importance of the robot’s interactionwith
the world is made clear. Language is not only linguistic communication, but also
heavily depends on co-ordinated interaction of agents with their environment as
has been made clear in the situated cognition paradigms (Clancey 1997).
7.4 A behaviour-based cognitive architecture
For the development of a robotic system that is able to fulfil a relatively com-
plex task that the language game is, an architecture is constructed that is based
on a behaviour-based architecture. Examples of behaviour-based architectures
are the subsumption architecture (Brooks 1990) and pdl (Steels 1994c). These ar-
chitectures mostly control reactive behaviour as “direct” couplings between sen-
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sors and actuators. It is most prominently based on the “vehicles” proposed by
Valentino Braitenberg (1984). Behaviour-based architectures have become very
popular in robotics in the past ten years. However, these architectures could not
showmuch more complex behaviour than e.g. wall following, phototaxis and ob-
stacle avoidance. Although these behaviours have interesting emergent function-
alities, they cannot be used for accomplishing more complex tasks that involve
planning. The dual dynamics architecture (Jaeger & Christaller 1998) could, but
there the planning is implemented implicitly in the reactive processes. It is there-
fore less controllable and thus prone to errors.
To deal with explicitly planned behaviour, a behaviour-based cognitive archi-
tecture has been developed. The cognitive architecture is an extension of pdl.
The planning is coded in finite state automata. Each state activates or inhibits
separate behaviours using “motivations” that can be set “on”, “off” or the “in-
verse”.2 The behaviours that are “on” control in parallel the emergent behaviour
an agent shows. This approach is very similar to the architecture proposed by
Barnes et al. (1997). The transition from one state to another happens when the
final condition of the state is satisfied. When another robot has to transfer to the
next state simultaneously, the first robot can send a radio signal to do so. Each
state has a timer and when a robot tries to achieve a goal for too long, the state
is left and the default state is entered, thus the task fails.
The architecture has basically three parallel operating layers between the sen-
sors and actuators of the agents. The first layer bears the finite state automata
that control planning. The second layer consists of behaviours that control the
reactive behaviour of a robot, like phototaxis. And thirdly, there are cognitive
processes that for instance control categorisation and naming. The processes in
the two final layers are controlled by the motivations set in the first layer. A
distinction is made between the reactive and cognitive processes. This is done,
because calculating reactive processes are faster than calculating cognitive pro-
cesses. The reactive processes demand a fast response, because a moving agent
cannot wait to respond when, e.g. it is close to a wall it has to avoid. In the con-
trol architecture that is used in this application, the sensor readings and actuators
are updated and processed 40 times per second. The cognitive processes can take
in principle as long as they need, because they can be processed (physically) in
parallel. In the current implementation this has been accomplished by doing off-
board processing later on. When all processes are run in real time, this should
2 In principle motivations can have any value between -1 and 1 controlling the strength of a
certain behaviour. These motivations have been incorporated before in pdl, see e.g. Steels
1994a; 1996b.
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either ask for a physically parallel process or incorporate a good timing protocol
that works on the clock process. When this is not done, unwanted side-effects
will occur as has been observed while implementing a real time language game
where robots tried to develop a lexicon about their actions (Vogt 1999; 2000b). In
these experiments it has been observed that robots collided with a wall and did
not avoid it because they were busy processing the categorisation or naming.
The cognitive behaviour-based architecture that has been developed for these
experiments is a general-purpose architecture for doing cognitive robotics. It
has been used to implement various language games on the mobile robots that
incorporate fundamentally different behaviours. In the current implementations,
the behaviours have been pre-programmed, including the planning. It might well
be possible that the planners are learned or created dynamically, see e.g. Barnes
et al. (1997). Furthermore, new layers may be introduced when necessary.
7.5 The Talking Heads
Before discussing the results obtained in the previous chapters in relation to the
Talking Heads and other related experiments, it is good to summarise the dif-
ferences between the different experiments. The main sources from which the
discussions are based are the bookThe Talking Heads experiment: Volume 1. Words
and meanings by Luc Steels (1999) and the PhD thesis L’émergence d’un lexique
dans une population d’agents autonomes of Frédéric Kaplan (2000).
7.5.1 The differences
In the Talking Heads several agents can materialise their cognitive structures
into a set of cameras, each representing the physical body of a robot. Different
sites are placed around the world and are connected via the internet. Agents can
travel from one site to another and engage in guessing games with each agent
that is present at a certain site. Furthermore, human users can launch new or
existing agents to travel the net. In a guessing game the robots look with their
cameras at a white board at which various geometrical figures are pasted. The
cameras cannot move around freely, they can only move there cameras in a pan-
tilt manner. In addition, the cameras are calibrated such that they can identify
co-ordinates at the white board reliably. This information is used to implement
pointing. So, although not completely perfect, the robots can reliably point to a
referent on the white board thus providing feedback. In addition, the calibration
is also used to focus the robots’ attention, which is used to detect a context. This
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way the Talking Heads can detect (again more or less) reliably a coherent context.
Since the Talking Heads cannot move from their place, the cameras observe a
referent more or less similarly at different times. The differences they detect are
mainly due to changing lighting conditions and possibly changes made on the
white board by human intervention introducing new referents. Another source
of difference lies in the fact that the robots can change bodies, and thus observe
a particular area of the white board from different positions. However, these
positions are limited to two at each site. The mobile robots can move freely in
their environment.
Besides the different sensory apparatus (a camera instead of light sensors) and
different referents (geometrical figures), there are already several important dif-
ferences found:
1. The first fundamental difference is the number of agents that are in the lan-
guage community. In the Talking Heads there is a dynamic flow of agents
that learn the language at different sites, whereas in the experiments pre-
sented here, there are only two agents.
2. Another fundamental difference is that the agents cannot move freely in
their environment, but they can only pan-tilt their movements and they
can travel from site to site and from camera to camera. The mobile robots
can move freely in their environment which is only at one site. The robots
cannot change from body.
3. The third difference is that the Talking Heads have a calibrated world in
which they can establish joint attention by means of pointing reliably. The
calibration is also incorporated to detect a more or less coherent context,
which is a flaw in the mobile robots implementation.
Another source of differences can be found in the segmentation, feature ex-
traction and categorisation processes of the two applications. Besides the fact
that the Talking Heads have cameras and a different environment of objects, the
way information is extracted from the image differs in fundamental ways. In
the mobile robots experiments the feature extraction is developed to identify
classes of light sources that are placed at different heights. The Talking Heads
have feature extractors that are more abstract and can be used for instance to
name very different objects similarly by using information about their relative
positions in a context. The feature extraction of the Talking Heads extracts fea-
tures about colour, horizontal position, vertical position, relative object size and
a filling ratio of the segmented area inside a rectangular bounding box. This way
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the Talking Heads develop a language not to recognise objects directly on their
shape, texture etc., but also on their relative position in a particular context. Such
abstractions are not made on the mobile robots.
Categories in the Talking Heads are constructed using a binary tree, which
splits subparts of the sensory channel space in equal halves of increasing gran-
ularity. Besides one experiment, the mobile robots’ categories are represented
as prototypical categories. In addition, the Talking Heads construct categories
that start searching lexical elements with one dimensional categories. When it
fails finding a good match, the Talking Heads look for all possible categories of
dimension 2 etc. This continuous until a good match is found or until the naming
game fails. In the binary tree method, the categories need not to be composed of
elements from one hierarchical layer. They can also be composedwith a combina-
tion of elements stored at different hierarchical layers. Remember that the binary
tree method does not work with different versions of the feature space, but the
different versions can be compared with different hierarchical layers. Thus the
Talking Heads potentially looks for all possible configurations of categories. This
process is guided by the naming game; when a suitable category is found in the
lexicon either for production of utterances or understanding, the search for more
complex categories stops.
Another feature of the category selection is guided by the notion of saliency.
After the discrimination game, a category that is most salient will be used in the
naming game. This way, the Talking Heads have a more invariant and coherent
way of categorising a certain scene. In the mobile robots it is opted to consider
only categories that span all the dimensions of the feature space. This way the
mobile robots are guaranteed to find a category that has the invariant property
of the segment in it. As argued, exploiting saliency does not guarantee to find
that information, whereas exploiting all dimensions of the feature space does.
Summarising, the differences found at the feature extraction and categorisa-
tion level between the Talking Heads and the mobile robots are:
4. The feature extraction of the Talking Heads extract more abstract infor-
mation of the sensed image. Most notably are those of colour and spatial
information.
5. The discrimination games in the Talking Heads explores categories that
are composed of one or more dimensions of the feature space at possibly
different hierarchical layers. It stops when a suitable match is found.
6. Saliency is incorporated in the Talking Heads to guide invariant and coher-
ent categorisations. This is necessary because, among others, the Talking
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Heads have more abstract feature extractors (4) and categories may not
span all the dimensions of the feature space (5).
In the naming part of the guessing game there are no large differences appar-
ent. The only main differences are in the word-form adoption strategies, some
parameter settings and the adaptation mechanisms of scores.
In the Talking Heads word-forms are adopted when there is a mismatch in the
referents the two robots identified as the topic. In the mobile robots this only
done in certain experiments. In both experiments word-forms are adopted when
the hearer could not find a matching word-meaning pair that matches the cat-
egorisation. When word-forms are adopted in the Talking Heads, the speaker
points to the topic and the hearer adopts the uttered word-form with the identi-
fied topic from pointing.
The word-form creation probability in the Talking Heads are always set to 1,
whereas this was set initially in the basic experiment presented here this was
set to 0.02. Kaplan (2000) investigated the different parameter settings of Ps. The
experiments reported in Chapter 5 revealed that when 0.1 ≤ Ps ≤ 0.9 the mobile
robots system worked best.
The scores are adapted in the Talking Heads by a different scheme than incor-
porated in the mobile robots. The scores s are adapted according to the following
equation:
σ = σ ′ + δ · X(7.1)
where σ ′ is the previous value, δ is a constant (usually set to 0.1) and
X =

1 if association is used successful
−1
{
if association is lateral
if association yields mismatch
(7.2)
This equation allows the scores to vary rapidly in through time, thus allowing
instability in some way. In addition, the method lets the scores to hold only a
little information on past effectiveness of an association. The walking average
method used on the mobile robots do not alternate heavily in time and it holds
information about a longer period of use. In fact it holds all past experiences, al-
though recent past experiences influence the scores more than experiences from
long ago.
So, the naming game of the Talking Heads differs from the mobile robots
mainly in the following features:
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7. Word-forms are always adopted when there is a mismatch or misunder-
standing in any way. In such cases, the speaker always provides the hearer
with topic information by means of pointing. In the mobile robots word-
form adoption is done always only in a few experiments. In the case of
word-form adoption, the hearer randomly selects a segment to be the topic.
8. The word-form creation probability Ps is always set to 1 in the Talking
Heads experiment. A lower value is used in the mobile robots.
9. The scores adapted in the Talking Heads are adapted differently than in
the mobile robots. The method used in the Talking Heads allows more
fluctuations and does not keep track of effectiveness in a longer history
than in the mobile robots.
The differences between the mobile robots experiment and the Talking Heads
are summarised in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: The summarised differences between the mobile robots experiments
and the Talking Heads experiments.
mobile robots talking heads
Referents Light sources Geometrical figures
Sensors Light sensors without
spatial information
Camera
Nr. of agents 2 Variable ≥ 2
Mobility Mobile Immobile
Calibration of world Yes No
Feature extraction Not complex Complex
Category span in n
dimensional feature
space





Form creation rate Ps < 1 Ps = 1




When comparing the results of the Talking Heads (Steels 1999; Kaplan 2000)
with the results obtained in this book (mainly reported in the guessing game
in Chapter 6), a first observation is that the results quantitatively are similar.
Discriminative success is also very high (Steels 1999) and the communicative
success varies between 50 % and 80 % (Kaplan 2000). The main reason why the
communicative success is low in the Talking Heads has been ascribed to the fact
that there is a continuous flow of agents in the environment.
In more controlled experiments where there are two agents developing a lex-
icon, the success increases, although it still does not converge to 100 % as the
system does in simulations (Steels 1999). The time of convergence, as far as there
is convergence, is much faster than in the mobile robots experiment. The time of
convergence is already achieved after 25 language games. In cases where there
are more than two agents the speed of convergence is longer and complete suc-
cess has not been obtained after 35,000 games (Steels 1999). An important source
of failure is ascribed to the uncertainties that is part of the physical interactions.
As in the mobile robots, experiment failures occur mainly when the robots do
not detect a coherent context or when pointing used for feedback fails.
In the mobile robots experiment convergence is never achieved before 1,000
language games; it usually takes about 2,000 games in the optimal models. This
is a rather long period, also when comparing the results with the experiments
of Billard & Hayes (1999). Billard’s robots learned a grounded lexicon in less
than 30 language games. The difference with Billard’s experiment is that one of
her robots had its lexicon pre-programmed and the other robot learned this lexi-
con. In the current experiment the lexicon has to be developed completely from
scratch; a task that is naturally much harder. The reason why convergence takes
long in the mobile robots experiment has probably to do with the mobility of
the robots. Due to this mobility the differences in sensing in different language
games is larger than in the Talking Heads. Furthermore, the two robots partic-
ipating a language game have larger differences in sensing as is the case in the
Talking Heads.
Although there are main differences in the experimental set-ups between the
Talking Heads and the mobile robots, the results are similar. The success of the
mobile robots experiments is consistently lower than in the Talking Heads ex-
periment with two agents. As argued, the communicative success of the mobile
robots experiment cannot exceed 80 % because there is a large fraction of situa-
tions in which the robots do not share a coherent context. Due to more reliable
context setting in the Talking Heads as a result of the calibration of the cam-
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eras orientation in relation to their environment, this fraction is much less in the
Talking Heads. The communicative success of the mobile robots when subtract-
ing the 20 % of failures due to context incoherence is very much similar to the
success obtained in the Talking Heads.
The categorisation in the Talking Heads use different representations for the
categories: a binary tree is used rather than a prototype representation. Assum-
ing that the binary tree method is very similar the binary subspace method, the
results presented in Section 5.1 showed that the binary tree method does not
work just as well as the prototype method.
When a binary tree is being developed, the categories of the tree do not cover
the complete feature spaces, whereas the prototypes do once they are formed
at a certain space. Hence the binary tree method cannot always categorise a
segment a every layer. When one of the segments cannot be categorised at a
certain layer, this layer is discarded in the discrimination game. The latter is
due to implementation limitations, which had been introduced for consistency
reasons (investigating a conjunction of four categories at the same hierarchical
layer). When looking at the success evolution of the discrimination games in the
Talking Heads (e.g. Steels 1999) it is clear that the success evolves similar to the
success of the prototype method presented in this book. In addition, de Jong (de
Jong & Vogt 1998; de Jong 2000) showed that applying the adaptive subspace
method, also yield similar results.3 This indicates that the power of categorisa-
tion lies not in the representation of categories, but rather in the methodology
of the discrimination games. This methodology is strongly based on generation
and selection of categories.
In the Talking Heads saliency is thought to be crucial in the establishment of
a coherent lexicon (Steels 1999). The results of the mobile robots experiments
showed that this can also be accomplished by preferring categories that span
all the dimensions of the feature space. Depending on the type of information
that needs to be categorised, one might prefer one method above another. When
one wants to categorise a variety of abstract notions like spatial information of
left/right, up/down or colour, one is interested in only one or more dimensions
of the feature space. In such cases the method of saliency may be preferred.
When the most information of an observation lies in the entire feature space,
one might prefer categories that span all dimensions in this feature space. In this
case saliency appears to be redundant. Furthermore, the sensory data revealed
that saliency does not guarantee invariance filtering. In more complex systems
3 Note that de Jong does not apply its experiments on the Talking Heads. de Jong’s experiments
are a simulation on the emergence of communication about situation concepts.
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where there are many more different sensory channels, a combination of both
might be useful.
In the mobile robots experiments it appeared that one-to-many relations be-
tween form and meaning can benefit the communication system as long as poly-
semy and synonymy is minimised. In his PhD. thesis Kaplan (2000) presented an
experiment in which groups of categories are classified in a variant of the nam-
ing game. In this variant clusters of categories tend to be named with the same
word-form. The categories are distributed as points in the conceptual space,
cf. Gärdenfors (1996). When an agent cannot name a particular category, the
agent can recruit the name of a category (or meaning) that is mathematically in
the same cluster of the conceptual space. This way a classification of meanings
emerge that are lexicalized with the same word-form. Although in the mobile
robots experiment, such classifications emerge from the existing model, it may
be beneficial for the agents to explicitly recruit neighbouring categories. This
is because such classifications in the mobile robots experiment are in continu-
ous competition with each other. They are thus exposed to antagonising forces.
Hence a deliberate recruitment may overcome this effect.
When looking at competition diagrams, the diagrams in the Talking Heads
look very similar to the ones presented in this book. This is not very surpris-
ing, since the competition between the different elements are very similar. Self-
organisation at the word-meaning level is established mainly by the update of as-
sociation scores. As reported in Steels (1999), de Jong (2000) and Kaplan (2000),
the main source of self-organisation appears to be lateral inhibition. When a
form-meaning association is used successfully, the score of the winning associa-
tion is increased and the scores of other associationswith either theword-form or
meaning are inhibited. In the language experiments the lateral inhibition sharp-
ens the difference between associations that are proven to be successful and con-
nections that are less successful. This way punishment of possible failures of
previously successful associations has little influence and the associations are
still likely to be used again. If lateral inhibition is not used, less successful as-
sociations can easily take over effective ones, causing instability. Hence a more
stable communication system is present.
According to de Jong (2000), lateral inhibition is more powerful than the re-
wards taken from the evaluated success. In an experiment where success was
not evaluated, but where there was lateral inhibition, guided only by the use of
associations, agents were well capable of learning a communication system. The
observational games confirm the findings of de Jong. Lateral inhibition disam-
biguates the level of synonymy and polysemy to a large extend, as observed in
Section 5.4.
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That lateral inhibition is such a powerful mechanism in self-organising sys-
tems should not be a surprise. It has already proved to be a powerful mecha-
nism of self-organisation in cognitive sciences. The Kohonen networks (or Self-
Organising Maps) showed how topological maps emerge in connectionist mod-
els that are fundamentally based on lateral inhibition. When activation of certain
neurons results in a desired response of the network, neighbouring neurons are
excited and neurons that lie further away are laterally inhibited. Similar mecha-
nisms are also used in Hebbian learning.
Kaplan (2000) reported an experiment in which the creation probability Ps has
been varied between 0.1 and 1.0 in a series of simulations of the guessing game.
The results showed a similar result as obtained in Chapter 5. There are hardly
differences in the evolution of the communicative success. Nevertheless, the
number of word-forms that enter the language does increase. Kaplan does not
investigate what the influences are for the quality of the communication system
that emerged other than reporting on the time of convergence of the system.4
In the Talking Heads Ps is usually set to 1. No negative side-effects have been
reported on this. But recall that the meanings of the Talking Heads are more
abstract (using e.g. spatial relations) and the aim of the experiment is to name
these meanings. In the mobile robots experiment the aim of the robots is to
name the referents with meanings that more directly correspond to the sensing,
rather than naming the referents by using abstract and relative meanings. In the
Talking Heads word-forms emerge that mean e.g. ‘left’, ‘far left’ or ‘close left’
and distinctions that have even more granularity. These word-forms can be used
to name different referents depending on the context of the language game. In
the mobile robots experiments the aim was that the robots learn to name the
referents that are in their context (and categorisation is context-dependent), but
independent of the orientation at which these are observed. To achieve this, a
lower setting Ps is more effective, since it allows more one-to-many relations
between form and meaning to cancel out the one-to-many relations between
referent and meaning. This way a word-form better relates to one referent. Thus
solving the symbol grounding problem more invariantly.
7.5.3 Summary
So, although there are many differences in the details between the Talking Heads
experiment and the mobile robots experiment, the principles of the models used
4 Convergence is established when the communicative success becomes 1. Kaplan measures the
success of his experiments by the average time a system needs to converge.
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are the same. The results are therefore also very similar. Due to the fact that
the Talking Heads are better controllable, the heads are better capable of con-
structing a coherent context. In addition the differences in sensing between two
Talking Heads is smaller than in the mobile robots experiments. As a result of
this, the maximum communicative success is much lower. Furthermore, arriving
at a stabilised success takes longer in the mobile robots experiments.
Lateral inhibition is found to be crucial for the development of a coherent lex-
icon in the Talking Heads (Steels 1999; Kaplan 2000) and in simulation done by
de Jong (2000). Experiments in the observational language game confirm this
finding.
Although the details of the categorisation differs a lot in the different models
used here, by Steels (1999) and de Jong (2000), the discrimination games explored
in all these models reveal similar results. Hence the power lies in the model of
the discrimination games rather than somewhere else.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the naming game. Although different
interaction schemes may be used, as well as alternative adaptation schemes, the
results of the two experimental set-ups are rather similar.
Hence, most important observation is that the principle of generation, selec-
tion and (cultural) interaction is a strong tool in explaining grounded lexicon
emergence.
7.6 Future directions
This book showed how the symbol grounding problem can be solved in a real-
world multi agent system in which robots interact with their environment (in-
cluding each other), adapt their ontology and lexicon individually and the re-
sulting ontology and lexicon are formed through self-organisation. In the ex-
periments, the symbols have been grounded in a lexicon, however the method of
discrimination games can also be applied to other task oriented applications, like
navigation. In such an application, the naming game can be replaced by another
type of game, for instance a self localisation game.
Since the set-up of this experiment has many elements of a toy problem, it is
necessary to scale up the models and test them in a more realistic real world envi-
ronment. The Talking Heads experiment as it is does not suffice this requirement
because the Heads’ world consists only of geometrical figures. The experiments
currently being investigated by Frédéric Kaplan (2000) are a better example. In
his new experiment he uses a dog-like robot, the aibo developed by Sony csl
in Tokyo, that learns a language from human-robot interaction in a world with
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real toys (furry animals and balls). More interesting would be an experiment
with a mobile robot navigating in an office environment. In such an experiment
the robot can ground “natural” landmarks like doors, paintings or whatever ex-
ists in an office environment. This way the robots can communicate about their
whereabouts.
Another interesting direction that can also be applied in a navigation task is
grounding a lexicon about actions, like going left and going right. A preliminary
study on this has been published in Vogt (1999) and Vogt (2000b). In this study
two robots engage in a follow me game. The robots take turns in being the
speaker and hearer. The speaker drives in front doing obstacle avoidance. The
hearer follows the speaker by doing phototaxis on the light that the speaker car-
ries. When the speaker changes its direction, it categorises the action and tries
to produce a single word utterance. When the hearer receives the utterance, it
also categorises its actions and tries to interpret the utterance. When the hearer
understands the speaker and it is still following it, the game is successful. Later
in the games, the hearer can try to follow the speaker only by using the speaker’s
utterances.
In this game, categorisation is done by what has been called the identifica-
tion game. By using reconstruction vectors of a time series (first proposed for
categorisation by Rosenstein & Cohen 1998a) a segment of the time series is com-
pared to the prototypes that it constructed. If there is a prototype close enough
to the segment that corresponds to the robot’s action, the identification game is
successful. When the robot fails to identify such a prototype, it creates a new
one, taking the segment as an example.
Integrating the “perceptual” language game, the follow me game and, for in-
stance, the self-localisation game can result in an interesting experiment where
robots learn to communicate about navigation. The result may be a path plan-
ning game, where the robots learn a language during a navigation task in such a
way that a path can be planned based on the grounded interactions. In addition,
it should be possible that one robot can give route descriptions to another robot
for going somewhere. Not by saying “go forward for 5 meter, then turn 90o left,
go forward 3 meters …”, but by saying “go forward until you see a yellow paint-
ing, go left, at the red door …”. This idea has been proposed for a post-doctoral
research at the University of Amsterdam in co-operation with the vub ai Lab.
An interesting side effect of such an experiment is that it can be integratedwith
newly investigatedmodels inwhich grammatical structures are developed (Steels
2000). In these new ideas, a procedural cognitive semantics is constructed, from




For all future experiments on (mobile) robots in this direction, it is advisable
to use off-the-shelf robots when possible. It turned out that developing the cur-
rent system was immensely difficult, and for a great deal the problems had to do
with the unreliability of the sensorimotor board of the robots and the unreliable
sensory equipment. Off-the-shelf robots are tested on their robustness and their
sensorimotor equipment has been calibrated. Hence, modelling a cognitive sys-
tem on such a robot is more easy. A disadvantage is that one has to cope with
the physical limitations of the robots that are used.
Additional interesting future research areas are involved with categorisation,
attention and feedback. For instance, is there a way to make a fuzzy categorisa-
tion system that benefits the grounding process? In this book the fuzzy system
did not provide much improvement over the normal categorisation, but it has
been mentioned that this might happen in more complex environment. Recruit-
ing similar categories or meanings in the naming game (Kaplan 2000) might also
be an interesting and beneficial strategy for selecting form-meaning associations
and classification.
Can the categorisation improve when the phase space of the sensorimotor
space is exploited using techniques from non-linear dynamics? In Rosenstein
& Cohen (1998a) and Vogt (1999), such methods have proved to be successful in
the categorisation of time series. Perhaps this could also be applied to the sensing
of real world objects.
Besides the discrimination game, other strategies of categorisation could be
investigated. Distinctions are not the only source of meaning. Identification is
another. An identification game has already been explored in Vogt (1999; 2000b).
When a segment is close enough to a prototypical category, the identification is
completed. If it fails, new categories may be introduced in the ontology. Possibly
similar strategies can be invented.
In the current implementations attention has been pre-programmed by means
of internal inspection. It would be interesting to implement other more realistic
strategies modelling attention. Saliency could be one source of attention selector,
novelty could be another one. Several studies argue that humans tend to focus
their attention at salient events in their surroundings and use these events as
the topic of their conversation, see e.g. Dessalles 2000. Robotic studies could be
made where such mechanisms are investigated. In addition, it is interesting to
investigate ways how such mechanisms could be learned or perhaps acquired by
genetic selection.
A similar argument can be given about the feedback. This has now also been
implemented by means of internal inspection. Other more plausible methods
should be developed. This is best done when having the agents operate and com-
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municate in a task-oriented application. Then agents can evaluate the success of
a language game based on the outcome of the task, which indicates the success
of the language game.
To make the model physiological more plausible, a more biologically inspired
structure of representation and processing should be investigated. A potential
architecture would be the selectionist architecture proposed by Gerald Edelman
and colleagues (1987). One language game model has already been implemented
in the Neural Darwinism approach (Popescu-Belis 1997). Another more simple
neuronal implementation of the language game is done by Dircks & Stoness
(1999).
7.7 Conclusions
This book showed how the symbol grounding problem is solved in a particular
experiment. In this experiment, two robots developed a shared and grounded
lexicon about the light sources that they could detect in their environment. In
the experiments the robots construct relations between the referents, meanings
and forms so that they can communicate the referents by using forms efficiently.
Conformwith the theories on semiotics, the relation between a referent, meaning
and form is called a symbol.
The model that has been developed lets the robots do a hybrid set of tasks:
sensing, segmentation, feature extraction, categorisation, discrimination, nam-
ing, evaluating feedback and adaptation. This way the robots develop a shared
lexicon based on three principles as hypothesised by Luc Steels (1996c): individ-
ual adaptation, cultural evolution and self-organisation.
Because the robots detect their environment differently under different cir-
cumstances, the categorisations of the light sources they try to name differ as
well. However, the mechanisms that guide the lexicon formation (i.e. the nam-
ing gamemodel) allowmany-to-many relations between category (meaning) and
form. Feedback or joint attention cause the robots to select relations in such a
way that there emerges more or less one-to-many relations between form and
meaning. This way the robots construct a lexicon that enables them to communi-
cate the referents rather consistently. It appeared that the physical conditions of
the robots influence their ability to co-ordinate their interactions, which in turn
influenced their capability to ground a shared lexicon.
So, the symbol grounding problem has been solved for this particular experi-
mental set-up, but there is still a long way to go for robotic agents to develop a
grounded language within its full scope. Nevertheless, this book provides a good




Actual success The actual success is a measure that calculates the average suc-
cess of the past 100 language games. A language game is successful when
both robots of a language successfully identified a symbol that has the
same form and stands for the same referent. Often this is the same as the
communicative success. In these cases, the latter measure will be used.
Binary subspace A binary subspace is a region in the feature space. Binary sub-
spaces are constructed by splitting another subspace in two equal halves
in one dimension of the feature space. A binary subspace is a possible
definition of a category.
Categorisation Categorisation is the process in which a feature vector is related
to one or more categories. In the experiments a category is defined by
either a prototypical category or a binary subspace.
Category A category is defined by a region in the feature space.
Communicative success The communicative success is a measure that calculates
the average success of the past 100 language games as evaluated by the
robots themselves. This need not be the same as the actual success.
Context A context is the set of segments identified from a single sensing event.
Consistency Consistency is a measure that indicates how consistent the refer-
ents are named by some word-forms.
Discrimination Discrimination is a process where the robot identifies categories
that relate to one feature vector, but not to another feature vector from the
same view. This discrimination takes place at the category level. Harnad
(1990) defines discrimination directly at the level of perception. Unless
mentioned otherwise, the term discrimination is used at the category level.
Discriminative success The discriminative success is a measure that calculates
the average success of the discrimination games of a robot in the past 100
A Glossary
language games. If a robot does not play a discrimination game in a lan-
guage game, the discrimination game is considered to be a failure.
Distinctive category A distinctive category is a category that relates to some seg-
ment in a context, but not to any other segment in the same context.
Distinctiveness Distinctiveness is a measure that indicates to what degree the
meanings used by a robot relates to the same referent as before.
Feature A feature is a value between [0, 1] that designates a property of the
sensed segment.
Feature extraction Feature extraction calculates some property of the sensed seg-
ment from the sensor data. It reduces the complexity of the segment and
returns a set of values that designate features.
Feature space The feature space is an n-dimensional space where each dimen-
sion is related to some property that can be calculated from the sensory
data that a robot can sense. In the experiments described here there are 4
dimensions, each relating to a property of a sensory channel. The domain
of each dimension are real values between [0, 1].
Feature vector A feature vector is an n-dimensional vector in the feature space
that has as its elements the different features that are extracted from a
segment. This way a feature vector is related to a segment.
Feedback Feedback is the process where the robots evaluate the effectiveness of
a language game, i.e. whether both robots communicated the same referent.
The feedback evaluated can be both positive as negative.
Form A form is an arbitrary string of characters from an alphabet.
Iconisation Iconisation is the forming iconic representations. It is a term that Har-
nad (1990) identifies as a subpart of solving the symbol grounding problem.
Identification Harnad (1990) defines identification as the invariant categorisation
of sensing a real world phenomenon. In this book this means that both
robots successfully related the referent to a meaning and a form. Although
the meaning can be different, the referent and form must be the same for
both robots.
Joint attention With joint attention is meant the state where both participants of
a language game know the topic prior to the verbal communication.
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Lexicon A lexicon is the set of form-meaning pairs that a robot has stored in its
memory.
Meaning In the theory of semiotics meaning is the sense that is made of the
symbol. The meaning arises in the interpretation of the symbol. In the
experiments this is the category that a robot used in a language game to
name a referent.
Parsimony Parsimony is a measure that indicates to what degree a referent gives
rise to the use of a unique meaning.
Polysemy Polysemy is the notion that a form is used to name more than one
referent.
Prototype A prototype is defined as a point in the n-dimensional feature space
and it is used for defining a category.
Prototypical category A prototypical category is a category that is represented in
the feature space by a prototype. It is defined by the region of which the
points in the feature space are nearest to the prototype.
Referent A referent is that what the symbol “stands for”. In the experiments, the
referents in the robots’ environment are light sources.
Segment A segment is a set of data from the sensory channels that is obtained
by segmentation.
Segmentation Segmentation is the process in which the aim is, given a sensed
data set, to construct regions that corresponds directly to a real world ob-
ject. It is implemented by a process that identifies from a sensed data set
connected areas that are uniform in some way.
Sensing Sensing is the process in which a robot records a view of its surround-
ings. In the experiments described here, the robots make a full 360o turn
while recording. Sensing results in a set of data points given on the sensory
channels.
Sensory channel A sensory channel is the channel in which the numeric output
of a particular sensor flows.
Specificity Specificity is a measure that indicates to what degree forms are used
to name a unique referent.
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Symbol The definition of a symbol is adopted from C.S. Peirce’s theory on semi-
otics. A symbol is defined as the relation between a referent, a meaning
and a form. This relation is often illustrated with the semiotic triangle.
Synonymy Synonymy is the notion that one referent is named by more than one
form.
Topic The segment that is the subject of a discrimination game and/or language
game is called the topic.
Word-form See form.
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Appendix B: PDL code
In this appendix the pdfl program that runs on the physical part of the robots is
presented. Its purpose is to sketch how the behaviour-based cognitive architec-
ture presented in Chapter 3 can be implemented in pdl.
The language game scenario that the program implements has partly been in-
troduced in Chapter 3. The scenario is extended with the part in which the robots
can find each other autonomously, as discussed in more detail in Steels & Vogt
(1997) and Vogt (1997).
The program is adapted such that there is more readability than the original
program. This means that some debug facilities are left out, as well as some by-
passes, which have been made to solve some not yet understood peculiarities of
the robots’ behaviours. In addition, although no actual implementation has been
made in pdl, it is sketched how the cognitive part of the language game may be
implemented in pdl. This sketch, however, leaves away the critical parts of the
segmentation, discrimination and naming processes.
pdl has been introduced in Chapter 2. pdl is implemented in ansi c. Part of the
code is in c, but it should be readable also for non-c programmers. Remarks are
given between /* and */ or behind a double slash: //. pdl processes are defined
as functions, which are usually preceded by a void.
/* Here are some include files with libraries for PDL, SMBII and C.
Also some definitions and declarations are present.






/*PDL declarations of quantities.




quantity LFBumper, RFBumper, LBBumper, RBBumper;
//Left- and Right- Front and Back Bumpers
quantity L0,L1,L2,L3; //The white light sensors.
quantity LeftIR, FrontIR, RightIR;
quantity LM, RM;//Left- and Right Motors
quantity IREm0,IREm1,IREm2,IREm3;//IR emitters
/*Basic behavior processes
Touch Based Obsacle Avoidance (TBOA) */
void touch_based_obstacle_avoidance(){
int T,DL=1,DR=1;
/*If both front bumpers are active one of the directions to turn
is randomly chosen. The appropriate direction DL(eft) or DR(ight)








/*If LFBumper and MotTBOA (motivation for obstacle avoidance
are active, then LM:=-Retract and RM:=-LargeRetract









/*If one of the back-bumpers is pressed and its motivation (MotTBOA)







/*Rotation with RotateSpeed in direction of MotRot.
If MotRot=1, then robot turns right.





/*Active IR Obstacle Avoidance (AOA) and IR-taxis
Since the IR modulation for AOA is the inverse of IR-taxis,
the same process is used. So, if MotIRT=1, then IR-taxis is
applied, and if MotIRT=-1, AOA is applied.
The IR modulation is regulated in the IR emission module ...
inv_sigmoid dampens the difference between the left and right IR,












/*When MotFW is on, the robot will try to accelerate towards default speed.












/*Pulsing the IR. During their default behavior the robots emit pulses









/*Emitting the IR. The modulation of the IR is set to 1
if the IR=1 (this means the IR is OFF), then the robot
can detect other IR sources.
If the IR > 1, the modulation is set to 95, so the robot













The 0 gives the reliability bit (i.e. unreliable transmission)
receipient is the identity of the receiving robot.
strlngth is the length of the message in bytes.









/*timing increments the Timer and evaluates whether or not the
robot is in a particular state too long. If so, the robot will






















/*Segmentation: In the actual implementation, the sensor-data is
transmitted to a radio base station, connected to a PC.
How the segmentation is done is discussed extensively in chapter 3.
The actual segmentation takes place off-line and the implementation




/*Read and process values of quantities L0, L1, L2 and L3.
This process includes sensing and featue extraction.
For each segment found, the feature values are calculated,







/*The processes discrimination_game, production, understanding and
feedbackadaptation are all processed off-board. They are given
for completeness, however the implementation details are left out.































/*So far (for now) the cognitive processes, which are mentioned for
completeness. The code continues with on-board processing.
maximize() detects a maximum in the IR flow of the front IR sensor.
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/*speaker() implements the finite state automaton of the speaker.
Each state is divided in a set op actions and final conditions.
The actions are executed by the basic behaviors or processes as
defined above.
The basic behaviors are activated by setting the motivations to
their appropriate values. The motivations are specified with MotXX,
where XX refers to the particular behavior.
For reasons of clarity not all motivations are continously given.
Unless otherwise specified, all motivations are initially set to 0.
After changes, when a motivation is not given, its values is as
last specified.
The final conditions of one state are either the pre-conditions of
the next state, or the pre-condition of state 0 in which the
default_behavior process (see below) take over. The latter type of
final condition is modeled by MaxTime and the process timing.









/*Waiting for confirmation and after the IR-switch has been
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relaxed, the speaker can determine in which direction to
























MotTBOA=0; /*If robot rotates, obstacle avoidance is nasty side-effect*/
//Final conditions
if (Timer>(RotationTime-1)){
/*If robot has not found other robot yet,
keep searching using taxis in next state.
Since the MaxTime in this state is
RotationTime, the transition has to be made
before, otherwise the state will be






StateSpeaker=3;/*Distance to hearer is too big.*/
else
StateSpeaker=4;/*Distance to hearer is ok.*/
































/*If the robot detects enough IR with its LeftBackIR sensor,
it stops. It stands still approximately when it is facing
the opponent robot backwards.
Using taxis would be more sophistigated, but takes longer and
is more error-prone.
Since the hearer must transfer to the next state simultaneously,





















/*There is a message saying the hearer aligned successfully.







case 6:{/*The speaker does its sensing, segmentation and feature
extraction.









/*After a particular time, the speaker stops rotating when it



























case 8:{/*The rest of the speaker’s FSA is how it would look like
if the cognitive part is processed on-board.











StateSpeaker=9; /*Discimination game was success.*/
else{/*Discimination game was a failure.
Language game ends in failure.





















/*The speaker produced an meaningful utterance*/
StateSpeaker=10;
}
else{/*The speaker could not produce an utterance.














/*Hearer provided feedback, which needs to be interpreted.


















case 0:{/*Default state. See default_behavior().*/
break;
}













case 2:{/*The hearer has to wait for the IR to relaxate.






























case 4:{/*The speaker does its sensing, segmentation and



























































else{/*The speaker failed either to produce or discriminate



















case 9:{/*Feedback and adaptation.*/
//Actions















/*default_behavior describes the robots’ behavior when they are
exploring their environment ’arbitrary’ in order to find each
other.
When one robot finds another contact is made, and the robots








MotIRT=-1;/*Inverse IR-taxis is Active Obstacle Avoidance*/
MotRot=0;













































/*Quantities are added to the network.
Each quantity has a name, an upper value,
a lower value and an initial value.
*/
//Sensors:
Identity = add_quantity(”Identity”, 1.0,0.0,0.0);
LFBumper = add_quantity(”LeftFrontBumper”, 1.0,0.0,1.0);
RFBumper = add_quantity(”RightFrontBumper”, 1.0,0.0,1.0);
LBBumper = add_quantity(”LeftBackBumper”, 1.0,0.0,1.0);

































































Appendix C: Sensory data distribution
To investigate some properties of real-world experiments, it is interesting to
know how the frequency of segments corresponding to light sources is distribut-
ed. Figure C.1 shows how this distribution is found in the recorded data set. It is
interesting to note that light source l0 is detected most often; r1 segmented l0
on the average even more than once a situation. Figure C.2 shows the distribu-
tion of context size frequencies. It should be clear that contexts are not always
of equal size within one situation, nor can one observe a normal distribution of
set sizes.
Figures C.3 and C.4 show how the data is distributed after segmentation and
feature extraction has been applied on the basic data set. The figures show the
distributions of features for dimensions (a) wl0, (b) wl1, (c) wl2 and (d) wl3
after perceiving light sources l0 and l3. The x-axes show the intervals between
0 and 1 with step-sizes of 0.1. The lower bound is included in the intervals and
the upper bound is not. The last “interval” shows the frequency of feature value
1.0. The figures should be read as follows: When a certain sensory channel reads
feature value 1.0, this sensory channel corresponds with the light source at the
same height (e.g. sc0 corresponds with l0). The relative frequency of reading
feature value 1.0 for this referent is 1. The relative frequencies of all other sensory
channels is distributed on the sensory space. It should be clear that most feature
values of other sensory channels read values in the interval [0.0, 0.1⟩. However,
there are more sensory channels that are not directly adjacent. Between 0.1 and
1.0, the distribution is low and not structurally distributed. Hence the data shows
no clear laws in the distribution. This indicates the noisy perception of the robots.
Noise that cannot directly be simulated.





























Figure C.1: The distribution of the frequency of corresponding segments in the






















































































































Figure C.4: The distribution of feature values observed for light source l3.
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Appendix D: Lexicon and ontology
In this appendix the lexicon and ontology of the basic experiment (Chapter 4) is
given. Of some additional meanings the legend is given (Tables D.5 and D.6). The
lexicons (Tables D.1 and D.2) and ontologies (Tables D.3 and D.4) give weighted
conditional probabilities based on co-occurrences of word and meaning or mean-
ing and referent. These probabilities P(ci|bj) are calculated as follows:
P(ci|bj) =
P(ci)∑n




where ci are word-forms and bj are the concepts when calculating the lexical
entries P(F|C). When calculating the probabilities for the ontologies ci are the
referents and bj are the concepts, yielding P(R|C). The tables only show a part of
the lexicon and ontology. Entries that have probabilities ≤ 0.01 are left out.
The legends of some occurringmeanings for robots r0 and r1 are given in tables
D.5 and D.6.
D Lexicon and ontology
Table D.1: Lexicon of robot r0. The cells of the table give the weighted condi-
tional probabilities that a word-form is used to name a meaning. These
probabilities are based on the occurrence frequencies in one of the ex-
periments after 5,000 language games. Associations with probabilities
lower than 0.01 are left out for clarity.
C-F huma xomu wosa kyga vyqa guhu lyzu poma pugu wely
M53 0.58 − − − − − − − − −
M67 0.08 − − − − − − − − −
M30 0.02 0.37 − − − − − − − −
M39 0.01 − − − − − − − − −
M18 − 0.14 − − − − − − − −
M20 − 0.09 − − − − − − − −
M17 − 0.04 − − − − − − − −
M22 − 0.03 − − − − − − − −
M43 − 0.03 − − − − − − − −
M16 − 0.02 − − − − − − − −
M26 − − 0.37 − − − − 0.11 − −
M5 − − − 0.40 − − − − − −
M27 − − − 0.07 − − − − − −
M33 − − − 0.04 − − − − − −
M15 − − − 0.02 − − − − − −
M58 − − − − 0.51 − − − − −
M393 − − − − 0.08 − − − − −
M211 − − − − 0.04 − − − − −
M484 − − − − 0.04 − − − − −
M23 − − − − − 0.80 − − − −
M61 − − − 0.08 − − 0.44 0.01 − −
M55 − − − 0.01 − − 0.11 − − −
M394 − − − − − − 0.02 − − −
M46 − − − − − − 0.01 − − −
M169 0.01 − − − − − − − 0.46 −
M238 − − − − − − − − 0.26 −
M121 − − − − − − − − − 1.00
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Table D.2: Lexicon of robot r1.
C-B huma xomu wosa kyga vyqa guhu lyzu poma pugu wely
M4 0.44 − 0.02 − 0.01 − − − 0.01 −
M51 0.12 − − − − − − − − −
M55 0.08 − − − − − − − − −
M37 0.03 − − − − − − − − −
M1 0.02 − − − − − − − − −
M69 0.01 − − − − − − − − −
M91 0.01 − − − − − − 0.03 − −
M5 − 0.33 − − − − − − − −
M39 − − 0.40 − − − − − − −
M81 − − 0.10 − − − − 0.12 − −
M13 − − 0.05 − − − − − − −
M96 − − 0.03 − − − − − − −
M40 − − 0.02 − − − − − − −
M16 − − 0.02 − − − − − − −
M65 − − 0.02 − 0.07 − − − − −
M46 − − 0.02 − − − − − − −
M21 − − 0.01 − − − − − − −
M242 − − 0.01 − 0.04 − − − − −
M0 − − − 0.30 − − − − − −
M22 − − − 0.18 − − − − − 0.01
M78 − − − 0.09 − − − − − −
M68 − − − 0.08 0.01 − − 0.01 − −
M75 − − − 0.06 − − − − − −
M85 − − − − 0.04 − − − − −
M389 − − − − − 0.08 − − − −
M42 − − − − − 0.07 − − − −
M44 − − − − − − 0.81 − − −
M363 − − − − − − − 0.12 − −
M102 − − − − − − − 0.03 − −
M287 − − − − − − − 0.01 − −
M62 − − − − − − − − 0.19 −
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D Lexicon and ontology
Table D.3: Ontology of robot r0 in relation to the referents for which they have
been used. The weighted frequencies give the relative frequency that
a given meaning co-occurs with the particular referent.
C-B 0 1 2 3
M53 0.68 − − −
M55 0.10 − − −
M67 0.03 − − −
M169 0.03 − − −
M33 0.01 − 0.01 −
M128 0.01 − − −
M187 0.01 − − −
M43 0.01 0.01 − −
M46 0.01 − − −
M30 − 0.68 − −
M18 − 0.18 − −
M16 − 0.03 − −
M5 − − 0.45 −
M20 − − 0.21 −
M27 − − 0.13 −
M23 − − 0.03 −
M22 − − 0.03 −
M26 − − 0.02 −
M15 − − 0.02 −
M89 − − 0.02 −
M37 − − 0.01 −
M233 − − 0.01 −
M61 − − − 0.84
M58 − − − 0.08
M394 − − − 0.02
M90 − − − 0.01
M393 − − − 0.01
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Table D.4: Ontology of robot r1.
C-B 0 1 2 3
M4 0.70 − − −
M55 0.07 − − −
M65 0.05 − − −
M51 0.04 0.02 − −
M37 0.03 − − −
M39 − 0.58 − −
M81 − 0.17 − −
M13 − 0.06 − −
M96 − 0.03 − −
M94 − 0.02 − −
M16 − 0.01 − −
M1 − 0.01 − −
M0 − − 0.46 −
M22 − − 0.27 −
M75 − − 0.08 −
M78 − − 0.05 0.01
M44 − − − 0.73
M68 − − − 0.15
M40 − − − 0.03
M242 − − 0.05 −
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D Lexicon and ontology
Table D.5: Additional legend of meanings of robot r0. See also Table 4.4.
M15 (0.02, 0.31, 1.00, 0.02)1
M16 (0.02, 0.99, 0.30, 0.02)1
M17 (0.56, 0.99, 0.30, 0.02)1
M22 (0.02, 0.01, 1.00, 0.99)1
M23 (0.56, 0.31, 1.00, 0.44)1
M26 (0.02, 0.31, 1.00, 0.99)1
M33 (1.00, 0.99, 1.00, 0.99)1
M39 (1.00, 0.31, 1.00, 0.44)1
M43 (1.00, 0.99, 0.30, 0.02)1
M46 (1.00, 0.31, 0.30, 0.44)1
M89 (0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.00)4
M121 (1.00, 0.01, 0.30, 0.44)1
M128 (1.00, 0.01, 0.30, 0.02)1
M169 (1.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)2
M187 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)4
M211 (0.69, 1.00, 0.00, 0.00)2
M233 (0.00, 0.00, 1.00, 0.00)2
M238 (0.02, 0.99, 1.00, 0.99)1
M394 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.01)5
M484 (1.00, 0.99, 1.00, 0.44)1
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Table D.6: Legend of meanings of robot r1.
M0 (0.02, 0.02, 1.00, 0.01)1
M1 (0.02, 0.02, 0.46, 0.01)1
M4 (1.00, 0.02, 0.03, 0.01)1
M5 (0.31, 0.02, 1.00, 0.01)1
M13 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)3
M16 (0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.00)3
M21 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)5
M22 (0.02, 0.02, 1.00, 0.53)1
M37 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)4
M39 (0.02, 1.00, 0.03, 0.01)1
M40 (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)4
M42 (1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00)1
M44 (0.02, 0.02, 0.03, 1.00)1
M46 (1.00, 1.00, 0.46, 0.01)1
M51 (1.00, 1.00, 0.03, 0.01)1
M55 (1.00, 0.58, 0.03, 0.01)1
M62 (0.02, 1.00, 1.00, 0.53)1
M65 (1.00, 0.02, 0.03, 0.53)1
M68 (0.02, 0.02, 0.46, 1.00)1
M69 (0.02, 1.00, 1.00, 0.01)1
M75 (0.02, 0.58, 1.00, 0.01)1
M78 (0.02, 0.02, 1.00, 1.00)1
M81 (0.31, 1.00, 0.03, 0.01)1
M85 (0.31, 1.00, 0.46, 0.53)1
M91 (1.00, 1.00, 0.46, 1.00)1
M94 (0.02, 1.00, 0.46, 0.01)1
M96 (0.31, 1.00, 0.46, 0.01)1
M102 (0.02, 0.58, 1.00, 1.00)1
M242 (0.02, 0.58, 1.00, 0.53)1
M287 (0.01, 0.01, 0.00, 0.00)4
M363 (0.31, 0.02, 0.03, 1.00)1
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How mobile robots can
self-organise a vocabulary
One of the hardest problems in science is the symbol grounding problem,
a question that has intrigued philosophers and linguists for more than a
century. With the rise of artificial intelligence, the question has become
very actual, especially within the field of robotics. The problem is that an
agent, be it a robot or a human, perceives the world in analogue signals.
Yet humans have the ability to categorise the world in symbols that they,
for instance, may use for language.
This book presents a series of experiments in which two robots try to
solve the symbol grounding problem. The experiments are based on the
language game paradigm, and involve real mobile robots that are able
to develop a grounded lexicon about the objects that they can detect in
their world. Crucially, neither the lexicon nor the ontology of the robots
has been preprogrammed, so the experiments demonstrate how a popula-
tion of embodied language users can develop their own vocabularies from
scratch.
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